# MSDI Security K



### 1NC---K

#### The affirmative prioritizes cooperation with NATO, an institution formed as a military alliance and that functions as the West’s defender of a hegemonic international legal order. Threats are the glue that bind alliances together. The narrative of the 1AC sustains and perpetuates securitization.

Alexandra Gheciu First Published March 19, 2019 Article Commentary NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community doi.org/10.1177/0020702019834645 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020702019834645

In recent years, there has been renewed interest among International Relations (IR) scholars in the ability of the Western security community to protect itself from a variety of threats and challenges. In this context, longstanding debates concerning the role played by the organization that is widely regarded as the institutional expression of that community—NATO—have recently taken on new dimensions. Scholars and policymakers often disagree in their interpretations of the relative strength of NATO, but many agree that the alliance needs to play a central role in protecting the West from a mix of conventional and non-conventional dangers, ranging from an increasingly assertive Russia to transnational terrorism. One of the key assumptions underpinning many analyses is that NATO constitutes the institutional expression of a pre-existing Western security community united around liberal-democratic norms and values. However, a close reading of the alliance’s history shows that, far from simply representing a pre-given community, NATO has always been involved in constructing “the West.” At the heart of that process of social construction lie practices of collective (re)imagining of the Western world in specific ways, as well as the representation—and management of—internal tensions as feuds within a community united by shared liberal values. Today, the task of managing internal differences has been rendered particularly difficult by the rise of radical conservative political forces in several allied states. This has translated into a clash between liberal and illiberal interpretations of the Western security community, which has the potential to seriously complicate inter-allied relations in the foreseeable future. As this paper shows, contrary to conventional wisdom, middle powers have always played important roles in the constitution of the Western security community. More recently, they have also played significant roles in contesting liberal interpretations of the security community, and articulating an alternative, radical conservative vision of the West. Recent developments in allied countries such as Turkey and Poland are a potent reminder that not all middle powers are alike; on the contrary, based on their socially constructed, historically specific definitions of identity, they can perform a diversity of international roles—in support of, or, conversely, as obstacles to liberal internationalism. The narrative of Western unity and the politics of collective forgetting during the Cold War One of the most influential narratives of international security put forward by liberal IR scholars and practitioners centres on the Euro-Atlantic security community, consisting of a group of countries united around a set of key liberal norms and institutions that generate “dependable expectations” of peaceful resolution of conflicts that might arise among them.1 From that perspective, NATO is an institution that was created in the context of the Cold War to protect the pre-existing security community from the threats posed by the West’s dangerous other: the communist bloc. Yet, as a series of constructivist scholars have persuasively argued, there is nothing natural about the Western security community.2 In Emanuel Adler’s words, “security communities are socially constructed and rest on shared practical knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”3 Furthermore, the absence of violence should not lead us to conclude that the construction of security communities in general and the Western community in particular were power-free processes. On the contrary, as Adler and Barnett explain, central to the establishment of a security community is the dialectic between power—primarily symbolic power—and knowledge.4 Thus, in the physically non-violent context of security communities, power is primarily “the authority to determine the shared meanings that embody the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to goods and benefits.”5 Applying this logic to the specific case of NATO, we can see the alliance not as the institutional expression of a pre-given community, but, rather, as an organization that has been deeply involved in power-filled practices of construction and reproduction of that community.6 Historical evidence indicates that the founders of NATO—policymaking elites from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, France, and the Benelux states—did not take the Western security community for granted. Instead, they engaged in a systematic set of practices aimed at constructing a sense of community around a shared set of liberal-democratic norms in the Euro-Atlantic area, and placed the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the heart of those practices. In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded as less worrisome than the danger of communist subversion within the weakened societies of Western European states.7 In that context, as Louis St. Laurent—then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs—argued, the best way to prevent a third world war was by confronting “the forces of communist expansion with an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of freedom.”8 At the level of top Western political elites, the fear of communism inspired a collective (re)definition of political identity in the Euro-Atlantic area. The “spectre of Communism” provided the defining other against which decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were able to subordinate their differences to a collective definition of a Western community. That community was seen as based on the common heritage of political and cultural ideas of member states; its defining mark was the set of shared values of individual liberal freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy.9 This view is clearly reflected in the preamble to the Washington Treaty (NATO’s foundational treaty), which stipulates that the alliance is based on principles of democracy, individual liberty, and law.

#### And, security is a psychological construct---the aff’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other

Mack 91 – Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 \*Gender modified)

**The** **threat of nuclear annihilation** has stimulated us to try to **understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to** such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was **no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as** an **innately aggressive** animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to **explore the psychological roots of enmity** are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "**I can accept psychological explanations of things,** but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of **military and political power**, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat-**by distortions of perception**, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but **we have not learned to understand how** we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and **we are not taught to** think critically **about how** our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations **historical accuracy is the first victim**.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to **surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups**. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the **morality or consequences** of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. **It enables people en masse to** participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.

#### Our response is to interrogate the epistemological failures of the 1ac---this is a prerequisite to successful policy

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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

## Links

### Link---NATO

#### Cooperation with NATO perpetuates the logic of securitization – it’s the most successful military alliance in history – founded on the desire to construct and eliminate an enemy and preserve the values of western rule of law and democracy.

Akturan, et.al., 2018 Ozan Beran Akturan, Jordi Vasquez, Noah McLean, Aurore Tigerschiold, and Forrest Alonso Haydon NATO-EU Cooperation: Transatlantic Perspectives on Regional Security Issues 2018 https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/nato-eu-cooperation-transatlantic-perspectives-on-regional-security-issues/

Throughout history military alliances have formed to balance either countervailing power or the perceived threat thereof. They have collapsed when the need for a balance disappeared as a result of either power crumbling or threat perceptions changing. While the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can be found in its members’ perceived need to balance rising Soviet power in the aftermath of World War II, the collapse of Soviet imperial rule in the late 1980s did not lead to NATO’s demise. For that reason, NATO is often referred to as the most successful military alliance in history. Not only did it prove to be the key instrument in defending its members against Soviet attack or subversion and in helping to speed Soviet disintegration, the Atlantic Alliance survived and, at times, thrived in the decade since the disappearance of the Soviet threat robbed NATO of its main raison d'être. If success is measured by longevity, then NATO has rightly earned its historic designation. What accounts for NATO’s persistence? Three factors can be cited. First, in the immediate aftermath of Soviet imperial rule, few were ready to throw the Alliance overboard. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher remarked at the time, “You don’t cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries on your street in the last 12 months!”1 The need to hedge against an uncertain future was reflected in the new Alliance strategic concept, adopted in November 1991 by NATO Heads of State and Government just days before the Soviet collapse. This concept pointedly noted that the need to “preserve the strategic balance in Europe” would remain one of NATO’s four fundamental security tasks.2 Second, the Alliance has always meant more than providing a countervailing balance to Soviet power. To a considerable extent, NATO evolved into a community of like-minded states, united not just by their opposition to Soviet communism but also by their determination (as the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 stated) “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”3 Over time, NATO grew from being an alliance principally dedicated to protecting its members against military threat or attack into the principal NATO in the 21st century - 7 - Final – March 19, 2001 institutional expression of the transatlantic community of states and the western values that both defined and united them. Together, the NATO allies formed a viable, yet pluralistic security community, one where (with the possible exception of Greece and Turkey) the thought of settling any dispute among its members by the threat or use of force has been ruled out a priori. 4 That community remains as vibrant today as it did at the height of the cold war. Third, when the military organization was established in the early 1950s to give full expression to the collective defense commitment of the Washington Treaty, the basis was laid for a large bureaucracy, staffed by many thousands of people dedicated to the organization and its mission. While old soldiers may fade away, large organizations rarely do. After initially resisting the need to change, the NATO bureaucracy responded, like all such bureaucracies, by seeking to adapt its mission and structure in a manner relevant to its new environment. On the military side, internal adaptation has taken the form of a streamlined and more flexible command structure capable of deploying military forces rapidly and over greater distances than was the case during the cold war. Politically, the Alliance has sought new missions to retain its relevance – from peacekeeping to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the process, NATO has not only survived but been transformed into a politico-military entity that differs in many significant ways from the organization that stood ready to meet a Warsaw Pact tank assault across the Fulda Gap.

#### Cooperation with NATO symbolizes a commitment to a common western identity grounded in the logic of threat construction and securitization

Gabi Schlag Re-constituting NATO: Foundational Narratives of Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s. Uses of “the West”, 156–178. doi:10.1017/9781316717448.008 Print publication year: 2016

One could imagine that the saying ‘There is life in an old dog yet’ fits quite well for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many serious challenges threatened its cohesion, such as the Suez crisis in 1956, the disputes over the so-called double-track decision in 1979, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1993. While the history of the alliance has often been told as a history of crises (e.g. Stanley Hoffman, 1981), neither internal disputes over the war in Iraq nor the disappearance of a ‘communist threat’ have led to a break-up of NATO. The transatlantic alliance lives on. It has even expanded in size and tasks after the end of the Cold War. Recent tensions between ‘the West’ and Russia over Crimea and Ukraine make clear that the Atlantic alliance is anything but dead. As Stephen Walt put it: ‘NATO owes Putin a big thank-you’ (Walt, 2014). In International Relations (IR), debates on the Atlantic alliance have witnessed ups and downs as well. While realist, liberal, and institutionalist scholars strove to explain the existence and persistence of NATO by referring either to an alliance against threat (Walt, 1990, 1997), an alliance of democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1995, Risse, 1996), or a security manager (Wallander, 2000), other approaches have advocated a more critical and reflective understanding of the discourses and practices which constitute(d) the alliance in the first place (Klein, 1990; Bially Mattern, 2005; Behnke, 2013; Hellmann, 2006; Jackson 2003; Neumann and Williams, 2000; Pouliot, 2010; Adler, 2008). NATO’s lasting ability to overcome internal and external challenges to its cohesion, I will argue, directs our attention exactly to the discursive practices which enabled a continuous re-constitution of a Western security community. By re-constitution I refer to the Janus-faced process of activating and transforming foundational narratives which justify the existence and continuity of NATO. This process commonly includes constructions of threats and a sense of a shared identity which are both ingrained in symbolic orders and mobilized by articulations of a common security strategy. Of further interest, therefore, is how the allies answered the question why NATO should exist, how they invented and used a common notion of identity, interests, and threats in order to justify a deep and lasting pattern of military cooperation between North America and (Western) European states. Such a critical constructivist approach directs our attention to the political dynamics whereby a Western security community is invented in the first place instead of already presuming it as taken for granted (cf. Tilly, 1998; Bartelson, 2009; Herborth, 2009). It emphasizes that the practical usage of meaning imbues an act of political power with quite tremendous institutional consequences. Invented as a geopolitical community of solidarity in the early 1950s with a clear distinction of friends and enemies, NATO symbolized more than a classical military alliance. Compared to the ‘pledge’ of collective defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4 emphasized that the allies ‘will consult together whenever . . . the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’. Exactly this invocation of a political community made NATO’s evolution possible and enabled a smooth reorientation towards out-of-area missions and Eastern enlargement in the 1990s.

#### NATO was literally founded as a military alliance on principles of deterrence, prioritizing security and maximizing Western domination

Akturan, et.al., 2018 Ozan Beran Akturan, Jordi Vasquez, Noah McLean, Aurore Tigerschiold, and Forrest Alonso Haydon NATO-EU Cooperation: Transatlantic Perspectives on Regional Security Issues 2018 https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/nato-eu-cooperation-transatlantic-perspectives-on-regional-security-issues/

Introduction Born in critical times, developed over decades, and having weathered divisive conflicts, both NATO and the EU will soon enter a period of political uncertainty in terms of their cooperation. This article provides insight into the longevity and feasibility of cooperation initiatives by the EU and NATO by surveying both the bureaucratic and the strategic challenges faced. The inception of the European Union (EU) during the post Second World War era is perhaps the true starting point for analysing how transatlantic security cooperation adapted a self-sustaining and mutually reconcilable rationale. Winston Churchill’s [call](http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html) for supranational European solidarity — a call for a “United States of Europe” — in his 1946 Zurich speech was not only necessitated by strategic US forebodings during the prelude to the Cold War, but also by a maturing understanding of the requirements of international security on both sides of the Atlantic. With this call for unity in mind, European Coal and Steel Community was conceived to foster economic interdependence among its members. From there on it surpasses its original purpose in becoming a safeguard of common European values. The American counterpart, NATO, was formed on the foundational principle of collective defence and deterrence, and emerged as a military alliance with abundant economic and political interests. Historically, NATO has prioritised the military and security while the EU aimed for economic and developmental progress. However, similar to the EU, NATO is an organization with an ever increasing dedication to a common set of values, through which is seeks to ensure stabilization and peace. Although NATO operates on more militaristic grounds than the EU, the alliance has overhauled its solely military focus to envision a wider appreciation of values, including [transparency and accountability](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_111582.htm) as well as [women, science and environment for peace and security](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm). NATO and EU’s positions -what they want- and interests -why they want- have not always overlapped. For instance, NATO actions had been in parallel to maintaining American unipolarity in the global order contrasted with EU prioritizing the multiscale cooperation with its neighbors and other world powers, including China, Russia and India. Exemplified by disapproving European position of American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO’s non-regional interventions is [advised](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Report_8-What_do_Europeans_want_from_NATO_0.pdf) to be exceptions rather than a rule by EU Institute for Security Studies.

#### NATO is an integrated military structure highly trained and schooled in both overt and subtle security planning.

Celeste A. Wallander Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War Author(s): Source: International Organization , Autumn, 2000, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 705-735 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601379

The integrated command structure as a general asset is crucial to understanding why NATO-and not other institutions, such as the UN or the Western European Union (WEU)-can act for post-Cold War military missions in Europe. "NATO has the military structure: look at Kosovo. The UN failed in Bosnia: it can do certain kinds of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions very well. But military missions require command and control, so this means NATO. Military command is crucial to what NATO does well."77 NATO has the headquarters with planning, logis- tics, and intelligence staffs, including military personnel who have all planned, trained, exercised, and schooled together for years and developed a deep trust.78 "If, for example, NATO were just the Article 5 commitment without any of its assets, it would be the WEU. What made NATO possible in the 1990s was what was devel- oped in the Cold War to deal with the Soviet threat and the alliance's internal tasks. One official said that the OSCE was considered as a vehicle for dealing with Yugosla- via, but officials recognized what it could and could not do. The OSCE is best at establishing norms and standards for political and human rights. "We do not need NATO for every security issue, but we did need it to be able to react to the ones that were on the agenda in the 1990s."80 Why were NATO's military command structure and political decision-making pro- cedures general, rather than specific, assets? Because, observed a senior defense official, "through its political consultation, integrated military command, and organi- zations for implementation, NATO is able to do the three things that have to be done for any policy: mobilize, organize, and implement."'81 Although developed during the Cold War, these capacities translate into post-Cold War missions and are crucial for multilateral security missions. While those who value efficiency bemoan NATO's slowness, the official noted, NATO "is not for maximum efficiency, but for acting together."82 Another official, when asked why NATO has been able to adapt, an- swered that it is because all political-military missions require planning, and "during the Cold War, that is what NATO did."83 And another official answered that it is NATO that has the tools for action, listing the integrated military command, logistics, command-control-communication, and the structures for coming to a coherent and cohesive consensus, whereas the UN and the OSCE do not.84 The political issues of non-Article 5 missions make the process more difficult, he observed, but the plan- ning mechanism is basically the same: procedures for generating forces and readi- ness are on the books, the militaries understand them, and governments are accus- tomed to and ready for them. However, just as clearly as Bosnia demonstrated that NATO's political consulta- tion and integrated command structures were general assets that made it adaptable to the new security environment of risks and non-Article 5 conditions, it also demon-strated that NATO lacked important specific military assets for dealing with out-of- area non-Article 5 contingencies. The alliance's potential new military missions re- quire smaller, lighter, and mobile forces with expertise and training in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and peace enforcement, in stark contrast to the Cold War mission of positional defense. This process of creating post-Cold War specific military assets began both among members and in conjunction with Partnership for Peace.

#### NATO exists to solidify and react to perceived threats of danger to Western security.

GIORGIO CAFIERO April 23, 2022 The Russian Threat Gives NATO New Purpose https://politicstoday.org/the-russian-threat-gives-nato-new-purpose/

It was not long ago when NATO’s divisions were running deep. Until recently, many in the West were questioning the security alliance’s purpose. As a presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump said that if Baltic states weren’t “paying their bills” the U.S. shouldn’t necessarily protect them from Russia notwithstanding treaty obligations. In 2019, French President Emanuele Macron asserted that NATO was “becoming brain-dead”. The following year, tensions between Greece and Turkey led some experts to conclude that NATO was “paralyzed”. At that time, 70 percent of Turkey’s population saw the U.S., NATO’s dominant military force, as a threat to their country. Many voices in the West accused Germany of being a “shaky alliance partner” and “NATO’s biggest freeloader.” But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February was a geopolitical tsunami that fundamentally changed the strategic stakes for NATO members. Amid drastic changes in Europe’s security architecture, the Western alliance has regained a sense of purpose. Today NATO is more unified and cohesive than it ever has been since the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991. “Threat is the glue that binds together a security alliance,” explained John Feffer, the director of Foreign Policy In Focus, in an interview with Politics Today. “When the threat increases–and there is a consensus on the nature of the threat–the alliance necessarily becomes more cohesive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has served to smooth over a number of disagreements within the alliance.” The Ankara-based Foreign Policy Institute’s Dr Tarik Oguzlu [wrote](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-natos-impasse-in-the-ukraine-russia-war/2563261) that “as we witness NATO’s European members awaking from their geopolitical hibernation, NATO is almost returning to its founding mission.” The war in Ukraine quickly led to a “revolution in German military affairs” with Berlin now committed to a hike in defense spending. The Germans put Nord Stream 2 pipeline on hold. Berlin is also arming the Ukrainian resistance with lethal weapons despite previously opposing NATO’s militarization of Ukraine. For decades, a handful of Western countries accused Italy of being too Russia-friendly. But for the past two months, Italy has taken a strong stance against Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Now closely aligned with the Transatlantic alliance against Moscow, Rome has supported sanctioning Russia. As Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi put it, Italy responded to the President of Ukraine’s appeal for weapons because “it’s not possible to respond only with encouragement” when a democratic country comes under attack. Talk in western capitals about kicking Turkey out of NATO has basically come to a sudden end. There has been somewhat of a rebound in Ankara-Washington relations as Turkey arms Kiev with Baykar TB2 drones. Based on shared concerns about Moscow’s conduct in Ukraine, Greece and Turkey have found common cause since 24 February. NATO’s Baltic members have long been far more alarmist about the Russian threat than those in Western Europe. But such East-West divisions within NATO are going away. “Western politicians are now saying to us, you were right,” Arvydas Anušauskas, Lithuania’s Minister of National Defence, [told](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thVCPFcHpNs) Al Jazeera. Since 24 February, NATO members “have rallied together and acted quickly with new defence and deterrence measures such as activating the NATO defence plans, activating elements of the NATO Response Force, and approving the deployment of four new multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe,” Mihai Chihaia, a policy analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre, told Politics Today. “Reinforcing the Eastern flank has been a top priority and the Allies have shown a very high degree of solidarity. In addition, the strong commitment to Article 5 (mutual defense) has been constantly reiterated.” NATO is not only becoming more unified because of a growing common threat perception of Russia. The security alliance might be on the verge of expanding its membership. Sweden and Finland appear close to abandoning their decades-old foreign policy tradition of neutrality and entering NATO. Finland doing so would add [810 miles](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finns-living-near-border-watch-russia-warily-recall-dark-past-2022-04-14/) to the border between Russia and NATO members.

#### NATO is premised on western imperialism and means all their authors assume a cold war mindset that causes perpetual war

Andreas Behnke, Lecturer, International Relations Group that gathers the enormous and varied expertise on international politics and strategy in the Department of Politics and IR, MA (Mainz), PhD (Stockholm), 2000, 'Inscriptions of Imperial Order. NATO's Mediterranean Initiative', *International Journal of Peace Studies* 5(1), 61-83,

Discussions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) role after the end of the cold war predominantly focus on its adaptation to the new security environment, the redefinition of its mission and the transformation of its military and political structures (Gordon, 1997; Kay, 1998; Yost, 1998). While this kind of literature is valuable in its own right, its underlying assumption about the adaptive logic of NATO's post-cold war policies tends to underrate the ability of the Alliance to actively shape the security environment through its discursive construction of security political 'realities' and the re-presentation of its institutional identity. At the same time, this literature arguably underestimates the task confronting NATO. The collapse of the cold war order does not only pose a problem to NATO in terms of adapting to a new reality, the features of which are are supposedly as clearly discernable as the ones of the cold war itself. Rather, its demise challenges NATO (and other international actors and institutions) to articulate new and stable 'structures of meaning' which can render "the unfamilar in the terms of the familiar" (Campbell, 1992:4) and which make it possible to re-assume political and military-strategic agency. The purpose of this essay is to analyze the way in which NATO is responding to these challenges. More specifically, it addresses the problem of the Alliance's 'Western' identity and the strategies of inclusion and exclusion through which this identity is re-defined and re-asserted after the disappearence of the constitutive Other of the cold war, that is, the Communist 'East'. At the same time, the essay deals with NATO's search for new adversaries and threats. These two issues, while often treated separately in the literature, are in fact closely related. As Owen Harries (1993:42) pointed out some years ago, The political 'West' is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 'East' to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy. We need not take Harries' skepticism at face value in order to appreciate the problematization of what the West actually is. Suffice it to state that matters of identity are intrinsically related to the problem of difference and adversity. The articulation of a Western identity, Harries' argument suggests, was made possible, and depended upon the presence of a hostile 'East'. As Bradley Klein (1994:120-21) has argued, this presence has allowed NATO to prevail and survive the many crises and internal conflicts amongst its member-states. Already in the 1960s, Henry Kissinger analyzed the effects of détente on alliance cohesion in terms that anticipate to some extent the troubles NATO would face some 30 years later after the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. As the détente develops, the need to transform the Alliance from its present defensive concept into a political arrangement defining itself by some positive goals will grow ever more urgent. Defense against a military threat will soon lose its force as a political bond. Negotiations with the East will prove corrosive unless they go hand in hand with the creation of common political purposes and the institutions to embody them (Kissinger, 1965:10). In other words, in the absence of a 'life-threatening' adversary, the West runs the danger of disintegrating and dissolving. That NATO was able to avoid this fate for forty years supports Klein's (1994:121) contention that the alliance strength rested on its ability to wed itself "to the defense of a distinctly modern, Western, Atlantocentric cultural project" which made it possible to deflect and externalize its internal contradictions and conflicts. If we acknowledge this internal relationship between (stable) identity and (hostile) difference, we can appreciate the paradox that the end of the cold war presented a much more serious threat to NATO than the East-West confrontation ever did. For the end of the cold war also means that the unraveling of Cold War representations has raised for the first time the fundamental issue of Western identity. It is no longer clear who is to be legitimately incorporated within the space of modern Western culture. ... Simply put the world under NATO's guidance is no longer subject to containment. It's boundaries have now been eroded... (Klein, 1994:133). Consequently, the West faces the problem of 'self-determination', of defining its identity and its borders against the rest of the world. Self-determination is usually assumed to contribute to peace in the international system. Thus, the United Nations (UN) Charter states in Article 1, paragraph 2 as one of its purposes, To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

### Link---BioD

#### Depictions of a pristine biodiversity ignoring the un-ending violence caused by the west – their attempts to maintain Bio – D are not for protection but further surveillance and exploitation

Timothy W. Luke, Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1997, Ecocritique, p. 65-69

Until the early 1970s, TNC adhered to many essentially romantic as­sumptions about Nature in its various operations. Nature existed as a real presence in places left undisturbed by human beings.27 At such sites, therefore, all plants and animals embodied Nature’s substance, and as such they were all worthy of protection. Therefore, acquiring any and all land that was not now being touched by some human settlement’s eco­nomic and social activity constituted a meaningful act of Nature conser­vation. The battle lines were drawn across territories understood as land under active current social utilization (or artificial zones without a large Nature presence) and land no longer or not yet put to such use (or natu­ral zones without a large social presence), making it, therefore, worthy as a site of Nature conservancy. At some point in the 1960s and 1970s, these discursive frames be­came obsolete, even though many people today inside and outside of the environmental movement do not recognize their obsolescence. Bill McKibben and Carolyn Merchant, to a very real extent, are right.28 Nature has ended. Nature is dead. Perhaps it was the conquest of extraterrestrial spaces in the moon landings of 1969—70, whose tele­visual and photographic images of the Earth sublated conceptual an­tinomies like Nature/Society, out-there/in-here, wilderness/settlement, and environment/economy in pictures of one undifferentiated little blue planet floating in space. Perhaps it was the penetration of trans­national capitalism even into Moscow and Beijing during Nixon’s detente, whose acceptance of Pepsi, Kentucky Fried Chicken, or Pan Am passengers underscored how commercial commodities now could go anywhere anytime anyone wished them to do so. Perhaps it was the collective shudder of the 1971—73 oil shocks from OPEC, whose antics illustrated how tightly coupled all human societies were to petrochemical energy supplies mostly pumped up from under a hand­ful of Mideastern deserts. The brittleness in the traditional categories, pitting “Nature” against “Society,” finally snapped. There really were no lands without any traces of some large social presence. Hundreds of individual plants and animals were not merely being disturbed by humanity; they were being eradi­cated as species in wholesale extinctions. Scientific observations of air quality, water quality, atmospheric integrity, bone composition, or milk production were indicating that human beings have profoundly dis­turbed what had been regarded as unalterable sovereign Nature with in­dustrial pollution, greenhouse gases, chemical contamination, and radio­active wastes. Hence, to pretend to be conserving “the untouched and undisturbed expanses of Nature” in simple actions of land ownership made very little sense. Nature, as it had been conceptualized by the Ecologist’s Union in 1945 for The Nature Conservancy to preserve after 1951, had been disappearing right from under everyone’s noses as global modernization accelerated at even greater rates from 1945 to 1973. Once-undisturbed lands could no longer be regarded as the container of Na­ture as such, they had to be continuously reassessed to determine their ecological values, creating the space of surveillance, as chapters 4 and 5 argue, known as “the environment.”29 From 1951 to 1973, TNC did have a decidedly scientific air about its operations, even though with its haphazard policies of property acquisi­tion the organization still worked as a land collection program to pre­serve scenic beauty, rare plants, and wild animals on whatever land it would get whenever it could get it. Low-key and nonconfrontarional, The Nature Conservancy’s style of environmental protection had been fairly cozy with big business from the beginning. Under the leadership of Pat Noonan from 1973 to 1980, however, this almost accidental prece­dent was turned into an article of faith. During the intensive environ­mental conflicts of the early 1970s, as Noonan notes, “corporations and environmentalists were butting heads, but we knew the free-enterprise system was a fantastic motivator. So the Conservancy decided to reach out to corporate America. No other environmental group was doing it.” This operational strategy was augmented with a new mission state­ment from Bob Jenkins, The Nature Conservancy’s in-house biologist. Dissatisfied with the Conservancy’s acceptance of land with dubious ecological worth, although it often appeared to be undisturbed as natu­ral scenery, Jenkins saw biodiversity rather than natural appearance as that quality which TNC should be preserving.31 Instead of protecting any and all land that it acquired, Jenkins’s strategy stressed preserving only those lands populated by rare or endangered flora and fauna in unique ecosystems. Scientific surveillance was combined with high-test property management to give TNC a much clearer purpose. Noonan’s acceptance of corporate free enterprise and Jenkins’s agen­das for surveying, inventorying, and guarding biotic diversity recentered The Nature Conservancy’s ideologies and institutions on the strategies they continue to follow today. Grove concludes: The Nature Conservancy would henceforth seek out and attempt to save species and biotic communities that stood in danger of disappearing under human pressures. It would buy land when necessary, but to cut down on management and overhead costs, property was often turned over whenever possible to responsible federal and state agen­cies for protection. Further, TNC would decentralize, establishing state field offices that could keep closer watch on the land. Coinciding with its new focus, the national staff grew out of its basement quarters in Washington and moved just across the Potomac River into a high rise office building in Rosslyn, Virginia. Emerging as well in the months and years that followed were the practical arguments for maintaining biotic diversity. . . . Although morals and aesthetics still apply, the emphasis turned to “save this plant because we may need it someday” instead of “save this plant because we have no right to kill it.” Over the past two decades, TNC has grown by leaps and bounds by sticking to the operating objectives in this “preserving biodiversity” mis­sion statement. Because Nature has ended, material signs of its now-dead substance need to be conserved as pristine preserved parts, like pressed leaves in a book, dried animal pelts in a drawer, or a loved one’s mortal remains in a tomb. Nature is dead, but long shall Nature live in the environmental­ized forms of rare species, exotic biodiversity, land preserves, and threat­ened ecosystems. As powerful anthropogenic actions have recontoured the earth to suit the basic material needs of corporate modes of produc­tion, these artificial contours now define new ecologies for all life forms caught within their “economy” and “environment.” The “economy” be­comes a world political economy’s interior spaces defined by techno­science processes devoted to production and consumption, while “the environment,” in this sense, becomes a planetary political economy’s ex­terior spaces oriented to resource creation, scenery provision, and waste reception. The pickets and suits deployed by other more vocal ecological groups perpetuate a faulty one-dimensional consciousness, “believing that environmental protection and economic growth are somehow mu­tually exclusive.”33 These antiquated perceptions cling to the illusion that Nature is alive, and somehow avoiding its subjection to capital in the commodity form by remaining wilderness. Recognizing the true to­tality of transnational capital’s power, which easily commodifies wilder­ness in many environmental products, the goal of “The Nature Conser­vancy is to change this unfortunate perception,” because, as anyone at­tentive to capital’s dynamics can attest, “our economy and environment are not antagonists, they depend on each other. ... protecting our natu­ral resources generates economic benefits.”34 Natural resources exist, but Nature does not. Economic survival is imperative, but the commodity logics driving it need to be grounded in sound ecological common sense lest the limitless dynamism of com­modification be permitted to submit everything to exchange logics im­mediately. Time is now what is both scarce and centrally important in the highly compressed time-space continua of contemporary commod­ity chains. It is no longer a question of jobs versus the environment, be­cause fewer jobs will not resurrect Nature. Nature is dead, and the envi­ronment generating global production assumes that jobs are necessary to define it as the space of natural resources. Doing jobs irrationally and too rapidly, however, is what destroys these environments, making jobs done rationally and at an apt pace ecologically acceptable. Consequently, the agendas of environmental protection must center on the “question of the short-term vs. the long-term,” and this is “what the Conservancy is all about.”35

### Link---Bioterror

#### Bioterror discourse is imagined, and leads to war

Kittelsen, 9 – Researcher for the Security programme @ the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (Sonja, “Conceptualizing Biorisk: Dread Risk and the Threat of Bioterrorism in Europe,” Security Dialogue vol. 40, no. 1, February)

The dread that the prospect of bioterrorism elicits thus not only compounds the distinction between actual and imagined threat, but also challenges the conventional spatio-temporal relationship between ‘threat’ and ‘security’, in that it reinforces a sense of imminence and pervasiveness of possible attack. Its imperceptible nature means that insecurity can exist independent of an actual attack occurring, the mere threat of infection and contagion carrying the capacity to evoke a heightened sense of fear long before and well after an attack has been identified as ever having taken place. In the absence of fact about a threat that deliberately evades detection, the demand on governments to act proactively has become all the more salient, and providing for security has taken a precautionary turn. Strategies aimed at mitigating the threat of bioterrorism have thus involved attempts at delineating security through spatio-temporal techniques that involve intervening in the present in order to avoid the potential for serious and irreversible damage in the future. They constitute an attempt at rearticulating the boundary between ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’ space through the active act of anticipation. Inherent in such an anticipatory logic, however, is an in-built vulnerability, in that this logic is necessarily informed by the subjective insecurities that the threat of bioterrorism elicits. It simultaneously functions within and constitutes a product of the dread that the threat of bioterrorism evokes, and accordingly does not so much serve to reduce the threat of bioterrorism as it serves to mitigate the effects of what is considered an inevitable occurrence. It there- by runs the risk of perpetuating insecurity to the extent that it facilitates threat through its enactment. Engaging with the threat of bioterrorism, then, neces- sarily requires recognizing how the same logic that informs the dread that bioterrorism elicits also serves to inform the security practices pursued to confront it. Just as the molecular body is no longer conceptualized as a unified whole, so too is Europe less a self-contained entity than a site of circulation and exchange. Mitigating the threat of bioåterrorism, then, necessitates explor- ing the ways in which security practices and perceptions of threat interact with each other and with the more tangible aspects of the threat of bioterror- ism to make Europe not only vulnerable to biological insecurity, but also a producer and perpetuator of it. This article argues that it is by conceptualizing bioterrorism through the notion of ‘dread risk’ that this self-perpetuation of vulnerability and threat can be exposed and the necessary inroads provided by which to engage more critically with the threat of bioterrorism, its produc- tion and perpetuation, as well as with the constitution of ‘security’ itself.

### Link---China Rise

#### Rhetoric of China being bad spreads disinformation

Gregory Kulacki, 9-21-2012, “*The Risk of Nuclear War with China*,” Huffington Post, <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/gregory-kulacki/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-w_b_1903336.html>, China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. ZKMSU

On the edges of the official competition, misanthropes in both nations spread sensational and frightening disinformation that poisons public discussion, making steps towards dialog and cooperation more difficult for political leaders to take. In the face of growing strategic distrust, neither government seems willing to accept the risks for peace that are necessary to minimize the risks of war, which, while still small, continue to grow.

#### The aff’s rhetoric of China as the enemy is telling of a self-fulfilling prophecy of societal failure in the US

Niv Horesh and Lim Kean Fan, May 2017, “*The "China Model" as a Complicated Developmental Trope*,” Project Muse, China: An International Journal, vol. 15 no. 2 pg. 166-176, muse.jhu.edu/article/661224, Niv Horesh (Niv.Horesh@durham.ac.uk, corresponding author) is Visiting Professor in China Studies at the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, United Kingdom. He obtained his PhD in East Asian Studies from the Australian National University. His primary research interests include the world history of money, Shanghai's rise to prominence, foreign policy of the People's Republic of China and the East Asian developmental state model. Lim Kean Fan (keanfan.lim@nottingham.ac.uk) is Assistant Professor in Economic Geography at the School of Geography, the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom. He obtained his PhD in Economic Geography from the University of British Columbia. His primary research examines the relationship between place-specific policy experimentation and the structural coherence of the Chinese political economy. ZKMSU

Commentator Joshua Ramo had famously lumped various threads of narrative under the rubric of “Beijing Consensus”. Subsequently, that narrative took on new dimensions, both in China and abroad, countervailing along the way the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as the organs behind globalising Anglo–American neo-liberal discourse (“Washington Consensus”).12 Then, why has Beijing’s narrative attracted so much attention if the Chinese experience is in reality so hard to define? It can be attributed mainly to an emergent insecurity among policymakers and the intelligentsia in Western Europe and North America about the validity of their own social and political values, and the salubrity of their own societies. Evidence to that effect can be found not merely in Brook’s litanies about the loss of American dynamism and the bumbling of the Barack Obama administration. More importantly, a growing body of academic literature has accumulated over the last few years to underscore how grossly unequally distributed income has become in the West. Many economists, not just on the far left, now indict the Ronald Reagan– Margaret Thatcher project of neo-liberalism for reversing the great post-war baby boomers’ march towards equal opportunity. Inequality seers like Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas Picketty or Luigi Zingales may not necessarily agree about the health of the Chinese economy per se, but they certainly share a platform when it comes to inveighing against the godfathers of financial deregulation, which they see as the underlying cause of America’s post-2008 recession.13 To be sure, there has always been critical interest among American academe in the failings of the “system”, and in democratic “optimisation” of economic outcomes. Buchanan and Tullock’s pioneering 1962 work on public choice is a case in point. They sought a free-market-friendly mathematical formula that would curb the ability of vested-interest groups to bypass the will of the silent majority through, for example, “pork-barrelling” swing voters or “lobbying” career politicians. However, in the 1960s, even studies such as Buchanan and Tullock’s were informed by the “genius” of America’s founding fathers and its 1787 Constitution,14 whereas many commentators of different partisan persuasions today view the Constitution itself, if not the Union’s whole political architecture, as anachronistic and unfit for the purpose in that they paralyse decisionmaking in Washington.15 In search of new answers, the insecurity premise, as discussed earlier, has resurrected interest in the once-marginalised, “heterodox” economic theories, ranging from Mancur Olson, Hyman Minsky, Wolf Ladejinsky, Karl Polanyi to John K. Galbraith. All heterodox thinkers shared, in their time, deep-seated suspicion of the ability of free markets or representative democracy for that matter, to pre-empt the harbingers of resource misallocation. In other words, they rejected in one way or another neoclassical economic theory. As has been argued elsewhere, this disillusionment with neoclassical diktat has also led to renewed interest in the lessons that economic history, economic sociology and new institutional economics might offer, thus revitalising these three disciplines.16 Recent historically informed work by economists is now almost de rigueur and has gone well beyond the left-leaning circles. Taking issue with the root causes of the 2008 global financial crisis, such work—ranging from Reinhart and Rogoff’s rightleaning This Time is Different to Acemoglu and Robinson’s more centrist Why Nations Fail—harks back to several centuries earlier in its temporal scope. At the same time, older work by contrarian economic historians and economists that has been somewhat neglected in the 1980s, when neo-liberalism was fast advancing, found new readers among conventionally trained economists—from Paul Bairoch, Chalmers Johnston to Alice Amsden. Also, authors outside academe like Joe Studwell draw on that onceneglected work and converge on the view that the East Asian experience belies neoliberalism and exposes the small-government biases thereof.17 Freshly published, Studwell’s path-breaking and quantitatively-compelling research in economic history is further validating his insights. Allen and Lind have both respectively shown, for example, that unfree-market, big-government designs had not only typified the East Asian path to industrialisation. In fact, such grand design could also be attributed to America’s rise in the early 19th century. Baldly put, Allen, Lind and others argue that wealthier countries start preaching to poorer countries about the need for free trade (read: reduce tariffs designed to protect nascent industries) and the need to reduce government size (read: allow foreigners to buy out vital sectors of the national economy) only after they themselves had completed industrialisation on the back of very protectionist measures.18 For these reasons, the human rights discourse in the modern developed world is critiqued by scholars like Noam Chomsky, Daniel A. Bell and Martin Jacques as a values-laden, ahistorical sugarcoating of what is, in essence, crude economic interests of/in advanced capitalist countries. Much like “free markets” in neoclassical parlance, human rights are conceived of as bringing about immediate betterment of the human condition irrespective of time and place, whereas in the Chinese narrative “individual” rights and “markets” are both viewed as contingent on “collective will” and on evolutionary social reform. Yet, as Stiglitz alluded to, the wealthier “collectivist” China becomes, the harder it is to shrug off its affinity with the “individualistic” United States. While, on the right, some Western critics still cling to democracy-vs.-tyranny binary, and on the left, some critics starkly posit the American neo-imperialism vs. China’s “peaceful rise” thesis, both contending powers are in fact experiencing flagrantly unequal wealth distribution—they are both big polluters, big military spenders, capital-punishment enthusiasts; and they also incarcerate big segments of their population.19 Perhaps more importantly, not only are their logics of socio-economic regulation increasingly more similar to each other, they are now more economically interdependent than at any other point in history.20 Much of the self-doubt in America as well as the newfound interest in institutional economics, have, after all, to do with the fact that the “one man, one vote” system proved incapable of stalling the reversal of the post-war social contract in the West, which had in turn stamped out the spread of communism. Ironically, as Picketty poignantly shows, once the spectre of communism had diminished, inequality exploded.21 Recent works are very important in this context because they show—based on independently gathered polling data—that the absence of “one man, one vote” in China is not yet costing the CPC much popular support. Peerenboom, in particular, does much to dispel the fairly common Western notion that the peoples of the developing world would prefer a greater degree of democracy and social equality to raising of living standards in absolute terms.22 The argument, to be sure, might hold well beyond China. It specifically brings to mind Latin America: while that part of the world democratised relatively recently, in some cases following decades of oppressive dictatorship, most Latin Americans still seem to prize economic performance over universal suffrage. Moreover, a few democratically elected Latin American governments have arguably taken social inequality well beyond the norm under their dictatorial predecessors.23 US-based academics like Pei Minxin and Huang Yasheng often invoke India by way of an inspiration for the developing world that is alternative to the “China Model”; one that is more democratic and therefore one that would prove more economically compelling in the long run.24 After all, India is the biggest and one of the longestrunning democracies in Asia. However, as Drèze and Sen’s work indicates, the fact that the Gini coefficient for supposedly-communist China may now be higher than that of India conceals the tough everyday realities that the overwhelmingly rural populations of either country face. For Drèze and Sen, perhaps more instructive is the fact that Chinese economic reforms of the last three decades did not whittle away at arable land distribution. In India, by way of contrast, arable land distribution remains badly skewed despite Nehru’s socialist legacy.25 What this points to, then, is the need for any transfers of concrete policies and regulatory ideologies—in particular that of the supposedly superior neoliberal reason—to be contextually and historically grounded.

#### The fear of China as the Other in their rise is a self-fulfilling prophecy that takes out the aff

Chengxin Pan, 2012, “*Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics*,” Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., pg. 84-86, Pan is the Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University. ZKMSU

WHAT’S THE COST OF IMAGINING AN ENEMY? In Charles Frazier’s award-winning novel Cold Mountain, the male protagonist Inman, a badly wounded soldier running away from the bloody battlefield during the American Civil War, meets a blind street vendor. Similar to his own wounds, someone must have been responsible for his blindness, Inman wonders. To Inman’s surprise, however, the street vendor says he was actually born that way. Looking at his terrible wounds at the hands of known enemies, Inman somehow starts to pity that blind man. ‘For how did you find someone to hate for a thing that just was? What would be the cost of not having an enemy? Who could you strike for retribution other than yourself?’3 A self-fulfilling prophecy 85 As he quickly flips through these questions in his mind, suddenly Inman begins feeling lucky—at least he knows his enemy. To that blind man, knowing no enemy denies him that precious sense of certainty or a clear target for revenge. With his known enemy, the lucky Inman is in good company. In many ways, the military-industrial complex finds itself in a similar situation, but its lucky star is the perceived certain threat of China. Without knowing this threat, the high-level military spending would be difficult to justify, and without that military spending, the political economy of fear could not function properly, nor could military Keynesianism continue to flourish. This is why Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and former Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department, observes that having survived decades of the Soviet challenge, containment might not be able to survive its own success. 4 While the lack of an enemy—real or imagined—appears costly indeed for the discursive identity and institutional ‘survival’ of the militaryindustrial complex, I contend that having an enemy, even an imagined one, is by no means cost-free. In fact, in the case of China, it could be very costly in that the construction and treatment of China as a threat could result in China becoming one in reality. In other words, the cost lies in the fact that the ‘China threat’ paradigm could become self-fulfilling in practice. To the military-industrial complex, the absence of a threat/enemy constitutes an ultimate threat. A self-fulfilling prophecy, according to American sociologist Robert Merton, means that ‘a false definition of the situation which makes the originally false conception come true’.5 What is ‘false’ in hindsight or in the eyes of a bystander is frequently defined as real by the actor in question; and ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. 6 In international relations, fear, often based on ‘false’ images, can have precisely such self-fulfilling consequences. Thucydides, the author of a realist ‘great text’ History of the Peloponnesian War, noted a self-fulfilling prophecy of fear in interstate politics. In his account for the war’s outbreak, Thucydides suggested that ‘What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta’.7 More than two millennia later, another realist scholar-practitioner, George Kennan ascribed the origin of the Cold War to the paranoid ideology of the Soviet Union.8 If so, the fear manifested in the ‘China threat’ paradigm could also become confirmed in reality. Two interrelated processes are at play here. First, the ‘China threat’ paradigm, taken as objective truth, would imply the need for containing China in practice. Second, such practice, given the logic of mutual responsiveness, is more likely than not to be mirrored back by China in either symmetric or asymmetric ways. As the latter’s hardline mimicry apparently ‘confirms’ the initial fear of the China threat, what we are witnessing is a classic case of self-fulfilling prophecy.

#### The fear of China comes from a neocolonial desire – such rhetoric is made to produce an economy of fear causing ontological death

Chengxin Pan, 2012, “*Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics*,” Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., pg. 66-69, Pan is the Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University. ZKMSU

The twin paradigms of China threat and China opportunity are animated by Western/American neocolonial desire. Their constructions of self and Other are not merely discursive in nature, but have political and strategic consequences. Rather than divorced from power, they are always in the service of power and at the same time (re)produced by it through the political economies of fear and fantasy. How knowledge, desire, and power interact in the cases of these China paradigms will be the focus of Chapters 4-7. Thus far, scholarly analysis of Western representations of China has tended to treat those representations merely as knowledge, which is then empirically evaluated against so-called ‘objective facts’ in China. Depending on whether they are thought to match Chinese reality or not, they are labelled either ‘truth’, ‘misrepresentations’, or something in between. But this empirically-grounded approach misses a crucial point. That is, it leaves intact and unquestioned the complicity of China knowledge in power relations. What is needed, therefore, is a critical examination of the power/knowledge nexus in the two modes of China representation. How the ‘China threat’ paradigm relates to the political economy of fear and informs political practice is the focus of this and the following chapter. And Chapters 6 and 7 will deal with the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm. To better understand the dynamics of power/knowledge/desire in the ‘China threat’ paradigm, we need to recognise this paradigm for what I think it is, namely, a particular form of desire—fear—disguised as certain knowledge. Fear, it may be argued, is primarily a biological instinct inherent in probably all animals that are both capable of fear and have experienced such an emotion. And yet, in the human context at least, fear is as much a sociocultural phenomenon as it is a natural, biological reflex. This is because most forms of fear in modern society are not experienced directly through actual physical encounters, but rather are created, mediated, maintained and reinforced through often-institutionalised knowledge resources such as images, symbols, metaphors and, above all, discourses. Sometimes referred to as ‘prevailing danger codes’, those knowledge resources serve as ‘an extremely dense layer of mediation between what one might be advised to fear… and what one’s moment-to-moment experience appears to be’.3 In a study of the politics of fear in the media, David Altheide argues that fear ‘did not just happen or emerge’ from uncertainty, the lack of community or a sense of lack of control over our lives; rather, it is largely produced and reproduced through ‘the entertainment formats of mass media and popular culture’. Only through coming to grips with this culturally-mediated dimension of fear, can we better understand why one’s sense of fear is often not directly or proportionally linked to the object of that fear. 4 In fact, quite often the opposite is true. For instance, Altheide points to the paradox that ‘there is widespread public perception [in the West] that risk and danger are everywhere, that we are not safe, and that the future is bleak’, even though most in Western societies ‘are safer, healthier, living longer, and more secure in their environments than virtually any population in history’.5 How is such a strange ‘surplus’ of fear produced and consumed in an otherwise reasonably safe and wealthy society? Michael Shapiro suggests that the increased level of popular representation in the political process has not been matched by a similar increase in people’s ability to represent safety and danger as they find them in their daily lives. 6 Rather, just as more and more supermarket products nowadays are no longer made locally, so too the ‘commodity’ of fear is increasingly outsourced from elsewhere, manufactured and packaged as knowledge by all sorts of security, intelligence, health and environment experts. And just as consumers part company with their money in exchange for whatever fantasies are evoked by commercial advertisements, consumers of fear surrender their power to scaremongering experts and political leaders, in exchange for the promised certainty and security. In return, through their knowledge of danger and threat, those experts and politicians gain trust, power, and the ability to influence others to behave in ways that meet their expectations. In this way, whatever form of knowledge that can effectively tap into fear and constantly reproduce it is, without doubt, ideally placed to serve power and enforce discipline. Little wonder that the discursive production of fear and threat has been a fixture in modern-day politics. In Australia, no recent federal elections were complete without some forms of politics of fear at play in the political campaigns, be it about ‘boat people’, terrorism, workers’ rights or even interest rates. Of course, fear is not always an undesirable element in politics and social life. Moïse argues that ‘an element of fear is an indispensable protection against the danger of overconfidence. Fear is a force for survival in a naturally dangerous world’.7 The ‘China threat’ paradigm should be understood in this broad context. This paradigm does not reflect a pre-existing sense of fear about a menace ‘out there’, but rather is a discursive site where such fear is first constructed and where a particular form of political economy of fear emerges. With a specific focus on the US, this chapter will examine how the China threat knowledge, which gives the popular fear of China an aura of objective credibility, serves the political and economic interests of the power elite, and is at the same time shaped by those interests. However, when fear is systematically deployed in politics, it is worth asking whose interests this fear politics intends to serve and how such fear is produced and for what purposes. THE CHINA THREAT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEAR The political economy of fear has been a much-cherished ingredient in statecraft for millennia. ‘Let them hate as long as they fear’, the Roman emperor Caligula once proclaimed. ‘[I]t is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both’, admonished Machiavelli in The Prince. 8 Thus, Robert Higgs argues that fear is a foundation of every government’s power: ‘Without popular fear, no government could endure for more than twenty-four hours’.9 While the state has traditionally relied on such visible instruments of fear as the army, the police, the legal system, and the prison to maintain discipline in a society, it has also resorted to a less visible instrument: the discursive production of fear. One particularly fertile ground for such fearrelated knowledge production has been the realm of international relations, where the objects of fear appear plentiful. The French political philosopher Jean Bodin observed that ‘the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is… to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause’.10 Similarly, Adam Smith examined in The Wealth of Nations how a government could use the nation’s anxiety for security to induce its citizens to agree to a new tax which otherwise they would probably resent.11 It is in this context that the fear of the China threat has been a recurring feature in American politics in general and during the presidential and congressional midterm elections in particular. During the 2010 midterm elections, for instance, New York Times reported that in a space of just one week, at least 29 candidates from both sides of politics unveiled advertisements accusing their opponents of being soft on China, with the undertone that China had been the chief villain for current American economic woes. Such is the political economic use of fear especially when it is disguised as scientific knowledge.

#### Prior commitment to Chinese threat perception makes their impacts inevitable –commitments to war collapse chances at peace

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 141-142

These are some of the questions in the minds of Western/American strategic analysts, who are wondering how to maintain U.S. preponderance in a world of anarchy and uncertainty. The conservative realist Samuel Huntington asks: “If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?” Obsessed with this self-imagery, many scholars and policy planners have been keen to reinvoke the timeless, structural certainty of geopolitical rivalry, and to embrace the ‘back to the future’ scenario, maintaining that despite the dawn of the post-Cold War period little has changed—the world remains a dangerous, volatile place. With such searching eyes for an enemy, it would be surprising if China failed to come into view. Indeed, China makes a perfect candidate, in that “China remains the major source of uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific.” That is, not only do the implications of its economic transformation and military ambition remain unclear, but the resilience of the Communist government even after its roundly condemned Tiananmen suppression seems also to fly in the face of the ‘End of History’ triumphalism. Consequently, (and before September 11), the only major certainty coming out of the post-Cold War era seems to be an unpredictable and dangerous China. From the beginning, this ‘China threat,’ I suggest, is not a result of its actual challenge to the West or the United States per se, but primarily a discursive dimension of the neorealist construction of the American self in terms of global supremacy and indispensable leadership. As Huntington makes it clear, “Chinese hegemony will reduce American and Western influence [in Asia] and compel the United States to accept what it has historically attempted to prevent: domination of a key region of the world by another power.” In the absence of such self-fashioning, most of China’s neighbours, which might arguably be more vulnerable to a China threat if there is one, have traditionally adopted a much less alarmist view on the ‘Middle Kingdom.’ Thus, China’s real challenge for America, as Yu Bin notes, “is perhaps more psychological and conceptual—that is, how to deal with a major power whose rise is not necessarily guided by Washington, unlike the post-World War II rise of Japan and Germany.” Also, it can be argued that the existence of an ‘enemy’ is indispensable to the continued imagination of the ‘indispensable nation.’ In Charles Frazier’s novel Cold Mountain, Inman, a soldier returning home from battle during the American Civil War, pondered the question: “What is the cost of not having an enemy?” Such a cost, then, seems very high indeed, for at stake here is what is seen as the ‘fundamental’ modern Western/American self-identity as a (global) rational being and indispensable leader. Heroic leadership would not be so needed if there was little left to fight for. Clearly mindful of this, Georgi Arbatov, Director of Moscow’s Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, told a U.S. audience the year before the collapse of the Berlin Wall: “We are going to do something terrible to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy.” While he correctly noted that for the U.S. to live without an identity-defining enemy is terrible indeed, Arbatov was only half right, for the ‘enemy’ itself often has no control over its status as an enemy. Rather, as noted before, it is primarily a ready-made discursive category built into the American self-imagination. With this discursive category as the analytical framework for understanding other actors on the world stage, Western and particularly American scholars did not simply ‘discover’ a China threat out there; it was cognitively constructed beforehand.

### Link---Democracy

#### The affirmatives democratic rhetoric gives the false illusion of peace - it causes mobilization against anything as long as it is labeled totalitarian

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy @ Brunel University (UK), editorial of [Radical Philosophy](http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/), 2008 (“Critique of Security.” PG(s). (115-117)

One of the ways this fear was put to work and the citizenry ‘aroused’ was through the elision of the differences between war and peace. The movers and shakers in the US state claimed that, in theory at least, democracies generally separate peace from war as distinct periods and processes, and that this distinction tends to be obliterated but ‘totalitarian’ regimes. And yet they also claimed that since we lived in an age of ‘permanent antagonism and conflict’ (with ‘no lasting abatement of the crisis’), as the NSC-68 put it-‘the smaller the gap between peacetime and wartime purposes, the greater [is] the likely-hood that a successful military effort will be politically successful as well’. NSC-20/1 noted that ‘a democracy cannot effect, as the totalitarian state sometimes does, a complete identification of its peacetime and war time objectives’, but nonetheless suggested that the US needed to ‘reduce as far as possible the gap between them’. Indeed, one Policy Planning Staff Memo of May 1948 suggested that liberal democracies had been ‘handicapped’ by ‘attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war’ and claimed that what was needed was the idea of ‘political warfare’ as ‘the logical application Clausewitz in time of peace’. NSC-20/1 thus cited Clausewitz’s claim that ‘war is a continuation of policy, intermingled with other means’. The intent was clar: ‘the basic objective outlines…is one which would be valid for peace as well as fro war’. Or as NSC-68 put it: the objectives of a society are equally valid and necessary for peace as well as for war’, and they are so because the challenge of security is one ‘whicch encompasses noth peace and war’. Hence it is ‘essential that this government formulate general objectives which are capable of sustained pursuit both in times of peace and in the event of war’. In other words, since the enemy is as much within as without, and since the objectives, fears, and insecurities running through the body politic are present in times of both peace and war, the distinction between the two is, in essence obliterated. War and politics become a unity, and ‘political warfare’ is set in place mobilizing ‘all the means at a nation’s command’. In this sense, the national security state sought to legitimize the exercise of war powers during periods of peace by transforming the concept of ‘peace’ as applied to liberal democracy. ‘Such as peace as the United States is experiencing is not a peace; it is in fact a war’. This transformation was effected through the notion of security, especially in its ideological circuit with emergency. Herein lies a further reason to explain the emergence of ‘national security’ rather than ‘national defense’ beyond that discussed at the beginning of Chapter 3. As Eyal Weizman has noted, the logic of ‘defence’ deals with war and seeks to constitute with borders and barriers a clear distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, between the territory within the state and that which is exterior to it. The logic of ‘security’, on the other hand , presupposes that the danger is already inside, presented by a population in which the subverive elements exist…If defence engages directly with the concept of war, security engages with the temporarily ill-defined and spatially amorphous ‘conflict’ not only between societies, but within them as well. Eliding the distinction between military practice and the everyday political administration of civil society thereby helps in ‘securing’ a general willingness among the citizenry to submit to wartime disciline and emergency powers on a permanent basis.

#### The fundamental assumptions of liberalism ignore other more vital causes of war—the properties that make a democratic nation peaceful aren’t democratic

Buchan 02 Bruce Buchan B Arts (Hons), M Arts, PhD winner of B Arts (Hons), M Arts, PhD Senior Lecturer, School of Humanities Senior Lecturer, School of Humanities “Explaining War and Peace: Kant and Liberal IR Theory” Alternatives v. 27

This sort of argument strips bare the assumption behind much liberal IR theory, that liberalism, and in particular the creation of civil society, is held to be the key to domestic and international peace. The "liberal" states that surround and protect their own civil societies are thus taken to be "morally complete" and nonviolent because they embody the normative superiority of liberalism. (51) In theorizing the development of a zone of interstate peace, therefore, liberal IR theorists assume that liberal states are not the source of war; they may engage in war, but only because illiberal or uncivilized states pose a threat. More importantly, however, the second consequence is that liberal IR theorists seem insensible to the domestic, "civil" roots of violence, its control and intensification, alongside liberal norms and within liberal and representative institutions, nurtured and sustained in the crucible of civil society, and driven by a process of civilization. Nowhere is this more obvious than in the work of Kant, on whom many contemporary liberal democratic-peace theorists unwisely rely. (52) When they do so, the claim to the normative superiority of liberal-democratic norms collapses since it soon becomes clear that Kant's arguments for a "pacific federation" of states were based in part on military competition, and his principles of representation turn out to be anything but democratic. (53) If, as Cederman suggests, "it is our duty" to take Kant's "ethical reasoning" seriously, then we may find, contrary to Cederman's expectations, that Kant was neither a democrat nor a liberal, and certainly not a theorist of "interdemocratic peace." (54)

### Link---Disease

#### The discourse of disease relies on biopolitical securitization of the military industrial complex – that causes perpetual war

Michael Dillon, Lancaster University, and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Keele University, A final version of this paper has been published as: (2008) 'Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century' (with Michael Dillon), Review of International Studies, April 2008, 34:2,http://www.biopolitica.cl/docs/Lobo\_Biopolitics\_of\_Security\_21stCentury.pdf

Western societies entered the 20 century in an era of infectious disease. In the United States, for example, tuberculosis was the number one killer while small pox, diphtheria, tetanus and other infectious diseases were prevalent. Curative medicine, allied to other biopolitical ‘social’ security strategies, transformed the morbidity of western populations, however, by virtually eliminating such diseases. Consequently, an entirely different demographic of morbidity has emerged. This new landscape is characterised by chronic rather than infectious diseases. Chronic diseases are in turn distinguished by a variety of significantly different features from those which characterised infectious disease. These features include the following. 1. First, susceptibility to chronic illness is a universal among western populations. 2. Second, chronic illnesses are characterised by early onset. 3. Third, chronic illnesses are progressive. 4. Fourth, such illnesses become clinical explicit only at certain symptom thresholds; angina or heart attack signalling the presence, for example, of heart disease that has been developing for many years. 5. Fifth, chronic illnesses are multifactorial. 6. Sixth, differences between individuals are manifested by the rate at which such diseases progress rather than the bald presence or absence of the disease. 7. Seventh, the onset and rate of progress of chronic illness is a direct function of exposure to risk factors. These in turn are very much a function of how lives are lived; ‘life styles’. Whereas infectious disease invited drug cures, chronic illnesses invite pre-emption and prevention together with medical campaigns aimed at changing life-styles, backed by widespread use of surveillance (or ‘screening’ in medical terms) and the statistical documentation of the incidence of disease distribution spatially as well as temporally. All these developments have in turn begun to be combined with the pervasive regulation and management of risk, and the astonishingly greater resolution given to the analytic of risk which resonates throughout all aspects of western society. Closely allied with the concern for risk factors arising from life-styles, is an intense individualisation and personalisation of medicine as well. Whereas Foucault spoke of the ways in which liberal biopolitical governmentality encouraged the development of the entrepreneurial self, 53 the compression of morbidity witnesses the emergence of a self entrepreneurially responsibilised to secure its own health care. Such developments similarly also reflect the intense preoccupation in military corporate and homeland security domains with the same kinds of preoccupations and analytical devices allying screening and surveillance with distribution-patterning and risk analysis across mass populations locally as well as globally. The biopoliticisation of security discourse in these more traditional areas of security analysis also reflects amassive shift to pre-emptive and preventative strategies. While we do not have the space to trace the connections, the correlation is no mere accident. Granted that both military and corporate strategies are driven by their own local and global dynamics, their informationalisation and biologisation nonetheless also directly reflects these developments as well. The reason we maintain is that they not only borrow from, and leach into, one another. They share a similar if diffuse account of the ‘real’.

#### The negatives of securitization of disease far out weight the positives-it is grounded in a racist discourse that has empirically been used for genocide

Stefan Elbe, Paper Presented to the 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17, 2004, on the panel ‘Activism and Practices of Dissent in Global Politics: Interdisciplinary and Critical Perspectives’, “The Futility of Protest? – Biopower and Biopolitics in the Securitization of HIV/AIDS”, <http://www.stefanelbe.com/resources/ElbeISA2004Final.pdf>, It was approved “On 10/09/2010 05:04, kentucky morrow wrote: Dear,  Dr. Stefan Elbe, First sorry for our last message, we were having some email trouble, but now have it all figured out Second, hello, we am writing to you today because, we  am a fifteen year old high-school student in the United States, and we have recently read one of your pieces of work, "The Futility of Protest? – Biopower and Biopolitics in the Securitization of HIV/AIDS”. we were very impressed by your piece ofwork and would like to cite it, for use in a high school debate round. We have long been a fan of critical securitization work, and  believe that your article would be very helpful to advancing its cause. Thanks again, we really enjoyed your articles and hope that I will be able to cite it for usein debate rounds. That's fine. Thanks for asking ... and good luck with the debate.Stefan Elbe”

3. The Ethical Dangers of Biopolitics Many of those advocating the securitization of AIDS hope that their actions will bring about a plethora of important, long-term normative benefits. These advantages include (i) mobilising more political support and economic resources for addressing the AIDS pandemic at global and local levels, (ii) breaking the silence and stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS in many African, Asian and Latin American countries, (iii) politicising the central role of the security sector as a vector of the virus, and (iv) helping to override the legal constraints bearing on the production of affordable life-saving AIDS medicines – especially those imposed by the international regime protecting intellectual property rights (TRIPS), the provisions of which do not apply to cases of national security crises.55 These goals do seem worth striving for, but they must also be reassessed in light of the biopolitical dimension to the securitization of AIDS identified above. Foucault, after all, had been able to detect at least two serious ethical dangers historically accompanying the deployment of biopolitical strategies, and both of these concerns can, to some extent, be shown to apply to the current securitization of HIV/AIDS as well. 3.1. Biological Racism One such danger is that historically biopolitical strategies have given rise to new instances of mass death heralded on the basis of biological criteria. With hindsight it seems profoundly ironic that the European era of biopower – advanced in the name of ‘life’ – coexisted with political strategies demanding the deaths of millions. Foucault later came to understand this bizarre confluence on the basis of a new racism – a racism of biology rather than of culture.56 ‘Racism’, he contended from a biopolitical perspective, ‘is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.’57 The Nazi movement demonstrated this darker side of biopolitics in a particularly stark manner when it carved up the European continent using the dubious criterion of ‘blood’ for deciding which populations could be usefully ‘Germanized’ and thus spared, and which ones could not.58 This biological racism was also projected internally to the Jewish population of the German *Reich*; Jews were no longer prosecuted solely because of their Judaism, but because of their ‘Jewishness’, which prompted Hannah Arendt to point out in her memorable phrase that whereas in the past ‘Jews had been able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness there was no escape.’59 A biopolitical society, in short, may still make decisions about whose life is worth preserving and whose life will be allowed to perish, and the function of racism in a biopolitical age is to make this very distinction. Indeed, biological racism may even prove to be more pernicious than the traditional cultural racism precisely in that there is no escape from one’s biological makeup. In either case, such biological racism can explain the historical irony that it was ‘as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed’.60 This darker side of the twentieth century European biopolitics, moreover, must give pause for thought regarding ongoing attempts to the frame the AIDS pandemic as an international security issue. Is there any evidence of racism operating in the international debate on HIV/AIDS? There is certainly evidence that the older, cultural racism is present in this debate, especially regarding the question of which peoples are allowed to live and which ones are left to die. Given the existence of life-prolonging medicines, the pandemic could be significantly curtailed with sufficient international political will and resources. Yet Africans’ claims to these medicines are not being satisfied; the survival of these populations is being given much less priority internationally than say

the less than 3,000 U.S. citizens who died on September 11, 2001, prompting the head of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, to remind his listeners that ‘if this would have happened in the Balkans, or in Eastern Europe, or in Mexico, with white people, the reaction would have been different.’61 It is indeed hard to imagine that this pandemic would have been allowed to rage out of control on any continent other than Africa. Of course, this kind of racism is different from the racism deployed by Germany’s National- socialists in that people are not being killed either deliberately or on biologically- defined grounds, but its effects are much the same; HIV-positive populations are being allowed to die in vast numbers despite the availability of life-prolonging medicines, thus highlighting an implicit racism between different populations at the global level. Yet, and somewhat paradoxically, it is also precisely this kind of cultural racism that the ongoing securitization of AIDS is attempting to resist; the securitization of AIDS is being driven by the desire to make more resources available internationally for addressing the pandemic, and thus it does not seem ethically culpable with regard to furthering this kind of cultural racism. Indeed, the hope of combating such cultural racism forms a considerable part of its rhetorical force. There is, however, also evidence of a second and more subtle form of *biological* racism operating in the international AIDS debate. This racism is not so much concerned with the traditional war *between* races, as with more modern attempts to guard the biological health and fitness of the whole population or race vis- à-vis specific ‘diseased’ or ‘degenerate’ threats. Nazi eugenics, it is worth recalling, began in precisely such a vein – by first attempting to eradicate diseased people for the benefit of the health of the German population as a whole. Foucault thus noted how *biopolitical* (as opposed to cultural) racism appeals to the principle ‘that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population.’62 This biological racism serving the population as a whole also occasionally surfaces in the debate on HIV/AIDS. In 1999, for example, one former UN Population Fund (UNFPA) official reportedly joked that AIDS would be one way of controlling population growth in Africa. Increased mortality, the official jibed, was one of three ways of controlling population growth, implying that this would be beneficial for those surviving the pandemic.63 Nor is this an isolated incident. The initial reaction of one official at the National Intelligence Council in the mid 1990s, responding to the early demand for a project on the security implications of AIDS, was reportedly: ‘Oh, it will be good, because Africa is overpopulated anyway.’64 Some have even committed such thoughts to paper. In a report by the World Bank from 1992 one can read that ‘[i]f the only effect of the AIDS epidemic were to reduce the population growth rate, it would increase the growth rate of per capita income in any plausible economic model’.65 Underlying such thinking is not a cultural racism, but a more subtle biological racism that pits the population or ‘race’ as a whole against HIV-positive persons by implying, however erroneously, that the former would be better off without the latter. Again, however, the securitization of AIDS is, at least on the surface of it, trying to combat this form of racism by calling for a more global and comprehensive response to the AIDS pandemic, and consequently does not appear ethically culpable with regard to furthering this kind of racism either. Where then, one might ask, is the evidence of the securitization of AIDS, as a biopolitical gesture, giving rise to new forms of racism in the way Foucault had warned? The extent to which novel forms of racism may emerge in the securitization of AIDS depends very much on exactly how HIV/AIDS is securitized. The tactical dilemma faced by all advocates and adherents of the securitization of AIDS is whether this securitization is to be achieved primarily on the basis of a national security or a human security framework. On the one hand, advocates of the securitization of AIDS clearly want this securitization to be successful in order for the normative benefits they envision to accrue as quickly as possible. This means casting HIV/AIDS as a security threat within the framework of national and international security, i.e. in terms that will appear most plausible and persuasive to the Security Council and the traditional security sector. This, in turn, would entail highlighting the effects of HIV/AIDS on the armed forces, on peacekeepers, and on state capacity. A human security framework, by contrast, is less likely to persuade the Security Council and the more traditionally oriented security sector to take the issue seriously at the highest levels, and is hence unlikely to achieve the same degree of political impact. So the tactical advantages of drawing on national and international security frameworks initially appear very compelling. Yet if the securitization of AIDS is to proceed solely or even primarily on the basis of national and international security, then it also inadvertently risks simply substituting the cultural racism it eagerly seeks to combat with a new strategic form of racism. Put differently, securitizing the illness in this manner could encourage an international response whereby medicines are provided not democratically and comprehensively to all who need them, but only to those populations who play a crucial role in maintaining national and international security, i.e. the armed forces and state elites. Securitizing AIDS with reference to national and international security may thus come to benefit those elites in question, but not the wider population. There is consequently a danger of the securitization of AIDS introducing a subtle put potentially disastrous new criterion for deciding who is allowed to live and who will be left to die; a criterion that assesses human beings not in terms of any intrinsic value, but on the basis of their strategic value. In this way the securitization of AIDS risks substituting a cultural racism with a new strategic racism that, from a biopolitical perspective, is still a racism because it would provide the crucial biopolitical function of deciding who must live and who must die. What is more, framing HIV/AIDS as a threat to national and international security also risks further fuelling the aforementioned biological racism that advocates of the securitization of AIDS are trying to combat. It does so by inadvertently construing persons living with HIV/AIDS as security threats. A characteristic headline from the British *Daily Telegraph* reads ‘*African AIDS: Deadly Threat to Britain’.*66 Nor is this an isolated incident; the portrayal of AIDS as being a disease that comes from foreigners, from outsiders, and especially from ‘black’ Africans, is a perennial feature of the discourse on AIDS ever since the illness was first discovered. Calls for quarantining people with HIV/AIDS not because of their skin colour but because of their biological characteristics, subjecting them to various forms of violence, attempting to bar such persons from serving in state institutions, and the refusal to issue visas to foreigners living with HIV, are only a few of the examples in which persons living with HIV/AIDS have been ostracized and even persecuted by some states for their illness. Nor are these examples confined to the dustbin of history. As recently as February 2003 the British government considered implementing compulsory HIV screening for prospective immigrants amid alleged worries that HIV-positive foreigners are traveling to the United Kingdom to seek treatment.67 Within the armed forces around the world, moreover, there has already been growing pressure to exclude soldiers living with HIV because the illness is being perceived as a security threat. As with Arendt’s aforementioned observations about ‘Jewishness’, there seems to be no escape from one’s HIV-status. Although the securitization of AIDS tries to remedy the cultural racism evident in the unequal global access to medicines, if it is conducted primarily on the grounds of national and international security it risks – contrary to its own intensions – furthering both a strategic racism that will save elites but not ordinary people, and a biological racism that fuels exclusionary practices regarding persons living with HIV. It is only by first acknowledging the biopolitical nature of the securitization of AIDS, that these novel ethical dangers can be identified.

### Link---Economy

#### Economic collapse scenarios further societal militarization by connecting it to national security – that turns the case and perpetuates the international capitalist order

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (UK), 2008 (“Critique of Security.” Pg. 101-102. )

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’. Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or economic well-being’, the significant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasize economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’. Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bourgeoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the glove. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere… It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them… to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.” In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about it part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital-accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, economic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere.

#### Securitizing western economic measures as a solution to impoverishment is a smokescreen for the neo liberal land management paradigm that makes exploitation and poverty inevitable

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**In our own work (Tuck & McKenzie, 2015), we have set¶ about describing relational validity—a set of precepts and¶ implications for critical place inquiry which share a filial¶ relationship with Koro-**Ljungberg’s (2010) “responsibility,”¶ Lather’s (1984, 1991) catalytic validity, and Fine’s (2008)¶ provocative validity. **Relational validity is based on paradigmatic¶ understandings of the relationality of life.¶** Discussing the words of his father Stan Wilson (2001),¶ Opaskwayak Cree scholar Shawn Wilson (2008) discusses¶ the concept of Self as relationship in Indigenous research.¶ He writes,¶ **Identity for Indigenous peoples is grounded in their¶ relationships with the land, with their ancestors who have¶ returned to the land and with future generations who will come¶ into being on the land.** **Rather than viewing ourselves as being¶ in relationship with other people or things, we are the¶ relationships that we hold and are part of.** (p. 80) **Relational validity prioritizes the reality that human life is¶ connected to and dependent on other species and the land.¶** **Thus, relational validity is based on the understanding¶ that the prioritization of “economic validity” is harmful for¶ people, other forms of life, and places. While only a few¶ years ago a discourse of climate change denial was prevalent¶ and growing** (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, &¶ Hmielowski, 2012), **we have entered a new stage in which¶ human extinction from the planet is a realistic and very¶ probable concern (**Sarmiento, Sean, Tola, & Hantel, 2014).¶ **The economic, individualist, and anthropocentric paradigm¶ of Western (post)modernism continues to expand in its current¶ globalizing and neoliberal forms** (Peck, 2013). **In its¶ global reach, it binds increasing numbers of governance¶ practices to the support of fossil fuel and other extractive¶ industries, resulting in the neglect of a fiduciary responsibility¶ to ensure the fulfillment of the right to clean water,¶ air, and land.** As a result, “the tensions of capitalism are¶ being played out on a global, biospheric scale and thus¶ implicate the future of life on earth” (Cooper, 2008, p. 49, in¶ Pierce, 2012, p. 24). **This is an economic paradigm that¶ banks its future on scientific and technological advances¶ designed to capitalize on forms of life** (Pierce, 2012) Thus, relational validity implies that research is not only¶ about understanding or chronicling the relationality of life¶ and the inadequacy of economic validity but also **that¶ research necessarily influences these conditions in small or¶ significant ways; it thus impels action and increased¶ accountability to people and place.** Because no action is an¶ action, and because not acting has implications, a more adequate¶ response is required for current and future injustices¶ (McKenzie, 2009). **The legacies of the spatial practices of¶ European colonization over the past 500 years in many parts of the globe continue to be supported by governments¶ but also social practices more generally, which also establish¶ and reify hierarchies of settler over Indigenous.** Doreen¶ Massey (2005) expresses the urgency of place this way:¶ What is special about place is not some romance of a pre-given¶ collective identity or of the eternity of the hills. Rather, **what is¶ special about place is precisely that throwntogetherness, the¶ unavoidable challenge of negotiating a here-and-now** (itself¶ drawing on a history and a geography of thens and theres); and¶ a negotiation which must take place within and between both¶ human and nonhuman. This is no way denies a sense of wonder:¶ what could be more stirring than walking the high fells in the¶ knowledge of the history and the geography that has made¶ them here today. This is the event of place. (p. 140)

### Link---Food Security

#### Food security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance

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Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale.

### Link---Hegemony

#### The historical record proves.

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“Today we take it for granted that war happens in smaller, poorer and more backward countries,” Steven Pinker writes in his new book, The Better Angels of Our Nature: the Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes. The celebrated Harvard professor of psychology is discussing what he calls “the Long Peace”: the period since the end of the second world war in which “the great powers, and developed states in general, have stopped waging war on one another.” As a result of “this blessed state of affairs,” he notes, “two entire categories of war—the imperial war to acquire colonies, and the colonial war to keep them—no longer exist.” Now and then there have been minor conflicts. “To be sure, [the super-powers] occasionally fought each other’s smaller allies and stoked proxy wars among their client states.” But these episodes do not diminish Pinker’s enthusiasm about the Long Peace. Chronic warfare is only to be expected in backward parts of the world. “Tribal, civil, private, slave-raiding, imperial, and colonial wars have inflamed the territories of the developing world for millennia.” In more civilised zones, war has all but disappeared. There is nothing inevitable in the process; major wars could break out again, even among the great powers. But the change in human affairs that has occurred is fundamental. “An underlying shift that supports predictions about the future,” the Long Peace points to a world in which violence is in steady decline.

A sceptical reader might wonder whether the outbreak of peace in developed countries and endemic conflict in less fortunate lands might not be somehow connected. Was the immense violence that ravaged southeast Asia after 1945 a result of immemorial backwardness in the region? Or was a subtle and refined civilisation wrecked by world war and the aftermath of decades of neo-colonial conflict—as Norman Lewis intimated would happen in his prophetic account of his travels in the region, A Dragon Apparent (1951)? It is true that the second world war was followed by over 40 years of peace in North America and Europe—even if for the eastern half of the continent it was a peace that rested on Soviet conquest. But there was no peace between the powers that had emerged as rivals from the global conflict.

In much the same way that rich societies exported their pollution to developing countries, the societies of the highly-developed world exported their conflicts. They were at war with one another the entire time—not only in Indo-China but in other parts of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The Korean war, the Chinese invasion of Tibet, British counter-insurgency warfare in Malaya and Kenya, the abortive Franco-British invasion of Suez, the Angolan civil war, decades of civil war in the Congo and Guatemala, the Six Day War, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet-Afghan war—these are only some of the armed conflicts through which the great powers pursued their rivalries while avoiding direct war with each other. When the end of the Cold War removed the Soviet Union from the scene, war did not end. It continued in the first Gulf war, the Balkan wars, Chechnya, the Iraq war and in Afghanistan and Kashmir, among other conflicts. Taken together these conflicts add up to a formidable sum of violence. For Pinker they are minor, peripheral and hardly worth mentioning. The real story, for him, is the outbreak of peace in advanced societies, a shift that augurs an unprecedented transformation in human affairs.

#### Hegemony is based on an ideological fantasy of US exceptionalism which necessitates permanent war-making---you should look at the benefits of hegemony from the outside-looking-in---their theoretically scary impacts obscure the real consequences of hegemony which have been untold suffering

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The history of US foreign policy is a violent and bloody one, although this is not necessarily the dominant perception of most Americans. From the frontier wars of subjugation against Native Peoples to colonial wars against Mexico, Spain and the Philippines, the Cold War interventions in Korea, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Libya and elsewhere, the post-Cold War interventions in Somalia, Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, and the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen and Libya today, the US has an unrivaled record of war and foreign military intervention. There are in fact, few periods in its history when the US has not been engaged in war or military attacks on other countries. In addition, the US is the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter of military weapons, and has a military budget several times greater than all its nearest rivals combined. It is in fact, the most warring nation in modern history. It is in this historical context that we have to try and understand its current military involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa and Libya.

Although it is sometimes argued by apologists that these military actions are always defensive in nature rather than proactive and expansionist, and are the result of real and serious threats to US security or the wider international system, the virtually impregnable security position of the US, notwithstanding the 9/11 attacks a decade ago, makes this argument unconvincing. The reality is that the size of the US landmass and population, the vast oceans to its eastern and western borders and the friendly countries to its north and south, and the extent of its economic and military power, means that there are no serious obstacles to the adoption of an isolationist foreign policy or even the adoption of a pacifist role in international affairs. In other words, there is nothing inevitable or predetermined about its long record of war and intervention. Explaining the historical record of US foreign intervention requires a careful evaluation of both its strategic interests and its ideological system, as it is the almost unique combination of these factors and the way in which they underpin and interact with each other which helps to explain why the US continues to be the most violent state in the international system today.

Strategically, the US is today the world’s dominant power. In order to maintain this hegemonic position in the international system, which is the primary and preeminent goal of all US foreign policy (or at least, no major foreign policy initiative can seriously contradict this first principle goal), necessitates a number of key measures, such as: maintaining military advantage over rivals, which in turn requires a permanent internal military-industrial complex; a system of allies and a military presence in bases stretched around the globe, especially in strategic regions like the Middle East and the Horn of Africa; influence over or control of strategic resources such as oil; domination or at least influence over the global economic and trading system; significant influence in international institutions; and preventing the rise of serious challengers to its overall hegemony.

At the same time, the US has evolved since the founding of the republic a core set of ideological beliefs which are now deeply embedded culturally and accepted by both the political elite and the wider society. Some of these beliefs are necessitated by, and functional to, the military power of the US: maintaining a costly and permanent military-industrial complex capable of staying ahead of its rivals, for example, requires a supporting set of cultural values which valorize military prowess, patriotism and sacrifice in war. These values are now part of the military-industrial-media complex in which video games and movies, among others, serve as recruitment tools for the military, narrative frames for interpreting foreign threats and as propaganda for generating support for foreign military intervention. Importantly, this military-industrial-media complex has come to generate its own material and political interests, in part because it requires actual wars to reproduce and sustain itself.

Other important ideological values include the strongly-held belief that the US has been called by history (or God) to protect the so-called free world from major threats. Thus, it is believed that the US was first called to defeat the threat posed by the Axis powers, then the communist threat, and today, the global threat of terrorism. This ideological belief rests on the notion that the US is uniquely placed – by virtue of its military and economic power, and its moral values – to ensure the safety of the civilized world; it is the ‘exceptional nation’ which must lead the world. Related to this, the US has come to believe that its core values of liberty and democracy are actually universal values which is it bound to protect at home and spread abroad. As with its military values, these ideological beliefs are ubiquitous in popular and political culture.

It is the combination of the US’s strategic interests and its ideological dispositions in the past two hundred years or more which explains the frequency and geographical distribution of its military interventions. In some cases, interventions have been launched primarily to protect perceived strategic interests, such as the case of the first Gulf War in which Iraq took control of Kuwait oil reserves and appeared to seriously threaten Saudi oil reserves. In other cases, the US’s strategic interests coincided with strong ideological imperatives, such as the Libyan intervention today where the presence of significant oil reserves and the desire to create a pro-US regime in a strategic region has combined with the US ideological value of spreading democracy and overthrowing a long-term dictator and US opponent. The key point however, is that ideological values such as democracy promotion only rarely generate sufficient will by themselves for military intervention, although Somalia and Kosovo may be considered exceptions (although there were strategic interests involved in both cases). In many other cases, such as Rwanda in the 1990s and Syria today, such ideological imperatives are insufficient on their own to generate US-led military intervention. At the same time, no wars can be justified or defended to the American public, except by claiming that they fit US ideological values; US politicians cannot admit that they are ever at war solely to secure strategic advantage.

Of course, during some periods such as the cold war and to a lesser degree the war on terror, US strategic interests simply overrode ideological commitments to human rights or democracy promotion, as it supported a series of brutal dictatorships in places like Latin America, Asia and Africa. In some cases, the US even approved of mass murder, such as the Indonesian government’s suppression of Communists in 1965 which killed 500,000 people, its support for the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, and its support for Latin American death squad activities in places like Chile and El Salvador. In other special cases, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, US strategic interests override ideological commitment entirely and little real effort is made to promote values-based policies.

The war on terror, particularly the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, demonstrates the interplay of these two factors, with both strategic interests – dealing with the threat of terrorism, the securing of Iraq’s oil and Afghanistan’s potential role as an access-point to Central Asian oil reserves, fashioning pro-US regimes, and the construction of military bases in strategic regions to put pressure on countries like Iran – and ideological imperatives – bringing liberty and democracy to countries wracked by human rights abuses – driving the interventions. Paradoxically, of course, the war on terror, like many previous US interventions, has resulted in massive human rights abuses around the world and the denial of liberty to millions, with torture, rendition, and the denial of civil rights commonplace, among others. At the same time, it has also endangered US strategic interests: the attack on Iraq strengthened and emboldened Iran, destabilized Pakistan, and greatly damaged the reputation and standing of the US in the Middle East and large parts of the Muslim world.

In the end, the culturally and politically embedded ideology of the US – its militarized patriotism – blinds its leaders and public to the interests and consequences of its military interventions, and sustains the likelihood of future interventions. Few Americans accept that its country’s wars have killed, injured and displaced literally millions of people in the last few decades, most often for little or no positive result in either strategic or ideological terms – that in fact the real-world consequences of its interventions are virtually always the denial of its own stated values of liberty and democracy. Fewer still question why the US is willing to sacrifice thousands or even millions of lives to secure its strategic interests, or why the US population is so perennially vulnerable to ideological appeals by leaders which mask the deeper strategic reasons for violent intervention. While it is unlikely that its strategic interests will change any time soon or that the military-industrial complex can be significantly reduced in size, there is always the hope that new leaders might arise and peace movements might emerge which are able to challenge, and perhaps even change, the militarized patriotism and deeply-embedded culture of violence which makes the US the most violent state in the world.

#### The discourse of legitimacy masks the violence of hegemony---the affirmative’s commitment to US leadership recreates gendered national identity that codes the US as a the masculine shepherd of the global-liberal architecture---turns the case

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Both during his campaign, and in his presidential inauguration speech, Barack Obama promised a "new beginning" in American foreign and national security policy (especially in relation to the Middle East) that would both keep us safe from enemies and "restore our moral standing" (Obama, Acceptance). In particular, this new beginning promised to distance U.S. foreign policy from the grim (and largely illegal) features of the Bush administration's "war on terror" such as the executive sanctioning of the torture of prisoners, the maintenance of a gulag of foreign detention centres where prisoners could be treated outside the guidelines of U.S. and international law, and illegal secret initiatives such as the program to assassinate Al-Qaeda operatives directed by Vice President Cheney (Mazzetti and Shane). In his first day in the White House, on January 22, 2009, Obama issued three executive orders that followed through on this promise.[2] In addition to these early executive orders, in the days and months following his election Obama showed great rhetorical sensitivity to the wide-spread negative perception in the Middle East of U.S. imperial behavior and designs, its uncritical support of Israel, and its disregard for civilian casualties and for the civil rights of prisoners. In an effort to reverse the tide of anti-American feeling, Obama's first post-inaugural interview was given to Hisham Melhem of Al Arabiya TV news (Interview). This was followed in April and May by major addresses in Ankara and Cairo whose primary intended audience was Middle Eastern and, more broadly, Islamic. Both of these speeches articulate a new rhetoric of hope for U.S.-Middle Eastern relations. In the speech to the Turkish parliament, for example, Obama declares:¶ I [...] want to be clear that America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot, and will not, just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will listen carefully, we will bridge misunderstandings, and we will seek common ground. We will be respectful, even when we do not agree [...]. (para. 38)¶ Hope for a new era of U.S Middle East relations is here embodied by an attitude of respect, by a willingness to negotiate differences and find areas of mutual interest, and by an explicit criticism of the unilateral and monologic focus of the Bush administration on the 'war on terror'.¶ This apparent change in direction in national security and foreign policy seems to be characterized by an alternate version of presidential masculinity and by an alternate telling of the myth of American exceptionalism. Many have commented on the muscular character of George W. Bush's rhetoric of war and national security. Indeed, his policies in what he called the 'war on terror' depended almost exclusively on what Joseph Nye famously called "hard power", and were justified rhetorically by a conspicuously militarist and masculinist narrative about America's role in world history and politics.[3] In contrast to the "[...] stern projection of a tough national persona" (Ivie and Giner 288) in Bush's rhetoric and policies, Obama seems to articulate a gentler, more reasoned approach to national security and terrorism that includes the use of 'hard' military power but also depends importantly on 'soft' power in the form of diplomacy, international cooperation, and an emphasis on human rights, economic stability and political freedom. Ivie and Giner argue that the success of Obama's rhetorical appeal to 'soft' power during the 2008 presidential campaign was due to his ability to harness and resignify the deeply-resonant myth of American exceptionalism for a more democratic and community-minded projection of America's role in world affairs. In Obama's version of national security, they write:¶ A less tragic sense of order mandated a reduced sense of guilt and thereby decreased the need for redemption via the cult of killing. This expression of national mission in more democratic and practical terms indicated, at least "logologically," the possibility of aligning public culture with a more global and constructive perspective on matters of national security. It revealed the possibility of a founding myth reformed to relax the lethal grip of the Evil One on the conscience of a nation that might do more good in the world if it were burdened less by tragic guilt.[4] (296)¶ This conclusion requires a retrospective reassessment in the light of Obama's decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly dramatic shift from progressive presidential candidate who was proud to have opposed the war in Iraq from the beginning, and who abolished the use of torture and illegal detention in his first day in office, to the president who in December 2009 made the decision to pursue and significantly escalate military violence in Afghanistan? How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly contradictory use of both the soft rhetoric of hope and diplomacy and the hard rhetoric of fear and military violence in his national security statements and speeches?¶ In the analysis that follows I argue that while Obama at times articulates a softer version of foreign policy, and seems to perform a softer, more inclusive presidential masculinity in the area of global politics and terrorism, this does not fundamentally signify a different orientation to national security as some have argued. I emphasize how Obama's rhetoric and policies fall within the standard rhetorical oscillations that constitute the myth of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity, and that those oscillations are principally and most significantly oriented by the more militarist and conventionally masculinist versions of the myth.¶ Presidential Masculinity in the Democratic Nomination Speech¶ Obama's speech at the Democratic National Convention in August 2008 marks the formal shift of his campaign focus from Democratic Party voters towards a national audience, and from his rivalry with Hillary Clinton to a campaign against John McCain. In terms of Obama's national security rhetoric, this is a fascinating moment because, in this new broader context, he makes an attitudinal shift to a more militarized and masculinized mode of speech. In fact, Obama's performance of soft masculinity on issues of national security during the primary campaign was an opportune product of the moment that did not reflect the principal orientation of his thinking.[5] This is quite clear in the nomination speech as he shifts his campaign towards a more conservative national audience, and directs his attention from a female rival to a male rival with military credentials.¶ Obama's first sentence about foreign policy in the nomination speech concerns his own stature and ability to lead American troops into battle, and to battle John McCain for the position of commander in chief. "If John McCain wants to have a debate about who has the temperament and judgment to serve as the next commander-in-chief, that's a debate I'm ready to have." (para. 79) What is most interesting about this lead-in to the topic of national security, terrorism, and foreign policy is that its main rhetorical function is to emphasize Obama's masculine capability. It does this by declaring his presidential mettle, but also through the performance of an 'I dare you' challenge to his political adversary. It seems to say, 'if you want to fight, then let's fight. Bring it on!'¶ Why does Obama begin this section of the speech with a flexing of muscle? In part, it has to do with the histrionics of presidential campaigns, and in this particular campaign with the anticipated challenge to Obama's military masculinity from John McCain, a candidate with a powerful story of military bravery and heroism to his credit. At the same time, the foregrounding of presidential masculinity in terms of the resolve and capacity to lead the armed forces into battle is nothing unusual. The most significant human protagonist in the narrative of American exceptionalism is almost always the figure of the president. This is especially true in times of danger, crisis or war. He is the commander in chief of the armed forces. To him goes the job of protecting the national family from outside threats and danger. To do this effectively, he must be brave, decisive and rational. He cannot afford to be feminized by being overly emotional or sympathetic to others; he cannot succumb to doubts, or become scared to act (Cohn, Cuordileone, Hopper, Lakoff, Sylvester, Tickner, Young). It is to this mythos that Obama's beginning performance of masculinity in the speech belongs. In the new context of a national audience, it stands out as a deeply-felt and vigorously articulated orientation towards national security.¶ After this initial show of male plumage, Obama continues the foreign policy section of the nomination speech by contrasting his youthful masculinity to McCain's elderly, bumbling masculinity.¶ For -- for while -- while Senator McCain was turning his sights to Iraq just days after 9/11, I stood up and opposed this war, knowing that it would distract us from the real threats that we face. When John McCain said we could just muddle through in Afghanistan, I argued for more resources and more troops to finish the fight against the terrorists who actually attacked us on 9/11, and made clear that we must take out Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants if we have them in our sights. (para. 80-81)¶ While McCain turns his sights away from the target, Obama stands up. While McCain muddles, Obama works to finish the fight and "take out" bin Laden if he's "in our sights." In the subtly crafted metaphor of aiming a gun at an enemy that organizes the passage, McCain appears as a distracted old soldier who aims at the wrong target and is generally confused. In contrast, vigorous and youthful, Obama stands up purposely, aims at the target, and fires. These metaphors all work to highlight the differences between McCain and Obama in terms of their embodiment of a properly militarized masculinity: which candidate can stand up, correctly identify the enemy, and fire the necessary shots to kill him.¶ Obama criticizes McCain for standing alone in "stubborn refusal" to recognize the realities of the conflict (that it is with al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, not in Iraq), and therefore for lacking judgment. This lack of judgment is also narrated in terms of a contrast between a youthful and an aging masculinity: "We need a president who can face the threats of the future, not keep grasping at the ideas of the past." (para. 84) Obama declares. The contrast between a man who grasps at the past and one who "faces" the future is coded with messages about age and masculinity: youthful, confident stepping forward into the future versus old, unsteady back-stepping towards the past. At stake in this contrast is which strategy will "defeat" the enemy. "You don't defeat -- you don't defeat a terrorist network that operates in 80 countries by occupying Iraq", (para. 85) Obama argues. These are enemies who must be killed in order to protect the nation. To do this requires a commander-in-chief with masculine resolve and courage who can lead us into battle. This is not work for touchy-feely idealists who want to understand, communicate, and negotiate. And Republicans, Obama points out proudly, are not the only ones with the proper testicular size to lead the army into battle: "We are the party of Roosevelt. We are the party of Kennedy. So don't tell me that Democrats won't defend this country. Don't tell me that Democrats won't keep us safe." (para. 87) As in his opening statement, part of the effectiveness of these lines is their performance of a kind of "I'm up to the challenge masculinity" that talks tough, is aggressive with challengers ("don't tell me"), and does not back down. The rhetoric of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity foregrounded here in the nomination clearly constitutes the dominant note of continuity in Obama's national security thinking. This is most evident in his two speeches from December 2009 in which he justifies his decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan as the following discussion will show.¶ Reasons for War: the December 1, 2009 Speech at West Point¶ Obama's December 2009 speech at West Point argues for the strategic necessity and ethical correctness of increased war effort in Afghanistan on the basis of history. The history begins with the 19 Al Qaeda operatives who committed the terrorist atrocities on 9/11 and moves quickly to focus on the Taliban who provided them with a secure base from which to operate. After 9/11, as Obama tells the story, we made great military inroads against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but then mistakenly turned our attention to Iraq. This provided an opening for the Taliban, and for Al Qaeda, who are now coming back into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The Afghan government cannot fight them off and therefore, he says, summing it all up: "In short, the status quo is not sustainable" (para. 12). How does a rudimentary history like this serve as an explanation or justification for war? What is the mediating logic?¶ The over-simplification of contemporary U.S and Afghan history entailed in this schematic narrative is head-spinning.[6] But, even putting that aside, if one accepts the history at face value, it is still the case that our commitment to war is left unexplained and unjustified by the narrative. The history begins with 19 terrorists, and ends with the large-scale military action on the part of the United States. Should it not take a lot more than saying, 'well, the Taliban are gaining momentum and, remember, they are best friends with Al Qaeda' to justify the deployment of 100,000 U.S. troops, predator drones strikes all over northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan, full involvement of the CIA, major flows of capital and materiel, and huge contracts with private military contractors like XE Services (aka Blackwater)? Obama's historical narrative simply does not add up to a political argument for this kind of war, and for this kind of outlay of capital.¶ As a justification for war, it seems, rather, to be structured like a myth in the sense that Roland Barthes gave the word. Myth, according to Barthes, is paradoxically effective because, formally, it works like an alibi. It is an explanation based on an absence of evidence and meaning rather than its presence. In an alibi (the accused was absent not present at the scene) the meaning and the evidence are always elsewhere (121-127). Obama's narrative amounts to a mythological explanation for war in the sense that its significance lies not in the history itself but in the formal seriousness of a president telling a story to justify war. That is, its significance lies in the rhetorical gesture that serves to remind the audience of the president's authority as commander in chief and of his role to defend the nation from harm. By telling this story the president in effect quotes an array of motives, intentions, plot sequences and characters that are formally full even if their content in this instance is misleading or empty. To paraphrase Hayden White, in this case the content is the form. Here, the details of the story of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan are significant to the extent that they play a role in a larger narrative already familiar to the American audience: the Unites States stands for peace and prosperity, freedom and democracy but sometimes it is attacked by evil enemies whose irrational desire is to destroy all that is good. In that circumstance, the president must protect the national family through the use of military violence. War is the best and, in fact, the only way to make ourselves secure.¶ Following this schematic historical narrative with which he begins the West Point speech, Obama reassures the audience that his final decision to escalate the war was taken only after a serious and difficult deliberative process. This process, he says, "has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners. And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people -- and our troops -- no less." (para. 13) The image of the president very seriously asking questions, exploring options, and consulting experts is one intended to produce a sense of citizen confidence both in the decision and in the decider (as George W. Bush famously called himself) again without revealing any of the details or particulars that constitute the decision. The rhetorical appeal here is essentially charismatic and depends on thick cultural associations with the president as benevolent paternal authority, and as rational but determined protector of the nation. The tone of the passage is that of a father reassuring his family that the big decision he has made today was made with great care, and with their communal welfare in mind.¶ Obama's stress on his careful deliberation process but not on the content of the deliberation is reminiscent of Iris Marion Young's emphasis on the "logic of masculinist protection" in national security thinking. This is a logic that connects the protective role of the father in the patriarchal family with the role of commander in chief. In both cases, she argues that one of the prices exacted by benevolent masculinist protection is that the protected woman/feminized citizen must concede "critical distance from decision-making autonomy." (120). In other words, if the fatherly president's allegiance to citizens and soldiers is expressed in the mindfulness with which he makes communal decisions of this magnitude, then it is equally true that our allegiance to the father-president is expressed in our acceptance of his authority and judgment to do what is best for us in these circumstances. The allegiance to the father quickly becomes the measure of our patriotism. As a rhetorical strategy, then, Obama's description of the seriousness of his decision-making process serves to legitimate his decision to escalate war through an appeal to an image of protective presidential masculinity. This appeal interpellates the audience in the role of a complicit, feminized citizenry that needs such fatherly protection.[7]¶ After the scant historical review, and a summary of where we are and why we are obliged to go to war, Obama devotes a good portion of the West Point speech to making a series of sequential points, statements of fact, and reasoned arguments. For example, he gives three specific goals for the Afghan intervention, and outlines how those goals will be achieved and how it will all be paid for. He also identifies three possible objections to the escalation and gives reasoned arguments for why these criticisms are incorrect. In sum, he says "As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests." (para. 37).As feminist International Relations scholars have argued, to talk about war in rationalist terms as Obama does here tends to divert attention from the cruelties of war, and to imagine the truth of war "abstracted from bodies"

(Ruddick 132). It becomes difficult, in this context, to focus on, or give weight to, the terrible details of war, and in particular to the death and destruction that modern wars exact mostly from civilians not soldiers.[8] As a rhetorical performance, the description of war in terms of rational sequences and formulas also tends to give authority to the rhetorician himself by distancing him from feminized forms of emotionality or care work (Cohn).¶ Obama ends his speech with the conclusion that presidential war speeches commonly have: an eloquent and solemn call to unity and patriotism. "Now, let me be clear: None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world." (para. 41) The logic of a bond between our free society and our leadership in the world is presupposed rather than described or explained. Like all heroes, the hero of the exceptionalist narrative faces a test. In this instance, he is us, and our essential quality of being a free society is linked to our dominance in the world.¶ Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents.We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies.We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions -- from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank -- that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings.¶ We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades -- a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress and advancing frontiers of human liberty.¶ For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination.Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations.We will not claim another nation's resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours.What we have fought for -- what we continue to fight for -- is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity (para. 47-49).¶ Unlike other world powers, we are benevolent, seeking only that which will make the world a better place. We are, that is to say, a world power but not a world empire. Our history shows this: our military violence and our leadership have underwritten global security for over sixty years. Strangely, though, our fatherly sacrifice to protect the world from harm is sometimes misunderstood, and "we have not always been thanked for our efforts." Who are the unthankful and what is their story? In the standard-issue exceptionalist narrative, they are the enemies of freedom, the sowers of chaos, and the ideologically possessed. Obama certainly believes this. At the same time, the statement that "we have not always been thanked for our efforts" also expresses a deep anxiety about the details and the stories that are erased by the great father's version of history.¶ Making War, Talking Peace: The Nobel Peace Prize Speech¶ The Nobel Prize acceptance speech, given just nine days after Obama's announcement of the escalation of the war in Afghanistan, provides a fascinating expansion of the plot of "American as good vs. foreign as evil" that informs the narrative justification for war in the West Point speech. In this speech, Obama contextualizes both American exceptionalism in general, and his specific decision to expand the war in Afghanistan, in a sweeping historical narrative of global progress. "At the dawn of history," Obama declares, "war was routinely pursued between tribes and peoples quite simply as a way of 'seeking power and settling disputes." (para. 6) Later, as "man" progressed, legal and diplomatic efforts were made in an attempt to regulate war and the way it was pursued. Obama invokes just war theory citing it as one of the principle ways in which humans have tried to regulate and civilize war. In Obama's narrative, the United States is located at the upper end of this historical progression because it is the United States that has provided the leadership to produce the global "architecture" of peace in the form of the United Nations, support for human rights, nuclear arms reductions, and so on. Elaborating on the schematic history of the United States that appeared in the West Point speech, Obama says¶ The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans.We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will.We have done so out of enlightened self-interest -- because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity (para. 18).¶ J. Ann Tickner argues that the idea of enlightened self interest corresponds to a masculinist model of international relations in which states are systematic and instrumental they are competitive "profit maximizers that pursue power and autonomy in an anarchic world system."(52) In this context, if international cooperation exists, it is explained not in terms of community or an interdependent notion of security and welfare, but rather in terms of rational choice and enlightened self-interest. Here, in Obama's version, we shoulder the burden of world peace and prosperity both heroically (with American blood and military power) but also as rational actors. We act not as an imperial power, but as a benign power exercising rational choices in a dangerous world in order to protect our interests. By virtue of the incantatory power of the exceptionalist narrative, our interests are identical with democratic values and the cause of economic justice.¶ The awkward context of the Nobel Prize speech both clarifies and complicates Obama's justification of war. While acknowledging the "moral force" of the theory of non-violence, he also argues that "evil does exist in the world" and that a realist assessment of the world "as it is" sometimes requires violence. This part of the speech is quite subtle, shuttling back and forth between the recognition that war is terrible and the insistence that it is sometimes necessary. The notion that war is sometimes just and sometimes necessary for building peace is modified throughout with an appeal to "responsibility" and to the rational, measured use of military violence. Obama argues that "all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace." (para. 26) The rationalist tone of responsibility and militaries with clear mandates is matched by Obama's framing of the philosophical question of war and peace as a matter of human imperfection. The ideals of peace are beautiful, but in the world as it is human beings are not perfect. They sometimes act unaccountably and irresponsibly. And sometimes they must be stopped from perpetrating evil.¶ At the end of the speech, Obama signals what for him is the chief human imperfection that is at the root of so much of the world's violence. He says,¶ As the world grows smaller, you might think it would be easier for human beings to recognize how similar we are; to understand that we're all basically seeking the same things; that we all hope for the chance to live out our lives with some measure of happiness and fulfillment for ourselves and our families. ¶ And yet somehow, given the dizzying pace of globalization, the cultural leveling of modernity, it perhaps comes as no surprise that people fear the loss of what they cherish in their particular identities -- their race, their tribe, and perhaps most powerfully their religion. In some places, this fear has led to conflict.At times, it even feels like we're moving backwards.We see it in the Middle East, as the conflict between Arabs and Jews seems to harden.We see it in nations that are torn asunder by tribal lines.¶ And most dangerously, we see it in the way that religion is used to justify the murder of innocents by those who have distorted and defiled the great religion of Islam, and who attacked my country from Afghanistan.T hese extremists are not the first to kill in the name of God; the cruelties of the Crusades are amply recorded. But they remind us that no Holy War can ever be a just war (para. 47-49).¶ In the context of globalization, what jams the machine is fear of loss of identity. This fear also gets in the way of our universal human aspirations for peace and prosperity. The most notable example of this kind of fear is, of course, the terrorism practiced by al Qaeda. This is a fear underwritten by megalomania: the idea that violence is mandated by God. What is striking about this passage is that it plots opposition to globalization as fear of change, almost as a kind of primitive or childish clinging to identity in a world whose universal characteristics are evident. But can this be the whole story? Can one explain the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as Obama appears to do here, as irrational fear of loss of identity? Is opposition to capitalist globalization American-style, and under the paternal arm of American power, always and everywhere a form of childishness or partial vision?¶ In his concluding comments, Obama quotes Martin Luther King's 1964 Nobel Prize acceptance speech in which he talks about the moral necessity of striving for what ought to be rather than accepting things as they are. This is an eloquent but highly impertinent frame for the speech. In his Nobel address, King soundly rejects those versions of history organized around notions of necessary violence. Accepting the prize on behalf of the entire civil rights movement, King says:¶ After contemplation, I conclude that this award which I receive on behalf of that movement is a profound recognition that nonviolence is the answer to the crucial political and moral question of our time - the need for man to overcome oppression and violence without resorting to violence and oppression. Civilization and violence are antithetical concepts. Negroes of the United States, following the people of India, have demonstrated that nonviolence is not sterile passivity, but a powerful moral force which makes for social transformation. Sooner or later all the people of the world will have to discover a way to live together in peace, and thereby transform this pending cosmic elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. If this is to be achieved, man must evolve for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation. The foundation of such a method is love (para. 4).¶ King clearly rejects the idea that civilization sometimes requires violence, or that violence can sometimes be just or moral. Love, in King's terms, is antithetical to the discourse of innocence, guilt, power and violence that constitutes the narrative of American exceptionalism. Instead, King's ethic of love is consonant with Judith Butler's critique of violence:¶ The violent response is the one that does not ask, and does not seek to know. It wants to shore up what it knows, to expunge what threatens it with not-knowing, what forces it to reconsider the presuppositions of its world, their contingency, their malleability. The nonviolent response lives with its unknowingness about the Other in the face of the Other, since sustaining the bond that the question opens is finally more valuable than knowing in advance what holds us in common, as if we already have all the resources we need to know what defines the human, what its future life might be (35).¶ This is precisely what is wrong with the narrative of American exceptionalism, and with Obama's obligation to it. A story whose plot is organized entirely around the character of its hero does not seek to know. It is narcissistic. It shores up what it knows in fear of the Other, and in this gesture reconfirms that its view of the world is the truth. Obama seems oblivious to the contradictions in his assertion of American power as he struggles here to articulate the oxymoron of peace through war. In the end, what "makes sense" in his justification for war is the cultural and political sense that adheres to the image of embodied presidential masculinity, and to his military leadership performed in patriotic service to America's heroic global mission.¶ Conclusion¶ Obama's national security policies and rhetoric are, to be fair, significantly different in many ways than Bush's. Nonetheless, he steeps his rhetoric of hope for a new foreign policy in the old, familiar language of American exceptionalism. This illustrates how the political logic of a militarized and masculinized nation, presidency and citizenry has proved to be more enduring, significant and powerful than the strategy differences that have divided Democrats and Republicans over the last 60 years. It is important also because the cultural logic of American exceptionalism guaranteed by military power makes so many questions difficult to ask because the questions themselves seem absurd, effeminately nave, or simply out of rhetorical limits. These are unasked questions such as what violence was required to achieve our affluence and power? How can that violence be justified? Are there models for world peace, prosperity and freedom other than America's dominance and "leadership?" Does military power and violence produce security? What constitutes security? Is invulnerability a legitimate security goal? Is the authority of Commander-in-chief one that automatically adheres to the presidency at all times, or should the executive be more limited in its power as originally envisioned in the Constitution? Is citizenship best characterized in terms of a militarized and masculinized patriotism? Can terrorism be fought with large-scale military tactics?¶ Of course, it is impossible to know all the ins and outs of how Obama and his advisors reached the decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. For those who voted for Obama over Clinton during the Democratic primary campaign because of his clear-spoken commitment to a different kind of foreign policy, the decision is disappointing to say the least. In the final analysis, when the decision was made, and its justification needed to be formulated into public rhetoric, what is clear is that the Obama administration felt at home in and oriented by - the old language of American exceptionalism. Familiar orientations, as Sara Ahmed argues, are an "effect of inhabitance." That is, their sense, their familiarity and their surety are products of their alignment with an already aligned world (7). My argument here is that the sense Obama makes of war is indebted to and made possible by - the familiarity and common-sense orientation of American exceptionalism. If the militarism and masculinism of his national security logic seem sensible or reassuring, it is because they are oriented in deeply familiar ways. The rhetoric of war and national security also works, of course, to recreate the familiar orientation from which it emerges. As Susan Jeffords argues, in the post-Vietnam context, heroic narratives about the war had the decisive (but indirectly manifested) effect of "remasculinizing American culture." This is why the work of disorientation that is proposed by feminist International Relations scholars and activists with its specific focus on the hidden injuries of gender in the familiar discourses of war and security is so important. It is also why it is so difficult.¶ I have argued that Obama's war logic is oriented by, and serves to reorient us towards, a national mythology grounded in narratives of glorified violence and masculinity. The difficulty of challenging and disorienting that prevailing narrative is eloquently described by Jorge Luis Borges in his story "The South." The story serves as an apt allegory of the mythology of American exceptionalism with its multiple commitments to masculinity and violence, and for the ways this mythology works to make military violence the seemingly inevitable and sensible locus where the national story is both resolved and reinvigorated. The main character in "The South" is named Juan Dahlmann. Dahlmann feels "deeply Argentine" despite the fact that his paternal grandfather was a northern European immigrant. Dahlmann's patriotic sense of identity involves, among other things, having purchased a little ranch in the south that had once been in his mother's family. Dahlmann lives in Buenos Aires, and for him the south has tremendous symbolic resonance as that place that retains the masculinist features of national mythology: the pampa, the gaucho, the singing bard, the tavern, the duel. Dahlmann dreams about the ranch and its old house, and takes comfort in imagining it waiting for him on the pampa, even though he never really gets a chance to actually go there. One day, Dahlmann is struck gravely ill with a terrible infection and is hospitalized with high fever. As is typical of so many of Borges' stories, it is impossible to tell if the subsequent narrated events are products of his hallucinatory state or are really happening to him. In any event, after some days of medical intervention, he is released and boards a train towards the south to convalesce at his ranch. He arrives, enters a tavern where he eats barbeque and drinks wine, and then is taunted by some young men who have been drinking too much. Although the bar owner tells him to pay them no mind, Dahlmann confronts them as any traditional male character in a gaucho story would be required to do. In seeming recognition of his decisive entrance into one of the enduring storylines of nationalist mythology (the knife fight between men at a watering hole on the pampa), the ancient gaucho in the corner of the bar who until now has remained motionless as if frozen in time, becomes "ecstatic" and throws him a dagger. The rest is preordained: Dahlmann will walk out of the tavern with a knife in his hand, he will fight bravely, and then die with the stranger's blade in his gut. It is, the narrator says, "as if the South had decided that Dahlmann should agree to the duel." (203) When he picks up the dagger, he feels two things: first, "that this almost instinctive act committed him to fighting" and, second, "that, in his clumsy hand, the weapon would not serve to defend him, but rather to justify their killing of him" (Borges, 203 translations mine).¶ For me, "The South" is a story about the masculinist mythology of national identity and violence. Intricate and contradictory is it dream or reality? the myth exercises its force both from within on Dahlmann's imagination and from without on his body. The logic of a militarized and masculinized rhetoric of national security, in concert with the economic logic of our military budget and the imperial logic of our global ambition, serves as our "south" leading us onward towards the use of large-scale military violence as if in a dream from which we cannot wake. We cannot hear the warnings of the barkeep who tries to tell us that we do not have to kill or be killed in this instance. Like Dahlmann, our politicians even the less bellicose among them when faced with security threats simply cannot imagine any alternative to masculinist bravado and the duel to the death.¶ "The South", then, is a cautionary tale. As long as presidents and politicians dare not challenge the role of the military budget as the primary organizing principle of our economy, and as long as the militarized and masculinized ideology of American exceptionalism remains the almost unitary language with which we speak of national security and foreign policy, there should be no surprise when ostensible doves from the Democratic Party such as Barack Obama pursue large-scale military campaigns in places like Afghanistan, and seem to do so as readily as their reputedly hawkish counterparts in the Republican Party. Alternate strategies to large-scale military violence require new story-lines of national identity and national security. We need to give ourselves a choice about whether taking up the knife is what the situation calls for. We need to ask questions about how we got into such a situation in the first place. We need to create alternatives to the logic that defines security as killing or being killed. Clearly, rhetoric plays a significant role in preparing these choices. But, as Obama's performance indicates, it is unlikely that our presidents and our politicians will do the rhetorical work necessary to disorient the prevailing exceptionalist narrative and reorient the debate towards the ethos of human security. It falls to us - citizens, activists and intellectuals - to turn our political rhetoric away from antagonisms that require violence towards the democratic task of contending with opponents with whom we share the world.

#### Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy---the strategy omnipotence sees threats to empire everywhere, which necessitates constant violence---you have an obligation to place the structural violence that hegemony invisibilizes at the core of your decision calculus

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By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.

I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5

Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”?

We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6

Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history.

Paranoia

Even the paranoid have enemies.

—Donald Rumsfeld

Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8

Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal.

Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty?

A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11

The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution.

—C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians”

The barbarians have declared war.

—President George W. Bush

C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism, Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. Where were the enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus? “And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?” By rights, the thawing of the cold war should have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military; any plausible external threat had simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army, bemoaned the enemy deficit: “It’s no use having an army that did nothing but train,” he said. “There’s got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for.” Dick Cheney likewise complained: “The threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain.” Colin Powell agreed: “Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that—the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain.” Before becoming president, George W. Bush likewise fretted over the post–cold war dearth of a visible enemy: “We do not know who the enemy is, but we know they are out there.” It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require “a catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.” 12

The 9/11 attacks came as a dazzling solution, both to the enemy deficit and the problem of legitimacy, offering the Bush administration what they would claim as a political casus belli and the military unimaginable license to expand its reach. General Peter Schoomaker would publicly admit that the attacks were an immense boon: “There is a huge silver lining in this cloud. . . . War is a tremendous focus. . . . Now we have this focusing opportunity, and we have the fact that (terrorists) have actually attacked our homeland, which gives it some oomph.” In his book Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke recalls thinking during the attack, “Now we can perhaps attack Osama Bin Laden.” After the invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary of State Colin Powell noted, “America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind we could not have dreamed of before.” Charles Krauthammer, for one, called for a declaration of total war. “We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold War era,” he declared. “It will henceforth be known as the age of terrorism.” 13

### Link---Human Rights

#### The international human rights regime bolsters the violence of liberalism by demarcating half the world as inhuman

WilliamRasch, Henry H. H. Remak Professor of Germanic Studies at Indiana University, Spring 2003, Cultural Critique, Vol. 54, p. 141-144

For Schmitt, to assume that one can derive morally correct political institutions from abstract, universal norms is to put the cart before the horse. The truly important question remains: who decides? [15](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural_critique/v054/54.1rasch.html#FOOT15) What political power representing which political order defines terms like human rights and public reason, defines, in fact, what it means to be properly human? What political power distinguishes between the decent and the indecent, between those who police the world and those who are outlawed from it? Indeed, what political power decides what is and what is not political? Habermas's contention that normative legality neutralizes the moral and the political and that therefore Schmitt "suppresses" the "decisive point," namely, "the legal preconditions of an impartial judicial authority and a neutral system of criminal punishment" (1998, 200), is enough to make even an incurable skeptic a bit nostalgic for the old Frankfurt School distinction between affirmative and critical theory. One could observe, for instance, that the "universality" of human rights has a very particular base. As Habermas says: Asiatic societies cannot participate in capitalistic modernization without taking advantage of the achievements of an individualistic legal order. One cannot desire the one and reject the other. From the perspective of Asian countries, the question is not whether human rights, as part of an individualistic legal order, are compatible with the transmission of one's own culture. Rather, the question is whether the traditional forms of political and societal integration can be reasserted against—or must instead be adapted to—the hard-to-resist imperatives of an economic modernization that has won approval on the whole. (2001, 124) Thus, despite his emphasis on procedure and the universality of his so-called discourse principle, the choice that confronts Asiatic societies or any other people is a choice between cultural identity and economic survival, between, in other words, cultural and physical extermination. As Schmitt said, the old Christian and civilizing distinction between believers and nonbelievers (Gläubigern and Nicht-Gläubigern) has become the modern, economic distinction between "creditors and debtors" (Gläubigern and Schuldnern). But while affirmative theorists like Habermas and Rawls are busy constructing the ideological scaffolding that supports the structure of the status quo, what role is there for the "critical" theorist to play? Despite the sanguine hopes of Hardt and Negri (2000) that "Empire" will all but spontaneously combust as a result of the irrepressible ur-desire of the multitude, can we seriously place our faith in some utopian grand alternative anymore, or in some revolutionary or therapeutic result based on the truth of critique that would allow us all, in the end, to sing in the sunshine and laugh everyday? Do, in fact, such utopian fantasies not lead to the moralizing hubris of a Rawls or a Habermas? [16](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/cultural_critique/v054/54.1rasch.html#FOOT16) In short, it is one thing to recognize the concealed, particular interests that govern the discourse and politics of human rights and quite another to think seriously about how things could be different, to imagine an international system that respected both the equality and the difference of states and/or peoples. Is it possible—and this is Todorov's question—to value Vitoria's principle of the "free circulation of men, ideas, and goods" and still also "cherish another principle, that of self-determination and noninterference" (Todorov 1984, 177)? The entire "Vitorian" tradition, from Scott to Habermas and Rawls, thinks not. Habermas, for instance, emphatically endorses the fact that "the erosion of the principle of nonintervention in recent decades has been due primarily to the politics of human rights" (1998, 147), a "normative" achievement that is not so incidentally correlated with a positive, economic fact: "In view of the subversive forces and imperatives of the world market and of the increasing density of worldwide networks of communication and commerce, the external sovereignty of states, however it may be grounded, is by now in any case an anachronism" (150). And opposition to this development is not merely anachronistic; it is illegitimate, not to be tolerated. So, for those who sincerely believe in American institutional, cultural, and moral superiority, the times could not be rosier. After all, when push comes to shove, "we" decide—not only about which societies are decent and which ones are not, but also about which acts of violence are "terrorist" and which compose the "gentle compulsion" of a "just war." What, however, are those "barbarians" who disagree with the new world order supposed to do? With Agamben, they could wait for a "completely new politics" to come, but the contours of such a politics are unknown and will remain unknown until the time of its arrival. And that time, much like the second coming of Christ, seems infinitely deferrable. While they wait for the Benjaminian "divine violence" to sweep away the residual effects of the demonic rule of law (Benjamin 1996, 248-52), the barbarians might be tempted to entertain Schmitt's rather forlorn fantasy of an egalitarian balance of power. Yet if the old, inner-European balance of power rested on an asymmetrical exclusion of the non-European world, it must be asked: what new exclusion will be necessary for a new balance, and is that new exclusion tolerable? At the moment, there is no answer to this question, only a precondition to an answer. If one wishes to entertain Todorov's challenge of thinking both equality and difference, universal commerce of people and ideas as well as self-determination and nonintervention, then the concept of humanity must once again become the invisible and unsurpassable horizon of discourse, not its positive pole. The word "human," to evoke one final distinction, must once again become descriptive of a "fact" and not a "value." Otherwise, whatever else it may be, the search for "human" rights will always also be the negative image of the relentless search for the "inhuman" other.

### Link---Rule of Law

#### The plan identifies the non-Western world as a space devoid of the rule of law---that sets the stage for aggressive intervention and colonial plunder, which locks in neoliberal structural violence

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi_legal_papers>

Within this framework, Western law has constantly enjoyed a dominant position during the past centuries and today, thus being in the position to shape and bend the evolution of other legal systems worldwide. During the colonial era, continental-European powers have systematically exported their own legal systems to the colonized lands. During the past decades and today, the United States have been dominating the international arena as the most powerful economic power, exporting their own legal system to the ‘periphery’, both by itself and through a set of international institutions, behaving as a neo-colonialist within the ideology known as neoliberalism.

Western countries identify themselves as law-abiding and civilized no matter what their actual history reveals. Such identification is acquired by false knowledge and false comparison with other peoples, those who were said to ‘lack’ the rule of law, such as China, Japan, India, and the Islamic world more generally. In a similar fashion today, according to some leading economists, Third World developing countries ‘lack’ the minimal institutional systems necessary for the unfolding of a market economy.

The theory of ‘lack’ and the rhetoric of the rule of law have justified aggressive interventions from Western countries into non-Western ones. The policy of corporatization and open markets, supported today globally by the so-called Washington consensus3, was used by Western bankers and the business community in Latin America as the main vehicle to ‘open the veins’ of the continent—to borrow Eduardo Galeano’s metaphor4—with no solution of continuity between colonial and post-colonial times. Similar policy was used in Africa to facilitate the forced transfer of slaves to America, and today to facilitate the extraction of agricultural products, oil, minerals, ideas and cultural artefacts in the same countries. The policy of opening markets for free trade, used today in Afghanistan and Iraq, was used in China during the nineteenth century Opium War, in which free trade was interpreted as an obligation to buy drugs from British dealers. The policy of forcing local industries to compete on open markets was used by the British empire in Bengal, as it is today by the WTO in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Foreign-imposed privatization laws that facilitate unconscionable bargains at the expense of the people have been vehicles of plunder, not of legality. In all these settings the tragic human suffering produced by such plunder is simply ignored. In this context law played a major role in legalizing such practices of powerful actors against the powerless.5 Yet, this use of power is scarcely explored in the study of Western law.

The exportation of Western legal institutions from the West to the ‘rest’ has systematically been justified through the ideological use of the extremely politically strong and technically weak concept of ‘rule of law’. The notion of ‘rule of law’ is an extremely ambiguous one. Notwithstanding, within any public discussion its positive connotations have always been taken for granted. The dominant image of the rule of law is false both historically and in the present, because it does not fully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others ‘lack’) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an ‘efficient’ market.

The rule of law has a bright and a dark side, with the latter progressively conquering new ground whenever the former is not empowered by a political soul. In the absence of such political life, the rule of law becomes a cold technology. Moreover, when large corporate actors dominate states (affected by a declining regulatory role), law becomes a product of the economy, and economy governs the law rather than being governed by it.

### Link---Russia

#### The painting of Russian threat construction only ensnares the structure into a logic of war via self-fulfilling prophecies

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky, April 2001, “*Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations*,” Strategic Forum, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a394649.pdf>, EUGENE B. RUMER is a Senior Fellow in and Director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. RICHARD SOKOLSKY is a Senior Fellow in the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program. ZKMSU

Ten years after the end of the Cold War, mutual hopes that a comprehensive partnership would replace containment as the major organizing theme in U.S.-Russian relations have not been realized. The record of the 1990s has left both Russia and the United States unsatisfied. Russia looks back at the decade with bitterness and a feeling of being marginalized and slighted by the world’s sole remaining superpower. It is also disappointed by its experience with Western-style reforms and mistrustful of American intentions. The United States is equally disappointed with Russia’s lack of focus, inability to engage effectively abroad, and failure to implement major reforms at home. A comprehensive partnership is out of the question. Renewed competition or active containment are also not credible as organizing principles. Russia’s economic, military and political/ideological weakness makes it an unlikely target of either U.S. competition or containment. Not only is Russia no longer a superpower, but its status as a regional power is in doubt. Current thinking about Russia is divided among four basic approaches: Forget Russia, Enfant Terrible Russia, Evil Russia, and Russia First. The Forget Russia view holds that Russia is too weak, too corrupt, and too chaotic to matter. After 10 years of trying to help Russia, the United States should focus its resources and attention on more deserving and important world issues. The Enfant Terrible view holds that, although Russia has been an irresponsible and irritating partner, it is too weak to hurt the United States and therefore need not be feared in earnest. President Vladimir Putin’s visits to Cuba and North Korea, courtship of Slobodan Milosevic, and welcoming of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to Moscow are of little strategic consequence and thus not worth our attention. This view presupposes the existence of an important U.S.-Russian bilateral agenda and the need to protect it from childish and irresponsible Russian grandstanding. The Evil Russia view holds that Russian courtship of Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea is a deliberate effort to undermine U.S. influence in the world and recreate the Soviet empire. Analysts embracing this view take less notice of Russia’s diminished capabilities than of ambitious rhetoric by Russian politicians. Given Russia’s evil purposes, the United States is already on a collision course with it and might as well do everything it can to box Russia in. The Russia First view holds that Russia still is the most important issue on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. It accepts the premise that the two sides have shared interests and that Russia, once reborn as a stable, prosperous democracy, can be a U.S. partner and ally. Therefore, the United States should actively assist Russia in its transformation and engage it in a broad and intense relationship with renewed vigor and creativity. There are shortcomings in all of these approaches. Notwithstanding its precipitous decline, to Forget Russia is clearly not an option: the country’s geographic expanse, nuclear arsenal, and proliferation potential simply make it impossible for U.S. policymakers to ignore. The Enfant Terrible view fails to take Russia seriously and ignores the very real problems that exist between the two countries. The Evil Russia view risks inflating the threat and making the myth of evil Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Russia First view is not grounded in reality. After a decade of failure, it should be clear that neither the specter of Russia’s past nor the promise of its future warrants a position near the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Need for Normalcy Russia’s external weakness and internal problems have left the United States without an effective interlocutor, either as partner or competitor. Thus, the United States should deal with Russia on a case-by-case basis to advance our interests, in much the same way we deal with most other countries. This path will sometimes lead toward partnership with Russia and at other times toward competition. It may even result in a situation where Russia and the United States find themselves as partners and competitors simultaneously in different parts of the world or on different issues. Given its size, history, strategic nuclear capabilities, and future potential, one is tempted to overstate the importance of relations with Russia and put them at the top of the U.S. national security agenda. Except for geography and nuclear weapons, however, there is little at this stage to justify making relations with Russia a top priority. Undoubtedly, Russia can inflict unacceptable damage on the United States. But fear of Russian nuclear weapons should not be the driving element of the relationship. The hostility and ideological differences that divided the superpowers during the Cold War are gone. The prospect of Russia consolidating and rebuilding itself under a militant authoritarian, nationalist regime is remote. Therefore, fears of a deliberate surprise attack on the United States are unjustified. Despite a number of bilateral undertakings outside the Cold War-style security agenda, ranging from regional diplomacy in the Balkans to investment, U.S. engagement with Russia, with the notable exception of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Initiative, is limited. American investment in Russia is a fraction of what it is in Europe or China, trade rarely exceeds a few billion dollars a year, and political and cultural relations are limited at best. In other words, beyond traditional Cold War issues, the United States has an extremely narrow relationship with Russia, let alone enough of a stake in it to merit a special place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Nonetheless, while Russia is not a major player in Europe or Northeast Asia, its proximity to Europe, Japan, and China make it a focus of U.S. policy.

#### Cold War perceptions of Russian decision making perpetuates conflict – casual relations spur escalation

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Cold war redux? Nearly two decades since the Cold War was transcended by the Soviet Union’s refusal to play the game any more,44 why has the rhetoric of the Cold War resur- faced? Nuclear sabres are once again being rattled, and the lines of a new global struggle for geopolitical advantage are beginning to emerge. This, however, would be a very peculiar new Cold War, since no fundamental interests divide the two former superpowers (one has been reduced to great power status, while the other has become a hyperpower). There are no fundamental ideological contradictions, direct conflicts over resources or major differences over the substantive issues that face the international community. Indeed, in some ways Russia could have become the natural ally of America and the EU on a range of questions. So why have the differences become so sharp, and why has the whole architecture of post-commu- nist security arrangements been brought into question? In a rather schematic manner below I will suggest that there have been four major failures in adjusting policy to the new circumstances: political, strategic, intellectual and cultural. The key question is: How can we find our bearings in what we had assumed would be the post-Cold War era, to ensure that it is indeed the end of this particular global confrontation? The political failure There has been a profound asymmetry in the transcendence of the Cold War. While the structures that fought the Cold War (including the ideological ones) were dismantled on the one side, they were retained on the other. The functions of bodies such as NATO have not been replaced by a common collective security regime, but instead have been strengthened and enlarged. Russia’s early enthu- siasm for the OSCE reflected the aspiration to create a genuine common security regime, but failed to take into account the asymmetrical end to the Cold War. The same applies to the ‘softer’ Cold War structures, including the whole ideological- security apparatus. These are active in Washington and London, but in a different way no less alive in Moscow, and have been the easiest structures to revive in a renewed period of confrontation. The asymmetrical transcendence of the Cold War is accompanied by an internal asymmetry at the heart of Russian politics. Russia renounced its claims to the ideological leadership of an alternative system to the world capitalist order and the geopolitical leadership of an alternative military and political bloc, but it did not renounce its civilizational identity or its aspirations to participate in global leadership. The external asymmetry allowed one side of the old Cold War conflict to claim the right to oversee the transformation of the other; and while this was at first welcomed in Russia, it increasingly came to be resented and exacerbated the tensions within the internal asymmetry. While the neo-conservatives in Washington stressed the imperial and global role that the promotion of democratic values should play, Moscow began to reassert an aggressive autonomy in interna- tional affairs, insisting on the sovereign right of each country, if not to claim a Sonderweg, then at least to choose its own path and to define democracy as it saw fit: the new ideology of ‘sovereign democracy’ that came to the fore after Ukraine’s ‘Orange’ revolution in late 2004.45 The fundamental failure in the post-Cold War era has been to find ways to compensate for the twofold asymmetry. Even the recognition of the problem—that Russia could not easily be categorized as just another ‘post-communist’ country— was a long time coming. The general difficulty of adjusting the international system to the end of the bloc politics and hegemonic aspirations that were characteristic of the Cold War has still not been resolved. The key challenge after the dissolution of communist power in 1989–91, the winding-up of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, was how to insert Russia into the new global order. This would have been relatively easy if Russia had been a defeated power (like Germany and Japan after 1945), but proved much harder to do on its own terms, as an endlessly proclaimed ‘great power’. As early as the December 1992 meeting of what was still the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Kozyrev warned of the onset of a ‘new Cold War’, and such warnings have sounded regularly since then. The legitimacy of Russia’s ambition to be a great power, even a ‘normal’ one, has been questioned, even more than Britain’s and France’s aspirations in this respect. The major difference, of course, is that Russia’s readjusted role has been accompanied by a profound change in its internal political order, a process that is far from over. Grave issues of international politics have become interwoven into a constant regime of inspection over how Russia is doing internally.46 This asymmetry has been effectively exploited by the opposition in Russia. Domestic political actors soon learnt that easy political capital could be made by working the international circuit, condemning the latest alleged malfeasance by Russia’s rulers.47 Some of Russia’s neighbours learned the rules of this game only too well, and fed a constant stream of anti-Russian material to receptive ears on Capitol Hill and elsewhere.48 This then fed back into profoundly misinformed statements about developments in Russia and its policies, which in turn provoked Russian reactions that only deepened distrust and exacerbated suspicions about policy motivations.49 Thus all sides entered into a deeply negative spiral of mutual suspicion that gradually hardened into abuse which in turn gave way to threats and counterthreats. Russian domestic struggles were projected onto interstate rivalries. Indeed, the scholar Dmitry Furman argued that ‘There is only one opposition to Putin at present—other countries.’50 At the same time, America’s ideological wars for and against various abstractions—against terror and authoritarian capitalism, and for ‘global freedom’ and the like—affect specific countries, not least Russia.51 The net result is that the security of Europe and the world today is facing the gravest threat to peace since the end of the bloc politics of the Cold War. In some ways the threat is even greater, since the earlier confrontation had devised rules and stable expectations about how the conflict would be managed. Cold War conflict management procedures have been dismantled, while elements of the conflict have re-emerged in a far more anarchic context. Indeed, the political failure in the early 1990s, and once again in the early 2000s, to build on the evident desire of Russia to move beyond the Cold War, and to create new organizations that could provide common institutional mechanisms to solidify what was by any reckoning an epochal shift in global politics, allowed old institutions and ways of thinking to reassert themselves. Integration within the framework of the EU was not accompanied by an inclusive pan-European unifi- cation process. In Moscow the representatives of the old bloc mentality are now certainly in evidence once again, and their views are encouraged by their counter- parts in the West. Sergei Karaganov, director of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP), argues that this is evidence that a ‘new epoch of confron- tation (NEC)’ is beginning. Even in the 1990s ‘any attempt by Russia to stop the panicked retreat produced by the disintegration of the USSR was declared to be “neo-imperialism”’, to the point that today ‘the oversimplification of criticism on some parameters is even worse than in the Cold War … Any critic or opponent of the Russian president and the Kremlin automatically becomes a democrat and friend of the West.’ Europe’s failure to act as an autonomous power and the inten- sified rivalry between ‘the traditional West and the energy-producing countries for control of energy resources’ mean that Russia ‘has been forced by history into the centre of a new competitive struggle between the liberal-democratic and authoritarian models of capitalism’.52 A report issued to mark the 15th anniversary of the CFDP on 16 March 2007 talked about a global ‘crisis of manageability’, in which no single power centre on its own could manage the crisis engendered by the growing number of failed and failing states.53

### Link---Terror

#### Framing of terrorism is based on irrational thoughts that create endless war and state control

James Der Derian, leading IR theorist, respected professor, Political Science Professor, University of Massachusetts, 12/19/2008, Critical Practices in International Theory, pg. 70-72

For some, this kind of intellectual activity might be considered subversive. Indeed, former Secretary of State George Shultz in a major policy address on terrorism stated that the US cannot effectively respond to terrorism unless Americans are of  one mind on the subject: "Our nation cannot summon the will to act without firm public understanding and support." Without such a consensus we risk becoming, in Shultz's words, "the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond." I believe, however, that it is time to take up a position of detachment towards terrorism that Hedley Bull approvingly referred to as "political nihilism". After all, "when times are out of joint," as they were for Hamlet and as they to be for the USA as the 1980s took a radical turn, we might find in Hamlet-who through his passionate yet intellectual introspection discovered just how rotten the declining state could be-a better guide than, say, Henry V-who "because he did not know how to govern his own kingdom, determined to make war upon his neighbors." We might also discover that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the official terrorist discourse, perhaps even uncomfortable truth that there is some of the terrorist in us, and some of us in the terrorist. My response, then, to Shultz is more diplomatic than politic:the new antidiplomatic estrangement of international relations requires that we endlessly mediate the terrorist act and the response to it with a deeper and broader knowledge of all practices of global political violence. Otherwise, the will to act becomes inseparable from the will to know, and terrorism becomes indistinguishable from counter-terrorism. Moreover, an alternative approach is needed because the problem of terrorism is implicated by a profound predicament that now confronts advanced societies. Call it late capitalism, post-modernism, post-warring, or as I prefer, neo-medievalism, it is a disturbing anxiety-inducing condition in which traditional modes of knowledge and formations of identity no longer seem up to the task of representing, let alone managing international relations. Nation-states never enjoyed a true monopoly on the use of force, but now more than in any other post-Westphalian time- and certainly at the accelerated pace-the legitimacy of that monopoly has come under serious challenges from social, economic, technical, and military changes. Interdependent economies, global ecological concerns penetration by surveillance and media technologies, the three dimensionality and nuclearization- they have all been recognized as growing antidiplomatic forces undermining the sovereign privileges and obligations of the territorial state. Less noticed and understood is the emergence of a terrorist discourse, by which I refer to a global semiotic activity where violent powers and insurgent  meanings clash. WIth a nuclear statement curtailing superpower and a global information economy boosting sign-power, it is increasingly in the discursive realm of terrorism that the "crises" of political legitimacy, national identity, and practical knowledge are being played out. Simultaneously brutalizing, repugnant, and fascinating, the terrorist repertoire-kidnapping, hijackings, and assassination- cannot alone account for its rise to the singular status of international crisis. In terrorist discourse a less visible battle is being fought-most desperately between the vanguards of aspiring powers and the rearguards of great powers-to reinscribe the boundaries of legitimacy in international relations. In short, four important yet neglected theoretical points are being made here. In the study of terrorism, method matters: but very little critical consciousness of just how much it matters has been demonstrated in the field. Second, method is matter given the symbolic practices of terrorism, limitations of physical anti-terrorism, and the simulacral projection of terrorism by the media, the representations of terrorism have taken o n a powerful materiality. Third, because of changing configurations of power that rival traditional claims of international legitimacy, new critical methods are called for. Fourth, method alone cannot substitute for an ontological step that anyone seriously seeking truths about terrorism must take: questioning how our own identity is implicated and constituted by the terrorist discourse must precede any study of terrorism. These critical considerations inform the analysis of modern forms of terrorism that follows. Taking into account the sheer volume of terrorist archive, I can make no claims for comprehensiveness. My strategy is deconstructive and reconstructive: to provide a method which might displace, critique, and historicize received accounts of terrorism and, simultaneously, to present an alternative primer for reading terrorism in its multiple, de-terroitoralized forms. What I wish to avoid is the subtextual ploy found in much of the terrorism literature where the theoretical organization of an inchoate body of thought pretends to reconcile the differences and contradictions of the terrorism, thus "taming" rather than interpreting a heavily conflicted field. At best, I hope to leave the reader with a critical method and the minimal amount of historical knowledge necessary to distinguish the politically dispossessed from the violently possessed, and to imagine possible forms of coexistence with the former, while galivanting collective action against the latter.

#### The case is a lie – terrorism truths are produced by fearmongering and faulty knowledge of the Other

Spencer, 8 – Lecturer in International Relations @ Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich (Alexander, and Rainer Hülsse, Assistant Professor of International Relations @ Ludwig-Maximilians-University, “The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the Constructivist Turn,” Security Dialogue vol. 39, no. 6, December)

In any case, most of what has been written on Al-Qaeda is based neither on interviews nor on field research conducted inside the organization. Rather, it builds on less-direct information – it is ‘veranda terrorism research’. Among the sources used are already existing studies of Al-Qaeda, media information and intelligence reports. Obviously, this leads to a rather incestuous field of knowledge, where one scholar reproduces the unverified views of another and thus contributes to the circulation of the ever-same ‘facts’ (Reid, 1993). This is hardly a new insight about terrorism research, however. Back in 1988, one review found that ‘there are probably few areas in the social science literature in which so much is written on the basis of so little research’ (Schmid & Jongman, 1988: 177). Another remarked that ‘with a few clusters of exception there is, in fact, a disturbing lack of good empirically-grounded research on terrorism’ (Gurr, 1988: 2). These findings have been subsequently confirmed – and deplored – on numerous occasions (e.g. Merari, 1991; Silke, 2001, 2004; Horgan, 2004; Schulze, 2004; Ranstorp, 2007). Obviously, this lack of primary research further aggravates the problem identified above, as it adds another layer of interpretation. Studies of this kind which predominantly use secondary information are interpretations of how others (e.g. intelligence staff or field-researching terrorism scholars) have interpreted Al- Qaeda members’ self-interpretation. And yet, despite these various filters, information in such studies is presented as though it provided objective accounts of the reality about Al-Qaeda. This is particularly true for work that draws on intelligence reports and treats them as though they were primary sources (e.g. Burke, 2003; Gunaratna, 2002; Jacquard, 2001; Koch, 2005; Reeve, 1999). Yet, even if an intelligence report is based on successful infiltration, it provides not a description but an interpretation of Al-Qaeda.

### Link---Warming

#### Warming rhetoric gets co-opted by the military furthering militarism - that turns the case

Marntinot, 07 [Steve – Instructor at the Center for Interdisciplinary Programs at San Francisco State University, “Militarism and Global Warming”] <http://www.greens.org/s-r/42/42-06.html>

In other words, war is the factor that renders the military a self-generating cyclic producer of global warming. Wars add untold and inestimable damage to the ecology on all levels, while fulfilling their major function of producing mass murder. War is the essential logic of a military machine, and of an ethic and a politics of militarism. Its fundamental purpose is to guarantee access to resources, and in particular petroleum, for its constituency. Its constituency is the US economy, and US industry. As the largest single consumer of petroleum in the world, its role is to guarantee the continued consumption of petroleum by the US economy, the largest national consumer of petroleum in the world. In addition, the military has become a major industrial factor in the US itself, as part of a greater economic cycle. This is a result of an ancillary economic process, the movement of runaway shops and of whole industries relocating to lower wage areas. Some industries moved south, others to Latin America, others to Asia or wherever on the globe they could be more exploitative. The US government, from the Reagan administration on, has provided subsidies to major industries to move to low-wage areas, and produced agreements in many countries for establishing export production zones — that is, zones in which production is only for export; they add little to the local host economies, and create international assembly lines whose only coherence is the multinational corporate structure that controls it. The effect of this process has been to gut the industrial base of the US economy. The subsidiary internal effect was that the military, the one industry that could not run away because it was strategic, gained economic hegemony by default. The US economy fell into the hands of the military-industrial complex. This brings us to the third dimension of militarist self-generation as a global warming factor. In the face of runaway industries, the US economy has become dominated by military production. The military is now connected and conjoined to roughly 50% of all economic activity in the US. This doesn’t mean that 50% of all production is military production; it means that 50% of all economic activity is associated with the military, either in the production of military hardware, the running of bases, or in ancillary industries whose major customer is the military, and who thus owe their existence and functions to that major customer. Military appropriations by Congress may be 25% of the budget, but there are ripple and multiplier effects that expand the economic involvement of the military to far beyond that 25%.  … the citizens of that structure, the corporations themselves, have no ethical concerns toward the planet nor toward life. Here is how corporate control of the economy, a history of militarism, and corporate globalization all come together. The US military is what facilitated the acquisition of exploitation rights in other countries by US corporations, leaving the US economy essentially a military-oriented economy. That is, militarism has engendered a military economy. Second, it fosters a situation in which a transnational corporate structure becomes the predominant political force in the world; and the citizens of that structure, the corporations themselves, have no ethical concerns toward the planet nor toward life. Its ethics are governed by the maintenance of its stock value on the stock markets of the world. Thus, resource exploitation is its food, and resource consumption is its metabolism. Militarism is the way corporations maintain their access to their food supply — the planet. Because the military economy is by nature a monopoly, owing to government control, security clearances, national security considerations, etc., all military industries fall into a culture of corruption that is far beyond that of ordinary industries. This corruption is a cultural phenomenon that makes health and longevity an ancillary concern. In the interests of that corruption, beyond profit or stock price levels, the military drives the political processes and thinking of this society to ideologically ignore or deny the problem of global warming. The profit picture is important, of course, and it leads the oil and coal interests to buy prostituted scientists to help them promulgate that denial. But the real opposition to recognition of global warming is more immediately the corruption that exudes from the military and its militarism. In order to seriously address the problem, the movements (ecology, environmentalist, anti-consumption, alternative energy) will have to be anti-militarist. The military is key to the cycle of self-generation of global warming at the human (initiatory) end of the spectrum of factors. The military may not be the worst offender in producing greenhouse gases in the pragmatic sense, but it is the worst offender as an entity and an ideology in the world. It has to be seen as lying at the heart of the offense itself.  The military may not be the worst offender in producing greenhouse gases in the pragmatic sense, but it is the worst offender as an entity and an ideology …It is not possible for the environmental movement to take a step toward preserving the environment unless two things are brought to an end — the existence of the US military machine and the existence of the corporate structure.

#### That destroys movements which are key to solving warming in the real world

Brinsmead, 98 [Robert D. – Hall of Fame Winner of the Tweed Business Excellence Award, “APOCALYPTIC AND CLIMATE CHANGE”]

APOCALYPTIC AND CLIMATE CHANGE: Apocalyptic has a 100% failure rate. Yet the question is raised whether climate change apocalyptic might be the one awful instance when apocalyptic proves to be right - like the boy who repeatedly cried “Wolf!” Apocalyptic takes its name from an aberrant form of Judaism that developed around 200 B.C. It prevailed until the bar Cochba revolt in 135 C.E. That was when it finally managed to destroy itself in an ill-conceived “end-time” conflict with the Romans. After this, Rabbinic Judaism pronounced a curse on any Jew who persisted with apocalyptic. Scholars of apocalyptic literature and apocalyptic movements recognize that this development within Judaism was the classical form of apocalyptic, providing a kind of paradigm for other apocalyptic movements right down to our day, including especially America’s religious Right, Marxism and Environmentalism. Apocalyptic has been called “a theology [or a world view] of despair,” meaning that it is an outlook that has lost faith in the historical process. After Judaism had been ruled by one great power after another (Babylon, Persia, Greece and Syria), it lost faith that its aspirations for independent statehood under its own Davidic king would take place within the ordinary historical process. It therefore focused on a very bloody “end-time” solution that would terminate the ordinary historical process. The hallmark of apocalyptic is to see the world getting worse and worse – whether that is the ruling powers getting worse and worse (Jewish apocalyptic), humanity getting worse and worse (Christian apocalyptic), capitalist society getting worse and worse (Marxist apocalyptic), or the environment getting worse and worse (Greenpeace-style apocalyptic). In the case of the apocalyptic Zealots within Judaism, (if I may borrow some striking imagery from Albert Schweitzer) they threw themselves on the wheel of history in a last desperate effort to make it turn. The wheel turned, but it crushed them rather than ending Greco-Roman civilization and the historical process. With its 100% failure rate, apocalyptic movements illustrate one thing that apocalyptic environmentalism is yet to learn: it is people who are fragile, not the world with its historical process. Its climate change alarmism is just another form of Salvationism - in this case the salvation of a supposedly fragile earth that is about to be destroyed by human activity. When even school children are being conscripted to play a role in “saving the planet” by doing good little deeds like cutting back on water and energy consumption, planting trees and riding bikes instead of using cars, we may see how far this apocalyptic salvationism has penetrated the popular culture. Suppose we ask a good geologist such as Professor Ian Plimer to tell us, especially in the context of the current global warming panic, whether the earth is so fragile that it calls for human efforts to save it. Plimer has already given his published answer, and it is almost like a snort of derision. In *The Past is the Key to the Present*, Plimer says: “For at least the last 2500 Ma, the continents have been pulled apart and stitched back together. Every time the continents are pulled apart, huge quantities of volcanic H2O, CO2 and CH4 are released into the atmosphere and greenhouse conditions prevail. When continents stitch together, mountain ranges form. Mountains are stripped of soils, new soils form and remove CO2 from the atmosphere, these soils are stripped from the land and the CO2 becomes locked in sediments on the ocean floor. When atmospheric CO2 is low, glaciation occurs. Large climate cycles can be related to plate tectonics.” (The full paper may be viewed at www.climatechangeissues.com/files/science/Plimer.doc ) Plimer goes on like this for page after page, portraying planet earth being pelted and pummeled with asteroids, intense global volcanism, mass extinctions, great ice ages, inter-glacial periods much warmer than our present “five minutes” of global warming, enormous sea-level changes, variations in atmospheric carbon dioxide from 6% to our present 0.037% and lower. In short, a planet that has survived what planet earth has survived for 4.5 billion years is anything but fragile. Plimer has also said that he wrote *A Short History of Planet Earth* because he “was inspired by a Greenpeace banner which read ‘Stop Climate Change.’ To stop climate change, one must stop supernova eruptions, solar flaring, sunspots, orbital wobbles, meteorites, comets, life, mountain building, erosion, weathering, sedimentation, continental drift, volcanoes, ocean currents, tides and ice armadas – no mean feat, even for Greenpeace!” www.smedg.org.au/plimer0701.html Whether the earth, including its climate system, is fragile or resilient goes to the heart of the climate change debate. The kind of world view that we bring to the debate determines how the facts about C02 and the climate are interpreted. For instance, if in discussion with a climate alarmist you point out that CO2 represents only 3.6% of all greenhouse gases, and that humans produce only about 3% of all CO2 emissions, you may then make the point that the human contribution is only 0. l8% - not much more than 1 part in a 1000 of all greenhouse gases. If anyone quibbles on the exact percentages here, you can double the human contribution and it is still comes out a very tiny number in the whole greenhouse equation. When the warming alarmists are confronted with these facts, they must resort to the argument that the climate is so finely tuned and earth’s systems are so fragile that this small human contribution – a human burp in a thunderstorm when compared with the vast natural greenhouse emitters - will cause a catastrophic tipping point in the earth’s fragile climate system. There is no danger that this super-tough, resilient old planet will not be able to take a bit of extra CO2 in its stride as it has repeatedly done in its past history anyway. So much for the myth of the fragile earth! It is also a dangerous myth because like all apocalyptic myths it has the capacity to hurt people. The policies being advocated by the climate change alarmists call for drastic economic and social changes, and they won’t be satisfied until they have destroyed civilization as we know it. If climate apocalyptic goes the way of all apocalyptic in being impatient and intolerant, no changes are going to be rapid enough or severe enough to inaugurate its post-industrial age. It will therefore throw itself on the wheel of history to force it to turn. We should already know the outcome.

#### Discourse analysis is a prior question – if we win a link argument that proves the aff is based on a production of knowledge which favors certain understandings of reality while marginalizing others - their global environment scenario ensures extinction and a diversion from real science

Karin Bäckstrand, Wallenberg Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science at Lund University, andEva Lövbrand, Department of Environmental Science at Kalmar University, 2006, Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change: Contested Discourses of Ecological Modernization, Green Governmentality and Civic Environmentalism, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 6 No. 1, pg 50-75

Discourses of Environmental Governance Discourse analysis has gained ground and proliferated in the analysis of global environmental change in sociology, political ecology and policy studies.[2](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT2) A central insight of this disparate work is to identify power relationships associated with dominant narratives surrounding "environment" and "sustainable development." Four dimensions of discourse analysis that are prominent in the literature and relevant for our study are highlighted. First, discourses are conceived of as a shared meaning of phenomena. Global environmental change in general and the role of terrestrial carbon sinks in particular are permeated by a struggle over meaning and symbolic representation. In line with Hajer we understand discourses as "specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorization that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices."[3](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT3) Secondly, the exercise of power is closely tied to the production of knowledge, [End Page 51] which in turn can sustain a discourse. Hence, discourses are embedded in power relations, "as historically variable ways of specifying knowledge and truth--what is possible to speak at a given moment."[4](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT4) Discourses as "knowledge regimes" bring us squarely to the role of science. In expert-driven global environmental change research especially, modern scientific knowledge, techniques, practices and institutions enable the production and maintenance of discourses. Thirdly, in line with argumentative discourse analysis, we subscribe to a conception of discourse that bridges the gap between the linguistic aspects and institutional dimensions of policy-making. In this vein discourse analysis can be brought to the forefront of the analysis of power and policy. Policies are not neutral tools but rather a product of discursive struggles. Accordingly, policy discourses favor certain descriptions of reality, empower certain actors while marginalizing others. The concept of discourse institutionalization is useful as it refers to the transformation of discourse into institutional phenomena.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT5) Fourthly, we align ourselves with a discourse analysis that includes a notion of agency. Recent studies have advanced concepts such as "discourse coalition" and "knowledge broker" to highlight how agents are embedded in discourses.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v006/6.1backstrand.html#FOOT6) In this perspective, discourses are inconceivable without discoursing subjects or agents that interpret, articulate and reproduce storylines congruent with certain discourses. We use the concept of discursive agent and argue that political power stems from the ability to articulate and set the term for the discourse.To conclude, we employ a discourse-analytic framework that sheds light on how discourses are deeply embedded in scientific practices and techniques, institutionalized in global policy arenas and articulated by agents spanning the public-private and local-global divide. In the sections below we present each of the three discourses that arguably underpin policy practice and academic debates of environmental governance. They provide rough maps for understanding the discursive framing of contemporary global environmental politics. However, as will be demonstrated, each discourse is heterogeneous and thus in a constant change and redefinition. Consequently, there are overlaps and conflicts between the discourses when making sense of environmental governance.

## Impacts

### Impact---S/V

#### Security renders lawfare a tool of violent biopolitical governance---the result is endless violence

John Morrissey 11, Lecturer in Political and Cultural Geography, National University of Ireland, Galway; has held visiting research fellowships at University College Cork, City University of New York, Virginia Tech and the University of Cambridge. Liberal Lawfare and Biopolitics: US Juridical Warfare in the War on Terror, Geopolitics, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2011

Security, not liberty: the ‘permanent emergency’ of the security society

The US military’s evident disdain for international law, indifference to the pain of ‘Others’ and endless justifying of its actions via the language of ‘emergency’ have prompted various authors to reflect on Giorgio Agamben’s work, in particular, on bare life and the state of exception in accounting for the functioning of US sovereign power in the contemporary world.111 Claudio Minca, for example, has used Agamben to attempt to lay bare US military power in the spaces of exception of the global war on terror; for Minca, “it is precisely the absence of a theory of space able to inscribe the spatialisation of exception that allows, today, such an enormous, unthinkable range of action to sovereign decision”.112 This critique speaks especially to the excessive sovereign violence of our times, all perpetrated in the name of a global war on terror.113 Minca’s argument is that geography as a discipline has failed to geo-graph and theorise the spatialization of the ‘pure’ sovereign violence of legitimated geopolitical action overseas. He uses the notion of the camp to outline the spatial manifestation and endgame of a new global biopolitical ‘nomos’ that has unprecedented power to except bare life.114

In the ‘biopolitical nomos’ of camps and prisons in the Middle East and elsewhere, managing detainees is an important element of the US military project. As CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid made clear to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2006, “an essential part of our combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan entails the need to detain enemy combatants and terrorists”.115 However, it is a mistake to characterize as ‘exceptional’ the US military’s broader biopolitical project in the war on terror. Both Minca’s and Agamben’s emphasis on the notion of ‘exception’ is most convincing when elucidating how the US military has dealt with the ‘threat’ of enemy combatants, rather than how it has planned for, legally securitized and enacted, its ‘own’ aggression against them. It does not account for the proactive juridical warfare of the US military in its forward deployment throughout the globe, which rigorously secures classified SOFAs with host nations and protects its armed personnel from transfer to the International Criminal Court. Far from designating a ‘space of exception’, the US does this to establish normative parameters in its exercise of legally sanctioned military violence and to maximize its ‘operational capacities of securitization’.

A bigger question, of course, is what the US military practices of lawfare and juridical securitization say about our contemporary moment. Are they essentially ‘exceptional’ in character, prompted by the so-called exceptional character of global terrorism today? Are they therefore enacted in ‘spaces of exceptions’ or are they, in fact, simply contemporary examples of Foucault’s ‘spaces of security’ that are neither exceptional nor indeed a departure from, or perversion of, liberal democracy? As Mark Neocleous so aptly puts it, has the “liberal project of ‘liberty’” not always been, in fact, a “project of security”?116 This ‘project of security’ has long invoked a powerful political dispositif of ‘executive powers’, typically registered as ‘emergency powers’, but, as Neocleous makes clear, of the permanent kind.117 For Neocleous, the pursuit of ‘security’ – and more specifically ‘capitalist security’ – marked the very emergence of liberal democracies, and continues to frame our contemporary world. In the West at least, that world may be endlessly registered as a liberal democracy defined by the ‘rule of law’, but, as Neocleous reminds us, the assumption that the law, decoupled from politics, acts as the ultimate safeguard of democracy is simply false – a key point affirmed by considering the US military’s extensive waging of liberal lawfare. As David Kennedy observes, the military lawyer who “carries the briefcase of rules and restrictions” has long been replaced by the lawyer who “participate[s] in discussions of strategy and tactics”.118

The US military’s liberal lawfare reveals how the rule of law is simply another securitization tactic in liberalism’s ‘pursuit of security’; a pursuit that paradoxically eliminates fundamental rights and freedoms in the ‘name of security’.119 This is a ‘liberalism’ defined by what Michael Dillon and Julian Reid see as a commitment to waging ‘biopolitical war’ for the securitization of life – ‘killing to make live’.120 And for Mark Neocleous, (neo)liberalism’s fetishization of ‘security’ – as both a discourse and a technique of government – has resulted in a world defined by anti-democratic technologies of power.121 In the case of the US military’s forward deployment on the frontiers of the war on terror – and its juridical tactics to secure biopolitical power thereat – this has been made possible by constant reference to a neoliberal ‘project of security’ registered in a language of ‘endless emergency’ to ‘secure’ the geopolitical and geoeconomic goals of US foreign policy.122 The US military’s continuous and indeed growing military footprint in the Middle East and elsewhere can be read as a ‘permanent emergency’,123 the new ‘normal’ in which geopolitical military interventionism and its concomitant biopolitical technologies of power are necessitated by the perennial political economic ‘need’ to securitize volatility and threat.

Conclusion: enabling biopolitical power in the age of securitization

“Law and force flow into one another. We make war in the shadow of law, and law in the shadow of force” – David Kennedy, Of War and Law 124

Can a focus on lawfare and biopolitics help us to critique our contemporary moment’s proliferation of practices of securitization – practices that appear to be primarily concerned with coding, quantifying, governing and anticipating life itself? In the context of US military’s war on terror, I have argued above that it can. If, as David Kennedy points out, the “emergence of a global economic and commercial order has amplified the role of background legal regulations as the strategic terrain for transnational activities of all sorts”, this also includes, of course, ‘warfare’; and for some time, the US military has recognized the “opportunities for creative strategy” made possible by proactively waging lawfare beyond the battlefield.125 As Walter Benjamin observed nearly a century ago, at the very heart of military violence is a “lawmaking character”.126 And it is this ‘lawmaking character’ that is integral to the biopolitical technologies of power that secure US geopolitics in our contemporary moment. US lawfare focuses “the attention of the world on this or that excess” whilst simultaneously arming “the most heinous human suffering in legal privilege”, redefining horrific violence as “collateral damage, self-defense, proportionality, or necessity”.127 It involves a mobilization of the law that is precisely channelled towards “evasion”, securing 23 classified Status of Forces Agreements and “offering at once the experience of safe ethical distance and careful pragmatic assessment, while parcelling out responsibility, attributing it, denying it – even sometimes embracing it – as a tactic of statecraft and war”.128

Since the inception of the war on terror, the US military has waged incessant lawfare to legally securitize, regulate and empower its ‘operational capacities’ in its multiples ‘spaces of security’ across the globe – whether that be at a US base in the Kyrgyz Republic or in combat in Iraq. I have sought to highlight here these tactics by demonstrating how the execution of US geopolitics relies upon a proactive legal-biopolitical securitization of US troops at the frontiers of the American ‘leasehold empire’. For the US military, legal-biopolitical apparatuses of security enable its geopolitical and geoeconomic projects of security on the ground; they plan for and legally condition the ‘milieux’ of military commanders; and in so doing they render operational the pivotal spaces of overseas intervention of contemporary US national security conceived in terms of ‘global governmentality’.129 In the US global war on terror, it is lawfare that facilitates what Foucault calls the “biopolitics of security” – when life itself becomes the “object of security”.130 For the US military, this involves the eliminating of threats to ‘life’, the creating of operational capabilities to ‘make live’ and the anticipating and management of life’s uncertain ‘future’.

Some of the most key contributions across the social sciences and humanities in recent years have divulged how discourses of ‘security’, ‘precarity’ and ‘risk’ function centrally in the governing dispositifs of our contemporary world.131 In a society of (in)security, such discourses have a profound power to invoke danger as “requiring extraordinary action”.132 In the ongoing war on terror, registers of emergency play pivotal roles in the justification of military securitization strategies, where ‘risk’, it seems, has become permanently binded to ‘securitization’. As Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster point out, the “perspective of risk management” seductively effects practices of military securitization to be seen as necessary, legitimate and indeed therapeutic.133 US tactics of liberal lawfare in the long war – the conditioning of the battlefield, the sanctioning of the privilege of violence, the regulating of the conduct of troops, the interpreting, negating and utilizing 24 of international law, and the securing of SOFAs – are vital security dispositifs of a broader ‘risk- securitization’ strategy involving the deployment of liberal technologies of biopower to “manage dangerous irruptions in the future”.134 It may well be fought beyond the battlefield in “a war of the pentagon rather than a war of the spear”,135 but it is lawfare that ultimately enables the ‘toxic combination’ of US geopolitics and biopolitics defining the current age of securitization.

#### The impact is massive structural violence as a majority of the globe is reduced to bare life---the war on terror represents an extension of necropolitical impulse of colonialism---investigating the historical constitution of war via asymmetrical power relations is necessary to solve endless violence

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¶ The Necropolitics of Global Civil War¶ As with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. It "tends," as Hardt and Negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. Hardt and Negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). What Hardt and Negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "War," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). For example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). The ambiguity of Hardt and Negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." At the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). If none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with Hardt and Negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ In fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the United States of America, specifically after 11 September 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as Crystal Bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. For example, in Sri Lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's Sinhala Only Movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since President Jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983. Similarly, according to Achille Mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the European imperial project in "Africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). In other words, although Hardt and Negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. Indeed, not only do Hardt and Negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what David Harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. As for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional association of civil war with "insurrection and resistance" (Agamben 2005, 2). Instead, it has become the effect of a diffuse new sovereignty (i.e., Hardt and Negri's Empire), a sovereignty that no longer decides over but has itself become a disembodied, that is, denationalized and normalized, state of exception. Yet, to talk about the disembodiment of global war not only reinforces media-supported ideologies of high-tech precision wars without casualties, but it also represses narratives about the ways in which the modi operandi of global war come to be embodied differently in different sites of war.¶ In her short story "Man Without a Mask" (1995), the Sri Lankan writer Jean Arasanayagam describes the global dimensions of a war that is usually considered an ethnic civil war restricted to internally competing claims to territorial, cultural, and national sovereignty between the country's Sinhalese and Tamil population. Told by an elite mercenary who clandestinely works for the ruling members of the government and leads a group of highly trained assassins, the story follows the thoughts of its narrator and contemplates the politicization of violence and death. As a mercenary and possibly an ex-SAS (British Special Air Service) veteran the Sri Lankan Government hired after the failure of the Indo-Lankan Accord, the narrator signifies the "privatization of [Sri Lanka's] war" (Tambiah 1996, 6) and, thus, the reign of a global free market economy through which the state hands over its institutions and services to private corporations, including its army, and profits from the unrestricted global and illegal trade in war technologies. Like a craftsman, the mercenary finds satisfaction in the precision and methodical cleanliness of his work, in being, as he says, "a hunter. Not a predator" in his ability to leave "morality" out of "this business" (Arasanayagam 1995, 98). He is an extreme and perverted version of what Martin Shaw describes as the " 'soldier-scholar,'???the archetype of the new [global] officer" (1999, 60). As a self-proclaimed "scholar or scribe" (ibid., 100), the mercenary plots maps of death. Shortly before he reaches his victim, a politician who underestimated the political ambition of his enemy, he comments that bullet holes in a human body comprise a new kind of language: "The machine gun splutters. The body is pitted, pricked out with an indecipherable message. They are the braille marks of the new fictions. People are still so slow to comprehend their meaning" (ibid., 100). These new maps or fictions of global war, I suggest, describe what Etienne Balibar calls ultra-objective and ultra-subjective violence and characterize how global civil war both generates bare life and manages and instrumentalizes death.¶ According to Balibar, ultra-objective violence suggests the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (2001, 27) brought about, for instance, by the Sri Lankan government's prolonged abuse of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, in the past plunged the country into a permanent state of emergency, facilitated the random arrest of and almost absolute rule over citizens, and thus created a culture of fear and a reversal of moral and social values. As the story clarifies, under conditions of systematic or ultra-objective violence, "corruption" becomes "virtue" and "the most vile" man wears the mask of the sage and "innocent householder" (Arasanayagam 1995, 102). In this milieu, the mercenary has no need for a mask, because he bears a face of ordinary violence that is "perfectly safe" (ibid., 102) in a society structured by habitual and systemic violence. But the logic of the "new fictions" of political violence is also ultra-subjective because it is "intentional" and has a "determinate goal" (Balibar 2001, 25), namely the making and elimination of what Balibar calls "disposable people" in order to generate and maintain a profitable global economy of violence. The logic of ultra-subjective violence presents itself through the fictions of ethnicity and identity as they are advanced and instrumentalized in the name of national sovereignty. The mercenary perfectly symbolizes what Balibar means when he writes that "we have entered a world of the banality of objective cruelty" (ibid.). For if the fictions of global violence are scratched into the tortured bodies of war victims, the mercenary's detached behavior dramatizes a "will to 'de-corporation'," that is, to force disaffiliation from the other and from oneself ??? not just from belonging to the community and the political unity, but from the human condition" (ibid.). In other words, while global civil war becomes embodied in those whom it negates as social beings and thereby reduces to mere "flesh," it remains a disembodied enterprise for those who manage and orchestrate the politics of death of global war. It is through the dialectics of the embodiment and disembodiment of global violence that the dehumanization of the majority of the globe's population takes on a normative and naturalized state of existence.¶ Arasanayagam's short story also casts light on the limitations of Hardt and Negri's understanding of the biopolitics of global civil war, for the latter can account neither for the new fictions of violence in former colonial spaces nor for what Mbembe calls the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of late modernity. Mbembe's term refers to his analysis of global warfare as the continuation of earlier and the development of new "forms of subjugation of life to the power of death" and its attendant reconfiguration of the "the relationship between resistance, sacrifice, and terror" (2003, 39). 4 Despite the many theoretical intersections of Hardt and Negri's and Mbembe's work, Mbembe's notion of necropolitics sees contemporary warfare as a species of such earlier "topographies of cruelty" (2003, 40) as the plantation system and the colony. Thus, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Mbembe argues that the ways in which global violence and warfare produce subjectivities cannot be dissociated from the ways in which race serves as a means of both deciding over life and death and of legitimizing and making killing without impunity a customary practice of imperial population control. If global civil war is a continuation of imperial forms of warfare, it must rely on strategies of embodiment, that is, of politicizing and racializing the colonized or now "disposable" body for purposes of self-legitimization, specifically when taking decisions over the value of human life. After all, on a global level, race propels the ideological dynamics of ethnic and global civil war, while, on the local plane, it serves to orchestrate the brutalization and polarization of the domestic population, reinforcing and enacting patterns of racist exclusion and violence on the non-white body. In contrast to Hardt and Negri, then, Mbembe invites us to articulate imperial genealogies for the necropolitics of today's global civil wars.¶ In other words, if imperialism was a form of perpetual low-intensity global war, the biopolitics of imperialism aimed at creating different forms of subjectivization. For example, while in India, the imperial administration sought to create a functional class of native informants, in Africa and the Caribbean, the British Empire created the figure of homo sacer. The latter, as Agamben argues, refers to the one who can be killed but not sacrificed. Homo sacer, Agamben clarifies, constitutes "the originary exception in which human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed" (1998, 85). Thus, the native is included in the imperial order only through her exclusion, while, simultaneously her humanity is stripped of social life and transformed into bare life, ready to be commodified on slavery's auction blocs and foreclosed from the dominant imperial psyche. Agamben's understanding of bare life derives from his reading of the Nazi death camps as the paradigmatic space of modernity in which the distinction between "fact and law" (ibid., 171), "outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit" (ibid., 170) dissolves and in which biopolitics takes the place of politics and "homo sacer" replaces the "citizen" (ibid., 171). While the notion of bare life is instrumental for theorizing biopolitics and the normalization and legalization of state violence under the pretense of, for example, protective arrests and preemptive strikes, it also suggests that the human body can be read as pure matter or in empirical terms. What goes unnoticed is to what extent the production of bare life depends on ideologies of race, that is, on the racialization of bodies, citizenship, and the concept of the human. For instance, under imperial rule, bare life is subjected to death and its politics in ways slightly different from those suggested by Agamben. More specifically, the killing of natives or slaves as bare life ??? then and today, as Rwanda's race-based genocide clarifies ??? not only configures human life in terms of its "capacity to be killed" (Agamben 1998, 114), that is as homicide and genocide outside of law and accountability, but also measures the value of human life on grounds of race. The making of bare life is a racialized and racializing process rooted within the necropolitics of colonialism. For, killing the native or slave presupposes the remaking of the human into bare life both through ideologies of pseudo-scientific racism and by subjecting them to what Orlando Patterson calls the "social death" (1982, 38) of the slave, that is, to a symbolic death of the human as a communal and social being that precedes physical death. 5 Thus, imperialism's necropolitics involves the making of disposable lives through practices of zombification and the "redefinition of death" itself (Agamben 1998, 161). In this sense, imperialism not only facilitated the extreme forms of racialized violence characteristic of global civil war, but it also helped create the conditions for making bare life the acceptable state of being for the present majority of the globe's population.¶ Not unlike Jean Arasanayagam's short story, Mbembe's account of the Rwandan genocide and the Palestinian intifada suggests that the new global subjectivities are not so much the networked multitude Hardt and Negri imagine. Rather, emerging from the "new fictions" of global war, they are the suicide bomber, the mercenary, the martyr, the child soldier, the victim of mass rape, the refugee, the woman dispossessed of her family and livelihood, the mutilated civilian, and the skeleton of the disappeared and murdered victims of global civil war. What these subjectivities witness is that, on one hand, living under conditions of global civil war means to live in "permanent???pain" (Mbembe 2003, 39) and, on the other hand, they refer back to the dialectical mechanisms of colonial violence. For under the Manichaean pressures of colonialism, colonial violence always inaugurates a double process of subjection and subject formation. Frantz Fanon famously argues that anti-colonial violence operates historically on both collective and individual subject formation. For, on the one hand, "the native discovers reality [colonial alienation] and transforms it into the pattern of this customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom" (1963, 58), and on the other, a violent "war of liberation" instills in the individual a sense of "a collective history" (ibid., 93). Thus, as Robert Young suggests, anti-colonial violence "functions as a kind of psychotherapy of the oppressed" (2001, 295). Yet, it seems that read through the necropolitics of imperialism, global civil warfare no longer aims at the "pacification" of the colonial subject or the "degradation" of the "postcolonial subject" (ibid., 293) but, as I suggested earlier, at the complete abolishment of the human per se. We may therefore say that if global civil war produces new subjectivities, it does so through, what I have referred to as a process of zombification. Understood as sustained acts of negation, zombification ??? a term that harks back to Fanon ??? refers to a dialectical process of the embodiment and disembodiment of global war. The former refers to the exercise of ultra-objective violence ??? that is, the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (Balibar 2001, 27) ??? in order to regulate, racialize, and extinguish human life at will, while the latter suggests the production of narratives of "de-corporation" (ibid., 25) and detachment by those who manage and administrate global civil war. The notion of zombification, however, connotes not only the exercise of, but also the exorcism of, the ways in which global war is scripted on and through the racialized body. Thus, a post-colonial understanding of global war needs to think through the necropolitics of war, including the uneven value historically and presently assigned to human life and the politicization of death. The latter issue will be addressed in the last section of this paper. The next section examines the cultural production and perpetuation of normative narratives of global warfare.¶ The Rhetoric of the Archaic and Michael Ondaatje's "Anil's Ghost"¶ Published shortly after Sri Lanka's civil war became entangled with the global politics of the South and the rise of the Sri Lankan nation-state to one of the war's principal and most corrupt actors, Ondaatje's novel Anil's Ghost dramatizes both the transformation of the country's civil war into a permanent state of exception and the failure of global non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to intervene in the war's rising human rights abuses and violent excesses. While the novel presents an extraordinary search for social justice through narrative and seeks to understand the operative modes of violence beyond their historical and social configurations, it also tends to sublimate and aestheticize violence by treating it as a normative element of human and, indeed, planetary life. My purpose here is to indicate that the novel's own project of dramatizing the complicity between religious and secular, anti-colonial and nationalist agents of war, and civilians and global actors (i.e., NGOs) remains compromised by the novel's aesthetic investment in a particular rhetoric of the archaic. The latter, I argue, unwittingly coincides with normative narratives of global war and facilitates the reader's detachment from the ways in which the Global North has reconstructed global life as a permanent state of exception.¶ Ondaatje's novel (2000) opens with an Author's Note that locates the narrative at a time when "the antigovernment insurgents in the south and the separatist guerrillas in the north???had declared war on the government" and "legal and illegal government squads were???sent out to hunt down" both groups. In this instance, the Hobbesian rhetoric of a "war of all against all" is more than a clich??. In fact, it is symptomatic of the novel's ambiguous critique of the role of the Sri Lankan nation-state and its elaborate, modernist discourse of violence. The Note foreshadows what the narrator later repeats on several occasions, namely that Sri Lanka's war is a war fought "for the purpose of war" (ibid., 98) and for which "[t]here is no hope of affixing blame" (ibid., 17). In short, the "reason for war was war" (ibid., 43). At first glance, the narrative's emphasis on the war's self-perpetuating dynamics implies a Hobbesian understanding of violence as the natural state of human existence. At the same time, it translates the actual politics of Sri Lanka's war into the Deleuzean idiom of the "war machine." For, according to Deleuze and Guattari, armed conflict functions outside the control and accountability of the "state apparatus???prior to its laws" (1987, 352), and beyond its initial causes. Although such an interpretation of Sri Lanka's war reflects what the political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda calls the "intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis" (1999, 158), its political and ethical stakes outweigh its gains. 6¶ To begin with, the novel's leitmotif of "perpetual war" situates Sri Lanka's conflict within a general context of global war, because, as the narrator reports, it is fought with "modern weaponry," supported by "backers on the sidelines in safe countries," and "sponsored by gun-and drug-runners" (Ondaajte 2000, 43). In this scenario, the rule of law has deteriorated into "a belief in???revenge" (ibid., 56), and the state is either absent or part of the country's all-consuming anarchy of violence. This absence suggests that the state no longer functions, in Max Weber's famous words, as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (2002, 13). It is of course possible to argue that the novel's critique of the Sri Lankan nation-state lies in its absence. It seems to me, however, that the narrative's tendency to locate the dynamics of Sri Lanka's war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a normative narrative of global war. On the one hand, it resonates with the popular ??? though misleading ??? notion that the "appearance of 'failed states'," as Samuel Huntington argues in his controversial study The Clash of Civilizations, intensifies "tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict" and thus "contributes to [the] image of a world in anarchy" (1996, 35). On the other, situating Sri Lanka's war outside the institutions of the state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that helps legitimize and cultivate structural violence as a permissive way of conducting politics. Such a reading of violence, however, overlooks that in a global context violence has become "profoundly anti-Hobbesian" (Balibar 2001, xi). Balibar usefully suggests that the twentieth century history of extreme violence has made it impossible to regard violence as "a structural condition that precedes institutions." Instead, he maintains, "we have had to accept???that extreme violence is not post-historical but actually post-institutional." It "arises from institutions as much as it arises against them" (ibid., xi). Thus, in such popular post-colonial narratives of war as Anil's Ghost, the normalization of violence figures as a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence as a state-sanctioned political practice.¶ If Ondaatje's novel presents Sri Lanka's war as an "inherently violent" event (Das 1998), it is also an event narrated through the symbolism and logic of archaic primitivism. For example, in the novel's central passage on the nature of human violence, the narrator observes, "The most precisely recorded moments of history lay adjacent to the extreme actions of nature or civilisation ???Tectonic slips and brutal human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical lives???A dog in Pompeii. A gardener in Hiroshima" (Ondaatje 2002, 55). The symbolic leveling of the arbitrariness of primordial chaos and the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create a rhetoric of the archaic that is characteristic, as Nancy argues, of "anything that is properly to be called war" (2000, 128). He convincingly argues that archaic symbolism "indicates that [war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as the progress of a linear/or cumulative time" and can be rearticulated as no more than a "regrettable" remnant of an earlier age (ibid., 128). In that, Nancy's observation coincides with Hardt and Negri's that the "war on terror" employs a medievalist rhetoric of just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the use of global violence by putting it outside the realm of reason and critique. In Nancy's observation, however, two things are at stake. First, what initially appears to be a postmodern critique of the grand narratives of history in fact demonstrates that a non-linear account of history may lend itself to the transformation of extreme violence into exceptional events. In this way violence is normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal political and economic relations of power, which lie at the heart of global wars.¶ Second, Nancy rightly warns us against treating war as an archaic relic that is "tendentiously effaced in the progress and project of a global humanity" (2000, 128). For not only does war return in the process of negotiating sovereignty on a global and local plane, but the representation of war in terms of archaic images also repeats a primordialist explanation of what are structurally new wars. As theorists such as Appadurai and Kaldor have argued, the primordialist hypothesis of global wars merely reinforces those mass mediated images of global violence that dramatize ethnic wars as pre-modern, tribalist forms of strife. Huntington's notion of civilization or "fault-line" wars as communal conflicts born out of the break-up of earlier political formations, demographic changes, and the collision of mutually exclusive religions and civilizations presents the most prominent and politically influential version of a primordialist and bipolar conceptualization of global war. In contrast to Huntington's approach, however, the narrative of Anil's Ghost contends that all forms of violence "have come into their comparison" (Ondaatje 2000, 203). Notwithstanding its universalizing impetus, the novel thus insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global order outside the technologies of violence and modernity. Indeed, in the novel's narrative it is the suffering of all war victims that "has come into their comparison" and suggests that the new wars breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be accountable. On the one hand, then, the novel's self-critical humanitarian project seeks to initiate a communal and individual process of mourning by naming, and therefore accounting for, in Anil's words, "the unhistorical dead" (ibid, 56). On the other hand, read as its critical investment in the war's politics of complicity, the novel's humanitarian endeavor is countered by the narrator's tendency to articulate violence in archaic and anarchistic terms. For, to revert to the symbolic language of "primitivism and anarchy" and "to treat [the new wars] as natural disasters," as Kaldor observes (2001, 113), designates a common way of dealing with them. Thus the rhetoric of the archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the making of a normative and popular imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable and comprehensible. Thus, their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist constructions of the failed post-colonial nation-state rather than a phenomenon with deep-seated roots in the global histories of the present. Such a normative imaginary of global war is produced for the Global North so as to dehistoricize its own position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and global economic restructuring of the Global South. In this way, as Ondaatje's novel equally demonstrates, the Global North can detach itself from the Global South and create the kind of historical and cultural distance needed to accept ultra-objective violence as a normative state of existence.¶ Conceptualizing war as a phenomenon of criminal and anarchistic violence, however, may do more than merely conform to the popular imagination about the chaotic and untamable nature of contemporary warfare. Indeed, anarchistic notions of violence tend to compress the grand narratives and petite recits of history into a total, singular present of perpetual uncertainty, fear, and political confusion and generate what the post-colonial anthropologist David Scott sees as Sri Lanka's "dehistoricized" history. Given the important role the claiming of ancient Sinhalese and Hindu history played in the violent identity politics that drive Sri Lanka's war, Scott suggests that devaluing or dehistoricizing history as a founding category of Sri Lanka's narrative of the nation breaks the presumably "natural???link between past identities and the legitimacy of present political claims" (1999, 103). This strategy seems useful because it uncouples Sri Lanka's colonially shaped and glorified Sinhalese past from its present claims to political power. We need to note, however, that, according to Scott, dehistoricizing the past does not suggest writing from a historical vacuum. Rather, it refers to a process of denaturalizing and, thus, de-legitimizing the normative narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity.¶ Anil's Ghost engages in this process of "dehistoricizing" by foregrounding the fictitious and fragmented, the elusive and ephemeral character of history. Indeed, as the historian Antoinette Burton suggests, the novel offers "a reflection on the continued possibility of History itself as an exclusively western epistemological form" (2003, 40). The latter clearly finds expression in what Sarath's brother, Gamini, condemns as "the last two hundred years of Western political writing" (Ondaatje 2000, 285). Steeped in the imperial project of the West, such writing is facilitated by and serves to erase the figure of the non-European cultural Other in order to produce and maintain what Jacques Derrida famously called the "white mythology" (1982, 207) of Western metaphysics. The novel usefully extends its reading of violence into a related critique of knowledge production, so that the latter becomes legible as being complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war. This critique is perhaps most articulated through the character of Palipana, Sarath's teacher and Sri Lanka's formerly renowned but now fallen anthropologist. Once an agent of Sri Lanka's anti-colonial liberation movement, Palipana represents the generation of cultural nationalist who sought history and national identity in an essentially Sinhalese culture and natural environment. Rather than employing empirical and colonial methods of knowledge production and historiography, Palipana had left the path of scientific objectivity, tinkered with translations of historical texts, and "approached runes???with the pragmatic awareness of locally inherited skills" (Ondaatje 2000, 82) until "the unprovable truth emerged" (ibid., 83). Now, years after his fall from scientific grace, Palipana lives the life of an ascetic, following the "strict principles of" a "sixth-century sect of monks" (ibid., 84). To him, history and nature have become one, for "all history was filled with sunlight, every hollow was filled with rain" (ibid., 84). Yet, Ondaatje's construction of Palipana and his account of the eye-painting ritual of a Buddha statue ??? a ritual that assumes a central place in the novel's cosmopolitan vision of artisanship as a practice of cultural and religious syncretism in the service of post-conflict community building ??? are themselves built on a number of historical texts listed in the novel's "Acknowledgment" section. As Antoinette Burton astutely observes, "the orientalism of some of the texts on Ondaatje's list is astonishing, a phenomenon which suggests the ongoing suppleness of 'history' as an instrument of political critique and ideological intervention" (2003, 50). Rather than effectively "dehistorizing" the character of Palipana, then, Ondaatje bases this character and the eye-painting ceremony on a central Sri Lankan modernist text, Ananada K. Coomaraswamy's Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (1908/1956).¶ Cont ¶ For Hardt and Negri, then, the state of exception functions as the universal condition and legitimization of global civil war, while positioning the United States as a global power, which transforms war "into the primary organizing principle of society" (2004, 12). They rightly observe that the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and war, violence and mediation. Yet, curiously enough, Hardt and Negri's understanding of the state of exception largely emphasizes the concept's regulatory and pragmatic politics, so that the United States emerges as a sovereign power on grounds of its ability to decide on the state of exception. By exempting itself from international law and courts of law, protecting its military from being subjected to international control, allowing preemptive strikes, and engaging in torture and illegal detention (ibid., 8), the United States instrumentalizes and maintains war as a state of exception in the name of global security and thus seeks to consolidate its hegemonic role within Empire. Although Hardt and Negri openly disagree with Agamben's reading of the state of exception as defining "power itself as a 'monopoly of violence' " (2004, 364), it seems to me that Agamben's theory of the state of exception, as put forward in Homo Sacer rather than in States of Exception, might be usefully read alongside Hardt and Negri's crucial claim that global civil war as well as resistance movements depend on the "production of subjectivity" through immaterial labour (2000, 66). What this argument overlooks is that, according to Agamben, the state of exception constitutes an abject space or "a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion" (1998, 181), where subjectivity enters a political and legal order solely on grounds of its exclusion. Moreover, the sovereign ??? albeit a nation, sovereign power, or global network of power ??? can only transform the rule of law into the force of law by suspending the legal system from a position that is simultaneously inside and outside the law. Through these mechanisms of exclusion and contradiction, subjectivity is not so much created as it is deprived of its social and political relationships. Thus the "originary activity" of global civil war is the violent conflation of political and social relationship and thereby the "production of bare life" (ibid., 83), of life that need not be accounted for, as is the case with the civilian casualties of the US-led war against Iraq. The state of exception, however, also figures as a prominent concept in post-colonial theory, for it raises questions not only about the ways in which we configure the human but also how we understand imperial or global war. ¶ In 1940, Benjamin famously wrote, "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight" (1968, 257). Benjamin's statement, as Homi Bhabha reminds us half a century later in his essay "Interrogating Identity," can be usefully advanced for a critical analysis of the dialectical ??? if not revolutionary ??? relationship between oppression, violence, and anti-colonial historiography. Indeed, "the state of emergency," as Bhabha says, "is also always a state of emergence" (1994, 41). Read in the context of today's global state of exception, namely the recurrence and intensification of ethnic civil wars across the globe and the coincidence of democratic and totalitarian forms of political rule, Bhabha's statement entails a number of risks and suggestions for a post-colonial historiography of global civil war.¶ First, Bhabha's notion of emergency/emergence reflects his critical reading of Fanon's vision of national identity and thus reconsiders the state of emergency as a possible site of "the occult instability where the people dwell" (Fanon 1963, 227) and give birth to popular movements of national liberation. In this context, the state of exception might be understood as both constitutive to the alienation that is intrinsic to liberation movements and instrumental for a radical euphoria and excessive hope that create and spectralize the post-colonial nation-state as a deferred promise of decolonization. It is through this perspective that we can critically evaluate Hardt and Negri's endorsement of what they call "democratic violence" (2004, 344). This kind of violence, they argue, belongs to the multitude. It is neither creative nor revolutionary but used on political rather than moral grounds. When organized horizontally, according to democratic principles of decision making, democratic violence serves as a means of defending "the accomplishments" of "political and social transformation" (ibid., 344). Notwithstanding the concept's romantic and utopian inflections, democratic violence also derives from Hardt and Negri's earlier argument that "the great wars of liberation are (or should be) oriented ultimately toward a 'war against war,' that is, an active effort to destroy the regime of violence that perpetuates our state of war and supports the systems of inequality and oppression." This, they conclude, is "a condition necessary for realizing the democracy of the multitude" (ibid., 67). In one quick stroke, Hardt and Negri move anti-colonial liberation wars into their post-national paradigm of Empire and divest them of their cultural and historical particularities. Moreover, translating explicitly national liberation movements into a universalizing narrative of global pacifism precludes a critique of violence within its particular historical and philosophical formation. In contrast, a post-colonial analysis of global war must tease out the intersections between the ways in which racialized violence constitutes colonial and post-colonial processes of nation formation and helps construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize global war and to abdicate responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic restructuring.¶ Second, while Bhabha's pun is symptomatic of the resisting properties that he sees as operative in the various practices of colonial ambiguity, it also, despite Benjamin's opinion, draws attention to the possibility that oppression alters the linear flow of Western history and challenges "the transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of human knowledge" (Bhabha 1994, 41). Here, Bhabha rightfully asks to what extent do states of emergency or acts of extreme violence constitute a historical rupture and, more importantly, call into question the nature of the human subject. It is at this point that a post-colonial reading of the state of exception fruitfully coincides with Agamben's notion of exception. For in both cases, the focus of inquiry is the construction of disposable life through the logic of necropower and the collapse of social and political relationships that enable the exercise of particularly racialized forms of violence, including torture and disappearances.¶ Third, Bhabha's notion of the double movement of emergency and emergence envisions an anti-colonialist historiography in terms of a dialectical process of perpetual transformation. It is at this point, however, that the coupling of emergency or exception and emergence becomes problematic for at least two reasons. First, combining both terms prematurely translates the violence of the political event into that of metaphor and risks erasing the micro- or quotidian narratives of violence ??? such as Arasanayagam's account of war ??? that both legitimate and are perpetuated by political and social states of emergency. In order to examine the relationship between global and communal forms of violence, a critical practice of post-colonial studies, I suggest, must reassess the term "transformation" and, concurrently, the assumption that acts of extreme global violence can be advanced in the service of "making history" (Balibar 2001, 26). In other words, if, as Hannah Arendt argues, there has been a historical "reluctance to deal with violence as a separate phenomenon in its own right" (2002, 25), it is time to examine the possibility of employing post-colonial studies in the service of a non-dialectical critique of global war. This kind of critique must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of violence. How, in other words, does bare life ??? if at all possible ??? attain the status of subjectivity within the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war?¶ Fourth, like Bhabha, we need to take seriously Benjamin's insight into the intrinsic relationship between violence and the conceptualization of history. Notwithstanding Bhabha's pivotal argument that the violence of a "unitary notion of history" generates a "unitary," and therefore extremely violent, "concept of man" (1994, 42), I wish to caution, alongside Benjamin's analysis of fascism, that what enables today's global civil war is that even "its opponents treat it as a historical norm" (Benjamin 1968, 257). What is at stake, then, in dominant as well as critical narratives of global civil war is their representation as natural rather than political phenomena, and the acceptance of globalization as a political fait accompli. Both of these aspects, I believe, contribute to the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of racialized violence and war. It seems to me, however, that the enormous rise of violence inflicted by global civil wars requires a post-colonial historiography and critique of global war that questions notions of history based on cultural fragmentation, rupture, and totalization. Instead, such a historiography must seek out patterns of connection and connectivity. But more importantly, as I have argued in this paper, it must trace the post-colonial moment of global civil war and begin to read contemporary war through the interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare. Thus, to understand the logic and practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding precisely of those civil wars and national liberation wars that do not appear to threaten the new global order. Furthermore, a post-colonial critique of global civil war should facilitate the decoding and rescripting of both the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment of global civil warfare.¶

#### Security threats are political constructions by experts to justify constant militarism

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Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today's dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them more directly and, in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. n310¶ [\*1486] ¶ Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of the national security state, with the U.S. military permanently mobilized to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike-at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decision-making are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint n311 -greatly outweigh the costs.¶ Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments, but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides-and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be-remains open as well.¶ Clearly, technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the [\*1487] world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. n312 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments-assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy.¶ In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America's post- World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. n313 In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century nation." n314 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and military power." n315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and war- making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power." n316 According to Fulbright, the United States had [\*1488] both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. n317 Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States' own national security rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states.¶ The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. n318 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding danger facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home. n319 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger-requiring ever-increasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling.¶ It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of [\*1489] modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States' massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. These assumptions mean that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underlines that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge.¶ If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of "expertise." n320 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. n321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.

#### Their threat discourse mass structural violence---rational impact calc goes neg

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It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you’ve been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons – among others.¶ The facts are simple and irrefutable: you’re far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called ‘national security issues’, the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of ‘security theatre’ designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious.¶ And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won’t notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won’t notice how much structural violence there is in the world.¶ More than this, they are hoping that you won’t notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate.¶ Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don’t want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence.¶ Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along.¶ Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don’t want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don’t believe the hype: you’re much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.

### Impact---Wars

#### Their paranoid projections guarantee unending wars

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In this sense, then, 9-11 has symbolically constituted a relief in the sense of a decrease in the persecutory anxiety provoked by living in a culture undergoing a deterioration from within. The implosion reflects the economic and social trends I described briefly above and has been manifest in many related symptoms, including the erosion of family and community, the corruption of government in league with the wealthy and powerful, the abandonment of working people by profit-driven corporations going international, urban plight, a drug-addicted youth, a violence addicted media reflecting and motivating an escalating real-world violence, the corrosion of civic participation by a decadent democracy, a spiritually bereft culture held prisoner to the almighty consumer ethic, racial discrimination, misogyny, gaybashing, growing numbers of families joining the homeless, and environmental devastation. Was this not lived as a kind of societal suicide--an ongoing assault, an aggressive attack—against life and emotional well-being waged from within against the societal self? In this sense, 9/11 permitted a respite from the sense of internal decay by inadvertently stimulating a renewed vitality via a **reconfiguration of political and psychological forces**: tensions within this country—between the “haves-mores” and “have-lesses,” as well as between the defenders and critics of the status quo, yielded to a wave of nationalism in which a united people--Americans all--stood as one against external aggression. At the same time, the generosity, solidarity and selfsacrifice expressed by Americans toward one another reaffirmed our sense of ourselves as capable of achieving the “positive” depressive position sentiments of love and empathy. Fractured social relations were symbolically repaired. The enemy- -the threat to our integrity as a nation and, in D. W. Winnicott’s terms, to our sense of going on being--**was no longer the web of complex internal force**s so difficult to understand and change, but a simple and **identifiable enemy from outside of us**, clearly marked by their difference, their foreignness and their uncanny and unfathomable “uncivilized” pre-modern character. The societal relief came with the **projection of aggressive impulses** onto an easily dehumanized **external enemy, where they could be justifiably** attacked and **destroyed**. This country’s response to 9/11, then, in part demonstrates how persecutory anxiety is more easily dealt with in individuals and in groups when it is experienced as being provoked from the outside rather than from internal sources. As Hanna Segal9 has argued (IJP, 1987), groups often tend to be narcissistic, self-idealizing, and paranoid in relation to other groups and to **shield themselves from knowledge about the reality of** their own aggression, which of necessity is **projected into an enemy**-- real or imagined--so that it can be demeaned, held in contempt and then attacked. In this regard, 9/11 permitted a new discourse to arise about what is fundamentally wrong in the world: indeed, the anti-terrorism rhetoric and policies of the U.S. government functioned for a period to overshadow the anti-globalization movement that has identified the fundamental global conflict to be between on the one hand the U.S. and other governments in the First World, transnational corporations, and powerful international financial institutions, and on the other, workers’ struggles, human rights organizations and environmental movements throughout the world. The new discourse presents the fundamental conflict in the world as one between civilization and fundamentalist terrorism. But this “civilization” is a wolf in sheep’s clothing, and those who claim to represent it reveal the kind of splitting Segal describes: a hyperbolic idealization of themselves and their culture and a projection of all that is bad, including the consequences of the terrorist underbelly of decades long U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and Asia, onto the denigrated other, who must be annihilated. The U.S. government, tainted for years by its ties to powerful transnational corporate interests, has recreated itself as the nationalistic defender of the American people. In the process, patriotism has kidnapped citizens’ grief and mourning and militarism has high **jacked people’s fears and anxieties**, converting them into a passive consensus for an increasingly authoritarian government’s domestic and foreign policies. The defensive significance of this new discourse has to do with another theme related to death anxiety as well: the threat of species annihilation that people have lived with since the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Segal argues that the leaders of the U.S. as well as other countries with nuclear capabilities, have **disavowed their** own **aggressive motivations** as they developed10 weapons of mass destruction. The distortion of language throughout the Cold War, such as “deterrence,” “flexible response,” Mutual Assured Destruction”, “rational nuclear war,” “Strategic Defense Initiative” has served to deny the aggressive nature of the arms race (p. 8) and “to disguise from ourselves and others the horror of a nuclear war and our own part in making it possible or more likely” (pp. 8-9). Although the policy makers’ destructiveness can be hidden from their respective populations and justified for “national security” reasons, Segal believes that such denial only increases reliance on projective mechanisms and stimulates paranoia.

### Impact---Nuclear War

#### Nuclear war is inevitable in a world structured by security

Anthony ’95 - Carl Anthony is the Executive Director of the Urban Habitat Program and the chair of the East Bay Conversion Reinvestment Commission Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Freedom from Annihilation Is a Human Right Spring Summer 1995 <http://urbanhabitat.org/node/945> \*language edited

Nuclear weapons are tools of a conquering, violent culture. Racism at domestic and international levels heightens the potential vulnerability and miscalculation surrounding nuclear proliferation. Few people of color have had any role in debate, development, or decision-making about the goals of this brutal technology. In a nuclear holocaust whole populations will be vaporized in the flash of an eye. People deciding the appropriateness of such a choice inevitably would bring their prejudices and fears to the devastating decision to annihilate whole peoples. The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of a Eurocentric technological elite, paranoid about the aims and aspirations of the majority of the world's population—people of color—magnifies the potential for global disaster. The great and growing gulf of human communication between the rich and poor, European and non-European, multiplies the potential antagonism that could result in planetary [extinction] holocaust. In this context organizing against nuclear proliferation is, by definition, a multicultural effort, bringing the intelligence and wisdom of every community to the global task of defeating the excesses of racism, human aggression, and technology-gone-berserk.

### Impact---Solves Extinction

#### Critical intellectualism key to solve extinction---voting negative outweighs hypothetical plan consequences

Jones 99—IR, Aberystwyth (Richard, “6. Emancipation: Reconceptualizing Practice,” Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/wynjones/wynjones06.html)

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. **This** task **is accomplished through educational activity**, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual–moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332–333) According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual–moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party—a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolò Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtù–ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern prince could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125–205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination—for example, in the case of gender—to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict. 1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security–related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short–term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse–Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse–Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectual communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center–left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks”—members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52–54; Risse–Kappen 1994: 196–200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse–Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse–Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard–liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse–Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90–110) Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and **intellectuals** persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least **have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior.** The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East–West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse–Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin, and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse–Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East–West relations in order to facilitate much–needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223–260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonstrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role—a significant one at that—in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution of society. Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’état the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full–square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing—even if they are self–consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures—can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323–377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, half man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and through which ruling or dominant ideas become widely dispersed. 2 In particular, Gramsci describes how ideology becomes sedimented in society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. **Obviously**, for Gramsci, **there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change.** In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well–worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229–239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive **social change requires** a slow, **incremental**, even **molecular, struggle** to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. The Tasks of Critical Security Studies If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of a war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist facade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116–121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing a part in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant punditry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture.... As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponents of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also Cortright 1993: 5–13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naive to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49–62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk–averse. It pays—in all senses—to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

## Alt

### Extend 1NC---Alt solves

#### Interrogating the psychological underpinnings of enemy creation is the only solution

Byles 3—English, U Cyprus (Joanna, Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification, http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/articles/art\_byles01.shtml)

The problem of warfare which includes genocide, and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, brings into focus the need to understand how the individual is placed in the social and the social in the individual. Psychoanalytic theories of superego aggression, splitting, projection, and projective identification may be useful in helping us to understand the psychic links involved. It seems vital to me writing in the Middle East in September 2002 that we examine our understanding of what it is we understand about war, including genocide and terrorism. Some psychoanalysts argue that war is a necessary defence against psychotic anxiety (Fornari xx; Volkan), and Freud himself first advanced the idea that war provided an outlet for repressed impulses. ("Why War?"197). The problematic of these views is the individual's need to translate internal psychotic anxieties into real external dangers so as to control them. It suggests that culturally warfare and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism and the so-called ''war on terrorism," may be a necessary object for internal aggression and not a pathology. Indeed, Fornari suggests that "war could be seen as an attempt at therapy, carried out by a social institution which, precisely by institutionalizing war, increases to gigantic proportions what is initially an elementary defensive mechanism of the ego in the schizo-paranoid phase" (xvii-xviii). In other words, the history of war might represent the externalization and articulation of shared unconscious fantasies. This idea would suggest that the culture of war, genocide, and international terrorism provides objects of psychic need. If this is so, with what can we replace them? If cultural formations and historical events have their sources in our psychic functioningthat is to say, in our unconscious fears and desires, and culture itself provides a framework for expressing, articulating, and coming to terms with these fears and desires, then psychoanalysis may help to reveal why war seems to be an inevitable and ineradicable part of human history. Superego as an Agent of Aggression In "The Ego and the Id," Freud formulated a seemingly insoluble dilemma in the very essence of the human psyche; the eternal conflict between the dual instincts of eros, the civilizing life instinct, and the indomitable death instinct (thanatos). He also identified some aspects of the death instinct with superego aggression, suggesting that the superego was the agent of the death instinct in its cruel and aggressive need for punishment and that its operative feeling was frequently a punitive hatred, while other aspects of the superego were protective. As we know, Freud thought the source of the superego was the internalization of the castrating Oedipal father. In chapter seven of Civilization and its Discontents, he theorized that when de-fusion or separation of the dual instincts occurred, aspects of aggression frequently dominated and that it was the purpose of the ego to find objects for eros and/or aggression either in phanta sv or reality. The role phantasy plays in projective identification is something to which I shall return. Other theorists, such as Melanie Klein, trace the beginning of the superego back to early (infant) oral phantasies of self-destruction, which is a direct manifestation of the death instinct. Klein transformed the oedipal drama by making the mother its central figure and thus playing a vital role in object-relations theory, about which I shall say more later in this essay. Although Klein's work relied on the dual instinct theory postulated by Freud, she re-defined the drives by emphasizing the way in which the destructive instincts attached themselves to the object, in particular the good-bad breast. Thus for Klein, the site of the superego is derived from oral Incorporation of the good/bad breast, contrary to Freud, for whom the site of the superego is the paternal law. Although the formation of the superego is grounded on the renunciation ofloving and hostile Oedipal wishes, it is subsequently refined, by the contributions of social and cultural requirements (education, religion, morality). My argument in this paper is three-fold: (1) These social and cultural requirements in which the superego is grounded may be used by the superego of the state and/or its leader to mobilize aspects of the individual's aggression during war-time in a way that does not happen in peace-time. (2) Klein's theory of splitting and projective identification plays an important role in the concept of difference and otherness as enemy. (3) Bion's development of Klein's theory into what he called the "container" and the "contained" may offer some way out of the psychic dangers of projective identification by suggesting that we may be able to access our internal psychic world as a transformative power to combat violence both internal and external. In an early attempt to define war neuroses, or how war mentally traumatizes the psyche, Freud wrote of the conflict "between the soldier's old peaceful ego and his new warlike one" becoming acute as soon as the peace-ego realizes what danger it runs in losing its own life to the rashness of its newly formed parasitic double" (SE 17 209). Accepting the violence that is within ourselves as well as in the other, the so-called enemy, is a difficult lesson to learn, and learning to displace our instinctual destructive aggression peacefully is enormously more difficult. To the extent the individual superego is connected to society, which assumes its functions particularly in wartime, the problem of war brings into focus the psychoanalytic problem of the partial defusion (separation) of eros and psychic aggression brought about by war through specifically social processes. These social processes involve the mechanisms by which aspects of the violent and aggressive social superego of the State mobilizes and appropriates some of the dynamic aspects of the individual's superego aggression: the need to hate, and to punish, for its own purposes, such as genocide or so-called "ethnic cleansing," and for territorial and economic reasons. Many of these actions are often masked as defending civilization, or an idealized State and/or its leader. This is also true of the "holy jihads" that are rapidly becoming an enormous threat to the world. In his book Enemies and Allies, Vamik Volkan suggests that the individual may see the superego of the State as his/her own idealized superego. And indeed, this may in turn help to explain how during war-time the social superego is placed in the individual and how in turn the individual is positioned in the social. In Civilization and its Discontents, to which I have already referred, Freud wrote about the ways in which the regulations and demands of a civilized society harbor the risk of the death instinct (aggression) being released at any favorable opportunity, especially when combined with Eros i.e., under the pretext of idealism and patriotism. This is especially true when t here is a leader who elicits strong emotional attachments from a group or nation. Of course, I am not arguing that there are not some important aspects of the social superego that are beneficial, for example the ethical and moral laws which shape society and protect its citizens; nevertheless, in wartime and its most recent manifestation, international terrorism, it is precisely these civilizing aspects of the social superego that are ignored or repressed. It seems to me that the failure of civilization historically to control the aggression, cruelty, and hatred that characterize war urgently requires a psychoanalytic explanation. Of course, I am speaking of psychic, not biological (survival of the fittest), aggression. In wartime the externalized superego of the state sanctions killing and violence that is not allowed in peace-time (in fact, such violence against others during peacetime would be considered criminal) sanctions, in fact, the gratification of warring aggression, thus ensuring that acts of violence need not incur guilt. Why do we accept this? Psychoanalysis posits the idea that aggression is not behavioral but instinctual; not social but psychological. To quote Volkan, who follows Freud, "It is man's very nature itself." Obviously, it is vital that humanity find more mature, less primitive ways of dealing with our hatred and aggression than war, genocide, and international terrorism. The most characteristic thing about this kind of violence and cruelty is its collective mentality: war requires group co-operation, organization, and approval. Some theorists argue that one of the primary cohesive elements binding individuals into institutionalized human association is defence against psychotic anxiety. In Group Psychology Freud writes that "in a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses. The apparently new characteristics he then displays are in fact the manifestation of this unconscious, in which all that is evil in the human mind is contained as a predisposition" (74). Later in the same essay, when speaking of the individual and the group mind, Freud quotes Le Bon : "Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings" (77). War is a collective phenomenon that mobilizes our anxieties and allows our original sadistic fantasies of destructive omnipotence to be re-activated and projected onto "the enemy." Some critics have argued that we "need" enemies as external stabilizers of our sense of identity and inner control. It has also been argued that the militancy a particular group shows toward its enemies may partly mask the personal internal conflicts of each member of the group, and that they may therefore have an emotional investment in the maintenance of the enmity. In other words, they need the enemy and are unconsciously afraid to lose it. This fits in with the well known phenomenon of inventing an enemy when there is not one readily available. The individual suicide bomber, or suicide pilot, is just as much part of this group psychology each bomber, each terrorist, is acting for his/her group, or even more immediately his or her family, from whom he/she derives enormous psychic strength and support. Just as importantly, she/he is acting in the name of his/her leader. All of these identifications require strong emotional attachments. Freud writes, "The mutual tie between members of a group is in the nature of an identification, based upon an important emotional common quality. . . . This common quality lies in the nature of the tie to the leader" (Group 1078). In Learning from Experience, Bion theorizes that a social groupfunctions to establish a fixed social order of things (the establishm ent), and that the individual has to be contained by the establishment of the group. Sometimes the rigidity of me system crushes the individual's creativity; alternatively, certain special individuals erupt in the group, which goes to pieces under their influence (Bion cites Jesus within the constraints of Israel). A final possibility is the mutual adaptation of one to the other, with a development of both the individual and the group. The development of a sense of self, its integration, its separation, and its protection all begin, or course, in early childhood. Psychoanalyses like Klein, Winnicott, and Bion have explored these ideas in what is known as object relations theory. Volkan writes that the concepts of enemy and ally and the senses of ethnicity and nationality are largely bound up with the individual's sense of self, and that individuals within an ethnic or national group tend to see their group as a privileged "pseudo-species" (Erikson) and enemy groups as subhuman (262). Of course enemies are threatening and do generate a reactive need for defenses; however, a basic psychoanalytic question might be to what extent the degree of defensiveness characteristic of war behavior represents personal, emotional needs of individuals for an enemy to hate, so that they can keep their conflicted selves together, and to what extent the State superego plays a role here. Our capacity for splitting and projection plays an important part in how we see others and feel about others, and through the process of projective identification, how we make others feel about ourselves and themselves. Projective identification involves a deep split, displacing onto and into others the hateful, bad parts of ourselves, and frequently making them feehateful to themselves through their own introjection of our hatred. This hatred is often racial or religious, frequently both. Moreover, in the process of projective identification, parts of the self are put into the other, thus depleting the ego. (This process can be a vicious circle, and it is a profoundly disturbing and characteristic pathology, often involving envy and/or rivalry, both corrosive, poisonous forces.) These Kleinian ideas, developed by other theorists, such as Winnicott and Bion, are hugely relevant to the problem of war and genocide, and most recently, of terrorism. Klein argues that in the paranoid schizoid position there is a splitting of good and bad objects, with the good being introjected and the bad being externalized and projected out into someone or onto something else. As with the infant and child, so with the adult, mechanisms of splitting and protection play upon negative and feared connotations of the other, of the enemy, and of difference; projection prevents warring nations from exploring and thus understanding what it is that actually divides them; it prevents mutual response and recognition by promoting exclusivity. As already mentioned, analysts such as Volkan and Erikson have written about the processes by which an enemy is dehumanized so as to provide the distance a group needs from its perceived enemy. First the group becomes preoccupied with the enemy according to the psychology of minor differences. Then mass regression occurs to permit the group to recover and reactivate more primitive methods. What they then use in this regressed state tends to contain aspects of childish (pre-oedipal) fury. The enemy is perceived more and more as a stereotype of bad and negative qualities. The use of denial allows a group to ignore the fact that its own externalizations and projections are involved in this process. The stereotyped enemy may be so despised as to be no longer human, and it will then be referred to in non-human terms. History teaches us that it was in this way that the Nazis perceived the Jews as vermin to be exterminated. As I write, Al Qaeda terrorist groups view all Americans as demons and infidels to be annihilated, and many Americans are comforted by demonizing all of bearded Islam. Many Israelis consider most Palestinians as dirt beneath their feet subhuman and most Palestinians think of most Israelis as despoilers of the land they are supposed to share. In other words, the problem of the mentality of war and of terrorism mobilizes our anxieties in such a way so as to prevent critical reality testing. If we could learn the enormously difficult and painful task of re-introjection, of taking back our projections, our hatreds, anxieties, and fears of the other and of difference, long before they harm the other, there might be a transition, a link, from the state sanctioned violence of war back to individual violence. We might learn to subvert negative projective identification into a positive identification as a means of empathizing with the other and thus containing difference. The violence of the individual could then be contained and sublimated in peaceful ways, such as reconciling and balancing competing interests by asking what exactly these opposing interests are and exploring what the dynamics, conscious and unconscious, are for the hatred of deep war-like antagonisms. In other words, we would need to change our relationship with the other, giving up the dangerously irresponsible habit of splitting, projective identification, and exclusivity by recognizing difference not antagonistically but through an inclusive process that recognises the totalitv of human relationships in a peaceful world. We might substitute for the libidinal object-ties involved in projective identification the re-introjection of the object into the ego, and thus reach a common feeling of sharing, of being part of the other, of empathy, in short. As Freud pointed our, the ego is altered bv introjection, as suggested by his memorable formulation: " The shadow of the object has fallen on the ego." In his book Second Thoughts, Bion theorizes that in the infant as in the adult, re-introjection can be dangerous if the dominance of projective identification confuses the distinction between s elf and the external object, since this awareness depends on the recognition of a distinction between subject and object. But Bion's theory of the pairing group, or the container and the contained, provides a way out of this predicament, suggesting that the outcome of such pairing is either detrimental to the contained, or to the container, or mutually developing to both. This idea is germane to my argument in this paper that the reciprocity of the container and the contained relationship, through both positive projective identification (empathy) and introjection or re-introjection, results in a positive allowance of difference in other words, a healthy acceptance of and adaptation to the other within the self and the self within the other.

#### Reject the affirmative---this is crucial to open up individual space for resistance against security

Anthony Burke 2, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, 2002 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27.1 page InfoTrac OneFile

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available--and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired--which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. (60) This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. (61 ) Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries.... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible." (62) Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels--that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Conolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"--an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. (63) Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"--a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

### 2NC---Alt---Solves Aff

#### Best way to solve the case

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But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm—the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed,197 its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’—marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact—than policymakers admit.

If the objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this meahn for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars-emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness-is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants-danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently-it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The problem at present, however, is that it remains unclear which popular base exists in society to raise these questions. Unless such a base fully emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

### 2NC---Alt---Solves Norms

#### The alternative allows for a moment of ethics in the face of the affirmative’s rush to tinker with the status quo in order to leave it fundamentally unchanged---this is the only way to assert agency and actuate an ethical form of diplomacy that solves truly peaceful norms---if they win their FW arguments, we’ll win that this is a better role for diplomats

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Yet we cannot stop here. If we did we would deprive the single individual as diplomat of the possibility of ethically relevant action. There would be no choice. Obedience would have to be of the no-questions- asked type, whatever the policy and whatever its consequences.34 But this is not so, and has never been so even in practice. It is by now widely accepted that for all kinds of public servants (and this includes diplo- mats), obedience to bureaucratic orders is not a cause of exemption from moral ± and legal ± responsibility. This is especially evident in the case of major crimes. The road that was opened in Nuremberg35 has now taken us to Rome, where in July 1998 the approval of the statutes of the per- manent International Criminal Court would not have been possible without a wide global consensus on the moral/legal responsibility of individuals who serve their state in different capacities but who, by so doing, are in no way exempt from ethical scrutiny and legal sanction. ¶ It would be untenable to maintain that diplomats are exempt from such scrutiny (and sanctions), and that the mandate of the International Criminal Court covers only the actual physical purveyors of violence. It would indeed be a bizarre limitation, especially in a world in which the distinction between military action and diplomacy is more and more blurred in the framework of complex conflictive situations; all the more so since the mandate of the court includes (though for the time being still wanting a definition) the crime of aggression, one in which diplomats can play as big a role as soldiers.36 ¶ How can we square the contradictory needs of impersonal bureaucratic discipline and persistent moral responsibility? The fact is that we cannot. The fact is that there must be a limit, a certain threshold beyond which¶ 56¶ the duty of allegiance and obedience is overruled, annulled by the moral outrage of certain acts in which the individual ``servant of the state'' is instructed to participate. The ethics of the public servant (with its corol- lary of obedience, of non-personalization of behaviour and choices) can take us only so far. A morally sane human being should be capable of determining when that limit is reached, when one must be able to breach one's allegiance and say ``no'' to the crossing of that threshold. ¶ It is necessary to recall that decisions to rebel against orders that are legitimate as to the line of command but that become illegitimate by their moral unacceptability are de®nitely not unheard of in the annals of diplomacy. Several historians of the Holocaust have stressed the role (sometimes merely passive, often active) of Italians, of®cially allied with the Germans, in saving thousands of Jews from detention and deporta- tion to death camps.37 Among those Italians were many military of®cers, but also several diplomats. Though the policy of the highest levels of fascist Italy, starting from Mussolini himself, was often wavering, contra- dictory, and ambiguous, there is no doubt that on many occasions Italian diplomats, in particular in the Balkans, proceeded totally on their own to perform acts of political indiscipline and to infringe very basic bureau- cratic rules, for instance by giving Italian passports to Jews whose only link with Italy was having visited it once: a rather serious breach of the ethics of an of®cial and one that would make any self-respecting consu- lar of®cer cringe. 38 In an unforgettable interview (included in Joseph Rochlitz's documentary The Righteous Enemy), the former Italian consul in Salonica, Guelfo Zamboni, replied in a half-surprised, half-amused tone to the interviewer, amazed at this most unusual concession of pass- ports to aliens: ``Well, they were in danger of death, weren't they? So, what was I supposed to do, let them be deported and exterminated?''39 ¶ The threshold at which personal assessment of moral duties becomes destructive of the ethics of the public servant is not a clearly defined line. Each - but that of course is no news in ethical discourse - has to draw that line and act accordingly. Certainly, if we were to allow the possibility for each diplomat to turn personal disagreement and mental reservation on any given issue into undisciplined behaviour and active rebellion we would revert to that individualistic free-for-all that is the antithesis of a functioning polis, even the most open and pluralistic one. And yet, there is always, even in cases that are not as monumentally horrendous as the Holocaust, a path for a digni®ed stand in the presence of radical moral disagreement with speci®c policies. In those cases one can avoid taking the extreme, always-questionable step of breaking loyalty by opting out ± by resignation. Of course, in non-democratic regimes such an act can entail consequences that may be as dire as those provoked by open re- bellion, but outside those regimes resigning means losing income, pres-¶ 57¶ tige, and career, but not life or freedom. Thus it becomes more feasible. But where has it happened more frequently, in the past decades? It seems not without signi®cance to note that it is in the USA that many diplomats have resigned (over policy issues from Viet Nam to Bosnia), a country whose citizens give a special relevance to debate on ethical issues and at the same time are frequently haunted by the awareness of the respon- sibility that their government's actions or omissions entail in terms of human consequences around the world. To be able to raise ethical issues in diplomacy you indeed need both: moral sensitivity, and the perception of the impact on human beings outside your borders of the power wielded by your country in the international arena. ¶ If there is this sort of ``ethical switch'' that can interrupt allegiance to the state in the case of moral dissent, wouldn't it be safer for a state, any state, to privilege staunch nationalists as their diplomats, at least in the highest-ranking positions? Wouldn't they be more reliable in all con- ditions and facing any sort of problem, any sort of dilemma? The fallacy of this sort of reasoning lies in forgetting what a government of®cial is supposed to be. It is true that public servants are not justi®ed in sacri®c- ing their loyalty to the state and their disciplined behaviour within their administrations to the vagaries of personal taste, nor to political inclina- tions, local partiality, or special interests. However, by the same token it is not necessary, and even counterproductive, that they should be mili- tants of the nation-state, true believers in king and country. They can be such as citizens, but no one demands that they be such as of®cials. The confusion between the two roles (citizen and of®cial) is typically totali- tarian, and amounts to saying that the only good lawyers are those who believe that their clients are innocent ± and possibly love them, too. ¶ Going back to diplomats, we indeed see that if we cast them as lawyers, and not as crusaders for the cause of their own nation-state, we will have solved part of our ethical dilemmas. Diplomats involved in a negotiation or dispute, no more than lawyers in court, do not have to believe in the righteousness of the cause they are defending. That is the essence of professionalism, a much more reliable foundation for good performance and loyalty than is belief. But the diplomat, as well as the lawyer, may decide at a certain point that there are some causes that are just too morally uncomfortable to defend, and opt out. It is of course easier to abandon litigation than to resign from government service, but concep- tually there do not seem to be radical moral differences between the two instances. Both are rare, but both are possible. ¶ The ethical dimension of diplomacy, however, should not be seen only in negative terms ± as a limit to bureaucratic allegiance, as a moral safety valve allowing us to escape complicity with morally outrageous actions. The assumption one should challenge, in this context, is that of a ``status ¶ 58¶ quo diplomatic system''.40 Actually, status quo leaves very limited room for ethical discourse, since it confronts the individual actor with the stark alternative between playing by the existing rules or becoming a sort of conscientious objector and dropping out of the ``regular'' game. In real history - and real diplomacy - we are instead confronted with a moving framework of rules, with diplomats themselves playing a relevant role in the evolutionary process. Here ethics ``gains space'', in so far as individual practitioners of diplomacy, even those who stick to the strictest allegiance to existing norms, are allowed to bring their own ethical inspiration to bear in shaping new international rules.41

## 2NC

### 2NC---Overview

The aff commits itself to sustaining policy that is justified and prioritized by constant securitization of the Other without thinking of how they were constructed or their objectivity. The 1AC lives within their paranoia of conflict which is endless

This expands beyond one act---it is the domestic and international political justifications that perpetuate conflict and violence by the institutions they espouse---they were founded on the legacy of the powerful, and any opposition activates a state of emergency that enables Western intervention and extermination, ecological, energy, political and economic catastrophe---that’s Mack. It’s not worth preserving a system that perpetuates a morally reprehensible structure of global apartheid and genocidal violence while destroying value to life.

Securitization of the 1AC causes serial policy failure---policy reform is inadequate because it cannot translate conventional policy approaches into the context of broader systems which prevents epistemological self-reflection. That normalizes violence against the Other which only serves to reify the affs impacts---only the alt can solve by confronting the deeper epistemological assumptions of the aff that allow for a more accurate version for implementation and disrupts the system of securitization---that’s Ahmed

### 2NC---Framework

The NEG can test the AFF’s consequences or ideological underpinnings. Debates about political ideology are logically prior to the aff’s security policy. The question of what we should do imports presuppositions about political subjectivity---if those presuppositions are wrong, our diagnoses and prescriptions will also be wrong, so they can’t perm away our links. It also means they can’t access the case until they’ve defended their ideological principles.

Forget the focus on the **how** of politics, we need to focus on the **why**. Learning how to make the existing system more effective is **unethical and epistemologically bankrupt** if that system is violent, so we should learn to ask why that system exists in the first place. That’s enough to vote neg, even if the alt solves nothing. Their version of debate turns us into mindless automatons who parrot the policy-of-the-day without considering the ideological or historical underpinnings.

Fairness—our interp is fair, the aff gets to choose their advantages and impacts, so they should defend them.

If the 1AC is a package of securitized scholarship, it shouldn’t be included and you should vote neg.

#### The affirmative is foundationally grounded in a narrative about NATO cooperation set in opposition to the enemy Other and in the gaze of the West to generate a shared liberal democratic identity. This is a reason to reject the discourse and representations of the affirmative – the scholarship is methodologically flawed.

Alexandra Gheciu First Published March 19, 2019 Article Commentary NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community doi.org/10.1177/0020702019834645 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020702019834645

To decision-makers locked in a competition with forces regarded as representing communist otherness, it was imperative that countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the US cultivate a sense of shared liberal-democratic identity—set in opposition to communism—among their peoples. In that context, they sought to articulate a narrative of Western unity, and disseminate it as widely as possible in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. As Erik Ringmar has argued, identities are constructed, maintained, and transformed via the telling of “constitutive” narratives.12 Narratives provide a set of meanings within which an actor’s identity, the situation within which they are located and the actions deemed appropriate are brought together.13 The process of telling constitutive narratives is especially important during periods of fundamental transformation, when new identities are being formed and old ones are being pressured to evolve.14 In the eyes of Western leaders, the narrative of unity among NATO members had to not only cultivate a sense of shared identity, but also to delegitimize—by casting them as inconsistent with Western identity—communist forces that were becoming increasingly powerful in many allied states. Once again, some of the most influential voices in favour of disseminating a narrative of Western unity and using that to legitimize community-building practices within NATO were its middle powers—particularly Canada. For instance, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, repeatedly argued in the early 1950s that NATO’s long-term goal had to be the creation of a community of free nations in the Atlantic area. More broadly, Canadian officials, together with NATO supporters from Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the UK, were acutely aware of the fact that, in order for the alliance to be able to help build “a community of free nations” united around liberal values, it had to find a way to help publics from allied states transcend recent memories of war among Western states. What was required, in other words, was a collective reinterpretation—and a selective forgetting—of the recent past.15 After all, the newly identified enemy, communist Soviet Union, had emerged from the war as a hero in the eyes of many in the West. The view of the “West as one” became central to a collective (re)reading of Western history following the establishment of the alliance.16 Collective efforts at history (re)writing found expression not only within the public discourse articulated by NATO, but also in confidential documents. Recently declassified documents from the 1950s reveal a set of shared understandings among NATO’s decision-makers regarding the way in which the history of member states should be interpreted in order to foster a sense of Western community. In addition, NATO mobilized its substantial material and symbolic power to widely disseminate the discourse on Western unity in all the allied states and, simultaneously, to delegitimize alternative readings of history—especially those that focused on ideas of solidarity—and memories of friendship—with the Soviet Union.17 In particular, as Patrick Jackson has demonstrated, the discourse of Western civilization played a key role in orchestrating the collective (re)reading of Germany as a member of the Western community, and on this basis legitimating its incorporation into NATO. This is not to suggest that the West was an essential entity that objectively determined a field of outcomes. Rather, “Western civilization” needs to be understood as “rhetorical commonplace,” used by allied policymakers as a discursive resource for de-legitimating policy options opposed to Germany’s incorporation into American-led institutions.18 In the official NATO discourse, Germany was interpreted as a member of the Western family that, under the Nazi regime, had temporarily deviated from its core values. Following the end of that regime, however, (West) Germany—acting under the close supervision of allied states—could and should be reintegrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. Against the background of the constitutive discourse on Western unity, disagreements and tensions that continued to occur among member states could be represented as “family” feuds, and managed within the framework of shared norms and a persisting sense of community. A full analysis of inter-allied disagreements during the Cold War is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worthwhile to briefly examine what could be seen as one of the most significant set of disagreements within NATO: arguments concerning the accession to the alliance of states that did not comply with the liberal-democratic norms and values around which the Western community defined itself. Particularly interesting were arguments over the inclusion of Portugal in 1949, as well as the accession of Greece and especially Turkey (completed in 1952). In that context, middle powers like Canada and Norway emerged as strong proponents of the view that countries which did not respect basic liberal-democratic values did not belong—and should not be included—in the alliance which represented the Western community.19 In the end, however, all the allies were persuaded to support the inclusion of those “problem” countries. Several factors were crucial to the emergence of that consensus: a shared recognition among the allies of the geostrategic importance of those countries in the context of growing confrontation with the Soviet Union, and a sense that, in that particular context, the inclusion of strategically vital but normatively deviant states was an acceptable compromise in the name of protecting the community of liberal values. The prevailing view came to be that the integration of states like Portugal and Turkey could be managed in a way that would not necessarily endanger the core values of the West. Furthermore, inclusion into the Western community was seen by some allied policymakers as a course of action that could help those countries evolve into stable liberal democracies. It is revealing, in fact, that a normative compromise that was eventually seen as reasonable in the cases of Portugal and Turkey was regarded as inappropriate in the case of a country whose political regime was perceived as an active threat to liberal-democratic values: Franco’s Spain.20 As Mark Smith put it, “Turkey could be accommodated, and Portugal’s dictatorship had less Fascistic origins than Spain’s. Significantly, neither had a history of active antagonism toward Western European liberalism. Admitting Franco would be admitting a regime of the very sort that had overturned European democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, and as such was wholly unacceptable.”21 The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a sense of triumph by the West over its defining other, and, as a corollary to this, a shared view among allied decision-makers that a new security environment was emerging in Europe. In a context marked by the breakdown of the Soviet bloc and the eruption of violence linked to ethnic conflict and the breakdown of states (most notably in the former Yugoslavia), there was a shift away from definitions of security focused on military power, and toward a heavy emphasis on “good governance” within states. In essence, security came to be associated with the liberal-democratic norms and institutions; negatively, risks came to be seen as emerging from the absence of liberal-democratic structures.[22](javascript:popRef('fn23-0020702019834645')) In a situation in which there was no clearly identified enemy state, but in which developments within the transient former communist countries threatened to undermine international security, a consensus emerged that the promotion of “good” liberal-democratic norms and institutions within those states would be vital for European and international security in the new era.

#### NATOs core identity is the expression and military guarantor of Western civilization – continually heightening threat perceptions and producing foundational narratives of collective unity toward a common purpose of securitization

Gabi Schlag Re-constituting NATO: Foundational Narratives of Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s. Uses of “the West”, 156–178. doi:10.1017/9781316717448.008 Print publication year: 2016

Bearing these arguments of critical constructivist approaches in mind, it is of central interest, then, how NATO is ‘able to mobilize its longstanding identity as the expression and military guarantor of Western civilization’ closely connected to the democratic and capitalist bonds among its member countries (Neumann and Williams, 2000, p. 361; italics added). It goes without saying that a common threat perception during the heydays of the Cold War has tightened these bonds. However, it does not explain how Western security cooperation was made possible in the first place and why it lasted for over 60 years, including the phase of detente ´ in the 1970s. Hence, the key shortcoming of realist, liberal, and institutionalist approaches to NATO is that they take the actor’s articulations of threats and interests at face value, while a critical approach directs our attention to how actors invoke threats, interest, and identities and to what kind of institutional consequences are made possible by these acts (Klein, 1990, pp. 315, 317; Jackson, 2003, p. 224). Such a perspective on the usage of concepts and their meaning is interested in the ways and forms of inscribing plots, characters, relations, and motives for action. As Trine Flockhart (2012, p. 80) writes, ‘[n]arratives describe the history, purpose and achievements of a collective entity such as NATO, and they contribute in the process towards its unity and facilitate its continuous transformation’. These I will call foundational narratives. Foundational refers to two related aspects characteristic of most political narratives: first, it directs our attention to the justifications why something exists. In NATO’s case this refers to the justifications mobilized by the allies in order to found and keep an ‘alliance’, i.e. to construct meaningful stories about what ‘NATO’ is and how its past, present, and future are to be described. Foundational narratives are answers to ‘why’- questions – questions such as ‘why do we still need NATO?’. Second, the term ‘foundational’ emphasizes the taken-for-grantedness of these narratives. Narratives are foundational when they restore unity in the light of (more or less) serious ‘identity crises’ where constructions of common representations appear as problematic. References to a ‘global war on terrorism’, for example, where military intervention and preemption is articulated as necessary, altered the organizational design of NATO in many ways. Within these discursive patterns the continuing relevance of a transatlantic alliance was never really questioned, irrespective of whether NATO was defined as a system of collective defense or a forum for political consultation. Understood in this way, foundational narratives are powerful and consequential in the sense that they enable and constrain the re-constitution of political subjects.

### A2: Perm---2NC

The perm is severance---the alt is a rejection and interrogation of the securitization of the 1AC which in no way includes the justifications for the 1AC they gave---any attempted severance of representations specifically is a voting issue---skews justification for the 1AC, creates a moving target, skews education

Permutation is incoherent---the alternative says you should take a fundamentally different position in relation to the aff

#### Links swamp the permutation---it instrumentalizes the alternative which only masks the plan’s violent governmentality---internal contradictions means it inevitably fails

Laura Sjoberg 13, Department of Political Science, University of Florida , Gainesville The paradox of security cosmopolitanism?, Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, 29-34

Particularly, Burke suggests that security cosmopolitanism ‘rejects a procedural faith in strongly post-Westphalian forms of government and democracy’ (p. 17) and reiterates that such an approach includes ‘no automatic faith in any one institutional design’ (p. 24). This seems to move away from one of the prominent critiques of, in Anna Agathangelou and Ling’s (2009) words, the ‘neoliberal imperium,’ as reliant on Western, liberal notions of governance to the detriment of those on whom such a form of government is imposed. Burke clearly problematizes this imposition, framing many of the serious problems in global politics as a result of ‘choices that create destructive dynamics and constraints’ (p. 15) at least in part by Western, liberal governments – characterizing modernity as culpable for insecurity. At the same time, the solution seems to be clearly situated within the discursive framework of the problem. Burke suggests that there should be a primary concern for ‘effectiveness, equality, fairness, and justice – not for states, per se, but for human beings, and the global biosphere’ (p. 24). Unless the only problem with modernity is the post- Westphalian structure of the state (which this approach does not eschew, but claims not to privilege), then this statement of values might entrench the problem. Many of the ideas of equality, fairness, and justice that come to mind with the (somewhat rehearsed) use of those words in progressive politics are inseparable from an ethos of enlightenment modernity. This may be problematic on a number of levels. First, it may fail to interrupt the series of choices that Burke suggests produce a cycle of insecurity. Second, it may fold back onto itself in the recommendations that security cosmopolitanism produces. This especially concerned me in Burke’s discussion of how to end ‘dangerous processes,’ where he places ‘greater faith in the ethical, normative, and legal suppression of dangerous processes and actions than in formalistic or procedural solutions’ (p. 24). It seems to me that there is a good argument that ‘suppression’ is itself a ‘dangerous process,’ yet Burke’s framework does not really include a mechanism for internal critique. Another problem that seems to confound security cosmopolitanism is evaluating the relationships between power, governance, and governmentality. There are certainly several ways in which Burke uses a notion of the state that distinguishes security cosmopolitanism from the mainstream neoliberal literature. For example, he characterizes the ‘state as an entity whose national survival depends on its global participation, obligations, and depen- dencies,’ (citing Burke 2013a, 5). This view of the state sees it as not only survival-seeking (in the neo-neo synthesis sense) but also dependent on its positive interactions with other states for survival. Burke’s approach to government/governance initially appears to be global rather than state-based, another potentially transformative move. For example, he sees the job of security cosmopolitanism as to ‘theorize and defend norms for the respon- sible conduct and conceptualization of global security governance’ (p. 21). At the same time, later in the article, Burke suggests entrenching the current structure of the state. His practical approach of looking for the ‘solidarity of the governing with the governed’ seems to simultaneously interrogate the current power structures and reify them. Burke says: Such a ‘solidarity of the governed’ that engages in a ‘practical interrogation of power’ ought to be a significant feature of security cosmopolitanism. At the same time, however, security cosmopolitanism must be concerned with improving the global governance of security by elites and experts. (p. 21) This attachment to the improvement of existing structures of governance seems to be at the heart of what I see as the failure of the radical potential in the idea of security cosmopolitanism. When discussing how the power dynamics between the elite and the subordinated might change, Burke suggests that ‘voluntary renunciation of the privileges and powers of both state and corporate sovereignty will no doubt be a necessary feature of such an order’ (p. 25). Relying on the voluntary renunciation of power by the powerful seems both unrealistic and not particularly theoretically innovative. This seems to be at the center of a paradox inherent in security cosmopolitanism: Faith in the Western liberal state is insidious, but the Western liberal state does not have to be. Modernity causes insecurity, but need not be discarded fully. Some universalizations are dangerous, others are benign. Dangerous processes must be stopped, even if by dangerous processes. Moral entrepreneurship is the key, but ther e is no clear foundation for what counts as moral. The security cosmopolitanism critique is inspired by consequentialism, but lacks deontological foundations despite deontological implications. Burke calls for (and indeed demands) to ‘take responsibility for it’ (p. 23) in terms of ‘both formal and moral accountability’ (p. 24). In so doing, he endorses (Booth’s vision of) ‘moral progress’ (p. 25), despite understanding the insidious deployment of various notions of moral progress by others. Security cosmopolitanism, then, is a proclamation for radical change that is initially stalled by its internal contradictions and further ~~handicapped~~ stalled by its lack of capacity to enact the very sort of radical change Burke sees it as fundamental to righting the wrongs he sees in the world. The result seems to be the (potential) reification of existing governments/governmentality through what essentially appears to be a non-anthropocentric ‘human security’ which cannot be clearly distinguished from current notions of human security (p. 15). It appears to remain top-down and without clear moral foundation while claiming significant improvement over existing approaches. This appearance/seduction of improvement without real promise for change might be more insidious than the nihilism of which many post-structuralists are accused, as it seductively appears to solve a problem it does not solve.

#### complete rejection is critical

Neocleous 8 [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the **fetish**, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encom passing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conﬂicts, **debates and discussions that animate political life**. The con stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – **constitutes a rejection of politics** in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conﬂicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efﬁcient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore **need to get beyond security politics,** not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be ﬁlled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re afﬁrming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to ﬁll the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to ﬁght for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as signiﬁcant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to ~~blind~~ **oblivious ourselves to the possibility of** building real alternatives **to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics**. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justiﬁes the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different con ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

#### 1AC links swamp the perm---all our arguments prove they instill a cognitive dissonance about the true state of security

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Cognitive approaches concede that real-life decision makers cannot comply with the expectation of full rationality. Instead, political decision makers adopt a number of strategies to deal with the limitations imposed on them by their cognitive capabilities. It is important to remember that such strategies are, to a certain extent, necessary and unavoidable. They facilitate information processing and enable actors to make decisions. However, they may also lead to misperception and error. A number of processes are particularly relevant. The study of problem solving has proven the need to pay attention to actors’ **definitions of the problem**.51 Studies of the limitations of memory have drawn attention to the problem of information overload in both problem solving and decision making. Most important, the development of the concepts of ‘cognitive dissonance’ versus ‘cognitive consistency’ by Leon Festinger and Fritz Heider in the 1950s and 1960s has served to emphasize the need for stability in beliefs and perceptions, while at the same time alerting us to the costs of such stabilit y: “misperception and biased interpretation, with individuals using denial, bolstering, or other mechanisms to maintain their beliefs.”52 According to Robert Art and Robert Jervis, “[P]eople simplify their processing of complex information by permitting their established frameworks of beliefs to guide them. They can then assimilate incoming information to what they already believe.”53 Thus there exists “a tendency for people to assimilate incoming information into their **pre-existing images.”** 54 This tendency is explained by psychological theor y as part of a strategy to avoid cognitive dissonance. There is little to stop this tendency, because “information is usually **ambiguous enough** so that people can **see it as consistent with the views** that they already hold.”55 Voss and Dorsey observe that “individuals build mental representations of the world and . . . such representations provide coherence and stability to their interpretations of the complexities of the environment.”56 So-called image theory studies the role played in the decision-making process by such **interpretive “blueprints**,” which have been variously called “images,” “schemata,” “scripts,” or “mental models.”57 The concept of “image,” which is most commonly used in foreign policy analysis, captures the notion of a schema, which is more popular in cognitive psychology. In the 1950s, Kenneth Boulding defined the term image as “the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavioral unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe.”58 He argued that “the images which are important in international systems are those which a nation has of itself and of those other bodies in the system which constitute its international environment.”59 Images can introduce misperception and error into the decision-making process, especially if they function as stereotypes. Stereot ypes can be defined as “images that are assumed to have attributes that characterize all elements of a particular group.”60 The role of stereotypical images, such as the “**enemy image**,” has been explored by authors such as Ole Holsti, Richard Cottam, or David Finlay and his colleagues. 61 Such studies find that stereot yping generally leads to “over-generalization, that is, erroneously attributing characteristics to a particular countr y that may not have one or more of the given characteristics. The countries are thus not sufficiently differentiated.”62 According to Holsti, “[T]he relationship of national images to international conf lict is clear: decision-makers act upon their definition of the situation and their images of states—others as well as their own. These images are in turn dependent upon the decision-maker’s belief system, and these may or may not be accurate representations of ‘reality.’”63 The impact of stereot ypical national images in policy making was particularly obvious during the Cold War, when Boulding referred to them as “the last great stronghold of unsophistication” in international politics, observing that “nations are divided into ‘good’ and ‘bad’—the enemy is all bad, one’s own nation is of spotless virtue.”64 The bipolar system was commonly characterized as a “closed” one, in which “perceptions of low hostilit y are self-liquidating and perceptions of high hostilit y are self-fulfilling.”65 This is because both sides continue to interpret new information in ways that help preserve the enemy image, even if such information is meant to constitute a conciliatory gesture. Closed systems suffer from the dangerous problem of distorted “mirror images.” Urie Bronfenbrenner explains: Herein lies the terrible danger of the distorted mirror image, for it is characteristic of such images that they are self-confirming; that is, each part y, often against its own wishes, is increasingly driven to behave in a manner which fulfills the expectations of the other. . . . [The mirror image] impels each nation to act in a manner which confirms and enhances the fear of the other to the point that even deliberate efforts to reverse the process are reinterpreted as evidence of confirmation.66 (128-130)

### A2: Performative Contradictions

The 1NC Ahmed evidence is specific to discourse in justification for policy reforms which has only been done by the aff

Our interpretation of conditionality is that advocacies operate in separate, non-intersecting worlds, all with the aim disproving the affirmative which no-links this argument.

The aff continually defending securitization proves our link---condensing to just the K solves all their offense because we are no longer defending securitization

#### Performative contradiction isn’t a unique voter – it allows us to prevent a sedimentation of knowledge – constant fear of it causes people to not write what is important but what doesn’t contradict

Pierre Schlag, April 1991, “*SYMPOSIUM: THE CRITIQUE OF NORMATIVITY: ARTICLE: NORMATIVITY AND THE POLITICS OF FORM*,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, accessed through Nexus-Uni. ZKMSU

In other words, the disciplines and sub-disciplines quite literally organize themselves around aporias and paradoxes. They achieve a [\*925] respectable formalization not because they "know" anything, but because they are organized so that they don't have to know about the contradictions, aporias, and paradoxes that surround them and that effectively define and limit their intellectual jurisdiction. As an example, consider the role of the performative contradiction. Until very recently, the worst thing one could do in academic thought was to get caught in a performative contradiction. Not surprisingly, after decades of striving to avoid performative contradictions, we have a sedimented academic structure and sedimented "knowledges" all nicely arranged in discursive formations constituted to avoid performative contradictions. But after decades of avoiding performative contradictions, there is now a new concern: where don't you go, what do you miss, if you keep trying to avoid performative contradictions? And, of course, there is a political angle to all this. After all, fear of performative contradiction discourages and marginalizes reflexive inquiry into the status of our own statements and our own knowledges. Fear of performative contradiction thus has a conservative effect. And what is conserved, of course, is the jurisdictional and structural integrity of our knowledges. But, of course, because this integrity depends upon such a truncated definition and establishment of the knowledges and the disciplines, it is almost a joke: integrity as joke.

### A2: Realism

#### We control uniqueness - the world is already as secure as it can be - even the most qualified realist agrees-there is only a chance the affirmative makes the world worse- all of their threats are at best over exaggerated triggering massive violence and all of our K impacts

[Stephen M. Walt](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/blog/2072), leading international realist, Robert and Rene Belfer Professsor of International Relation, previously taught at Princeton and the University of Chicago, where he served as Master of the Social Science Collegiate Division and Deputy Dean of Social Sciences, Resident Associateof the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution, a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the National Defense University, on the editorial boards of Foreign Policy, Security Studies, International Relations, and Journal of Cold War Studies, and he also serves as Co-Editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, published by Cornell University Press, he was elected as a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 11/22/10, “The U.S. is too secure for its own good”,http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/22/the\_us\_is\_too\_secure\_for\_its\_own\_good

\*Altered for ableist language\*

You know the old line: "you can't be too thin or too rich?" The foreign policy equivalent would be "you can't be too secure."  Because there is no agency or institution that can protect states from each other, realists generally view security as the highest aim of states. The need for security encourages governments to remain watchful about emerging dangers and to avoid squandering resources unnecessarily on fanciful projects or special indulgences. The need to compete effectively in the harsh world of international politics imposes a certain discipline on domestic political quarrels, and encourages competing parties to limit partisan backbiting for the good of the country.  When people say that "politics stops at the water's edge," that's what they are talking about.   Nonetheless, being too secure has a downside: It allows U.S. politicians to do and say a lot of ~~stupid~~ [bad] things without thinking that they might actually be putting the country at risk. Case in point: the Republican Party's absurd [objections](http://washingtonindependent.com/81743/outright-misreadings-fuel-gop-opposition-to-new-start) to the New Start [treaty](http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol) with Russia, which seem to be based solely on the desire to prevent the Obama administration from logging even a modest political success.   The New Start treaty is not a major strategic breakthrough, but that's just the point. It's a modest agreement that will save us some money in the long-term, reduce strategic uncertainty, make it easier to enlist Russian cooperation on other issues, and make the United States look a bit less hypocritical when we try to convince other states to forego nuclear weapons themselves. But none of that matters to today's Grand Obstructionist Party (GOP) leaders, in sharp contrast to isolated Republic moderates like Richard Lugar (R-IN) or veteran officials like Henry Kissinger or James Baker, all of whom support the treaty.   But the taproot of this foolishness isn't just the poisonous know-nothingism of today's Republican Party. The underlying permissive condition for this behavior is America's extraordinarily secure international position. Although we are constantly bombarded with alarmist reports about grave dangers facing the nation from outside, the United States remains remarkably secure compared with other states. The U.S. economy is still the world's largest and most diverse, despite its recent woes, and it is still more than twice as large as the number 2 and number 3 economic powers (China and Japan). We spend more on national security than the rest of the world put together, are the only state with global power projection capabilities, and have the world's most sophisticated nuclear arsenal. Many of the world's significant military powers are our allies, so our actual lead is even greater. There are no major powers near to our shores, and we are insulated from many global problems by two enormous oceanic moats.   The United States does face a modest problem from terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, but that is due in good part to our own ill-advised meddling in the Middle East and elsewhere. And assuming it never acquires a nuclear weapon (which we can prevent by working with others to enhance nuclear security around the world), Al Qaeda is not an existential threat to our prosperity or way of life. Even if all their thwarted plots had succeeded--and I'm very glad they didn't--the damage would pale in comparison to the costs of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Indeed, if history is any guide, international terrorism at its worst poses [less threat](http://www.amazon.com/Overblown-Politicians-Terrorism-Industry-National/dp/1416541713) to American life than auto accidents, nut allergies, or falling in a bathtub.   In short, although perfect security is beyond anyone's grasp, the United States is as secure as any state could ever expect to be. That's a wonderful thing for us Americans, but it has at least two negative consequences. First, because the United States doesn't have to worry very much about protecting its own shores from a serious military challenge, it is free to run around the world getting involved in various problems, even when it has lost sight of any underlying strategic rationale and has no clear idea why it is doing these things. For example, when you are really secure, very powerful, and have a lot of wealth to draw upon, you can keep [extending](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/17/nato-combat-role-in-afgha_n_784680.html) the deadline in places like Afghanistan almost indefinitely, even when the costs of doing so far outweigh any likely benefits.   The second problem with being too secure is that it allows politicians to use foreign policy as a partisan political football, and to indulge special interests and other ideological fixations. When a state faces real dangers -- as the United States did during World War II or the Cold War -- it has to set priorities carefully and avoid squandering resources on whims. But when a state is as secure as America is today, then partisan politics will loom larger and become nastier. Without a "clear and present danger" to focus the national mind, presidents find it harder to face down pressure from groups with strong but focused agendas, whether the issue on the table is defense spending, Middle East policy, or trade. Moreover, exploiting foreign policy issues in order to bash the president doesn't seem to place the country in immediate danger, so members of the opposition can do so without being accused of compromising national security.   Don't get me wrong: I'm not arguing that the United States would be better off if we faced a really serious external threat again. On balance, I'd rather be strong, wealthy, and insulated from major dangers. But there is a real cost to our present condition: we end up doing a lot of things we shouldn't, and we don't do a lot of things we should. The end result is that our position in the world will gradually erode, and then we'll have to start taking this stuff seriously again.

### A2: Short Timeframe

#### We have time to think about it---its your role to expose the fantasy of short-termism

Pinar Bilgin 4 IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience

Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas 'something' needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of 'short-termism' in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as 'approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation'. Viewed as such, short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating.  The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state 'failure'.  Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of 'state failure' in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa'eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, 'strong'/'weak' states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information.  Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the 'war on terror' be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories.  Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode 'wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds', towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to 'failed states', the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of 'failure' raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention frompractitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.

## Affirmative Answers

### Framework

#### Vote aff if security cooperation on ai, cybersecurity, or biotech is a good idea or vote neg if it is not – the aff should get to weigh plan implementation against a competitive alternative and get offense against the means used to achieve [alt action], the neg should be held accountable for solvency, resistance, and uniqueness concerns and if they win that, the judge should vote on judge choice – prefer our interpretation:

1. **Fairness---neg has a competitive incentive to moot the 1AC post-facto**
2. **Education---debate has zero value if we never discuss the implications of the topic outside of the academy**

### 2AC Perms

**Perm do both**

**Perm do the plan then the alt – 2x bind: if inclusion after doesn’t solve the links it can’t solve the squo**

**Perm do plan and parts of the K not linking to our offense or double turning the K**

#### Permutation do both: Evaluating synthesis is more productive than prior questions – their links only prove the mystification of ethics which is why you lean toward problem-solving instead of low link thresholds

Cochran 99

Molly, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

-avoids over-analysis gridlock and theoretical echo chambers

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

#### Permutation do the AFF and challenge the national security paradigm---methodologically pluralist understandings are more predictive.

Roland Bleiker14, Professor of International Relations, University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, 16(2), 6-17-2014, p.325-327

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event

### A2 Epistemology First

#### Indicts of our epistemology/knowledge production don’t come before or disprove the case

Jackson 2010 (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, DC, 2010, “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics,” ebook)

Faced with the impossibility of putting an end to the science question within IR by turning to the philosophy of science, what should we do? Since we cannot resolve the question of what science is by appealing to a consensus in philosophy, one option is to become philosophers of science ourselves, and to spend our time and our scholarly efforts trying to resolve thorny and abstract issues about the status of theory and evidence and the limits of epistemic certainty. But this is an unappealing option for a scholarly field defined, if loosely, by its empirical focus (world politics), and it would be roughly akin to advising physicists to become philosophers of physics in order to resolve the question of what physics was and whether it was a science. This also mis-states the relationship between philosophical debates and scientific practice; practicing scientists have a pretty good working definition of what it means for something to be “scientific,” but this “is less a matter of strategy than of ongoing evaluative practice,” conducted in the course of everyday knowledge-producing activities (Taylor 1996, 133). We do not expect physicists to give philosophical answers to questions about the scientific status of their scholarship; we expect them to produce knowledge of the physical world. Similarly, we should not expect IR scholars to engage in “philosophy of IR” to the detriment of generating knowledge about world politics; the latter, not the former, is our main vocational task.

#### Weigh our specific evidence to get closer to the truth

Kratochwil 2008 (Friedrich Kratochwil, professor of international relations at European University Institute, 2008(Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

In what follows, I claim that the shift in focus from “demonstration” to science as practice provides strong prima facie reasons to choose pragmatic rather than traditional epistemological criteria in social analysis.

Irrespective of its various forms, the epistemological project includes an argument that all warranted knowledge has to satisfy certain field- independent criteria that are specified by philosophy (a “theory of know- ledge”). The real issue of how our concepts and the world relate to each other, and on which non-idiosyncratic grounds we are justified to hold on to our beliefs about the world, is “answered” by two metaphors. The first is that of an inconvertible ground, be it the nature of things, certain intuitions (Des- cartes’ “clear and distinct ideas”) or methods and inferences; the second is that of a “mirror” that shows what is the case.¶ There is no need to rehearse the arguments demonstrating that these under- lying beliefs and metaphors could not sustain the weight placed upon them. A “method” à la Descartes could not make good on its claims, as it depended ultimately on the guarantee of God that concepts and things in the outer world match. On the other hand, the empiricist belief in direct observation forgot that “facts” which become “data” are – as the term suggests – “made”. They are based on the judgements of the observer using cultural criteria, even if they appear to be based on direct perception, as is the case with colours.4¶ Besides, there had always been a sneaking suspicion that the epistemological ideal of certainty and rigour did not quite fit the social world, an objection voiced first by humanists such as Vico, and later rehearsed in the continuing controversies about erklären and verstehen (Weber 1991; for a more recent treatment see Hollis 1994). In short, both the constitutive nature of our concepts, and the value interest in which they are embedded, raise peculiar issues of meaning and contestation that are quite different from those of description. As Vico (1947) suggested, we “understand” the social world because we have “made it”, a point raised again by Searle concerning both the crucial role played by ascriptions of meaning (x counts for y) in the social world and the distinction between institutional “facts” from “brute” or natural facts (Searle 1995). Similarly, since values are constitutive for our “interests”, the concepts we use always portray an action from a certain point of view; this involves appraisals and prevents us from accepting allegedly “neutral” descriptions that would be meaningless. Thus, when we say that someone “abandoned” another person and hence communicate a (contestable) appraisal, we want to call attention to certain important moral implica- tions of an act. Attempting to eliminate the value-tinge in the description and insisting that everything has to be cast in neutral, “objective”, observational language – such as “he opened the door and went through it” – would indeed make the statement “pointless”, even if it is (trivially) “true” (for a powerful statement of this point, see Connolly 1983).¶ The most devastating attack on the epistemological project, however, came from the history of science itself. It not only corrected the naive view of knowledge generation as mere accumulation of data, but it also cast increasing doubt on the viability of various field-independent “demarcation criteria”. This was, for the most part, derived from the old Humean argument that only sentences with empirical content were “meaningful”, while value statements had to be taken either as statements about individual preferences or as meaningless, since de gustibus non est disputandum. As the later dis- cussion in the Vienna circle showed, this distinction was utterly unhelpful (Popper 1965: ch. 2). It did not solve the problem of induction, and failed to acknowledge that not all meaningful theoretical sentences must correspond with natural facts.¶ Karl Popper’s ingenious solution of making “refutability” the logical cri- terion and interpreting empirical “tests” as a special mode of deduction (rather than as a way of increasing supporting evidence) seemed to respond to this epistemological quandary for a while. An “historical reconstruction” of science as a progressive development thus seemed possible, as did the specification of a pragmatic criterion for conducting research.¶ Yet again, studies in the history of science undermined both hopes. The different stages in Popper’s own intellectual development are, in fact, rather telling. He started out with a version of conjectures and refutations that was based on the notion of a more or less self-correcting demonstration. Con- fronted with the findings that scientists did not use the refutation criterion in their research, he emphasised then the role of the scientific community on which the task of “refutation” devolved. Since the individual scientist might not be ready to bite the bullet and admit that she or he might have been wrong, colleagues had to keep him or her honest. Finally, towards the end of his life, Popper began to rely less and less on the stock of knowledge or on the scientists’ shared theoretical understandings – simply devalued as the “myth of the framework” – and emphasised instead the processes of communica- tion and of “translation” among different schools of thought within a scien- tific community (Popper 1994). He still argued that these processes follow the pattern of “conjecture and refutation”, but the model was clearly no longer that of logic or of scientific demonstration, but one that he derived from his social theory – from his advocacy of an “open society” (Popper 1966). Thus a near total reversal of the ideal of knowledge had occurred. While formerly everything was measured in terms of the epistemological ideal derived from logic and physics, “knowledge” was now the result of deliberation and of certain procedural notions for assessing competing knowledge claims. Politics and law, rather than physics, now provided the template.¶ Thus the history of science has gradually moved away from the epistemo- logical ideal to focus increasingly on the actual practices of various scientific communities engaged in knowledge production, particularly on how they handle problems of scientific disagreement.5 This reorientation implied a move away from field-independent criteria and from the demonstrative ideal to one in which “arguments” and the “weight” of evidence had to be appraised. This, in turn, not only generated a bourgeoning field of “science studies” and their “social” epistemologies (see Fuller 1991), but also suggested more generally that the traditional understandings of knowledge production based on the model of “theory” were in need of revision.¶ If the history of science therefore provides strong reasons for a pragmatic turn, as the discussion above illustrates, what remains to be shown is how this turn relates to the historical, linguistic and constructivist turns that preceded it. To start with, from the above it should be clear that, in the social world, we are not dealing with natural kinds that exist and are awaiting, so to speak, prepackaged, their placement in the appropriate box. The objects we investi- gate are rather conceptual creations and they are intrinsically linked to the language through which the social world is constituted. Here “constructivists”, particularly those influenced by Wittgenstein and language philosophy, easily link up with “pragmatists” such as Rorty, who emphasises the product- ive and pragmatic role of “vocabularies” rather than conceiving of language as a “mirror of nature” (Rorty 1979).¶ Furthermore, precisely because social facts are not natural, but have to be reproduced through the actions of agents, any attempt to treat them like “brute” facts becomes doubly problematic. For one, even “natural” facts are not simply “there”; they are interpretations based on our theories. Secondly, different from the observation of natural facts, in which perceptions address a “thing” through a conceptually mediated form, social reality is entirely “arti- ficial” in the sense that it is dependent on the beliefs and practices of the actors themselves. This reproductive process, directed by norms, always engenders change either interstitially, when change is small-scale or adaptive – or more dramatically, when it becomes “transformative” – for instance when it produces a new system configuration, as after the advent of national- ism (Lapid and Kratochwil 1995) or after the demise of the Soviet Union (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994). Consequently, any examination of the social world has to become in a way “historical” even if some “structuralist” theories attempt to minimise this dimension. [. . .]¶ Therefore a pragmatic approach to social science and IR seems both necessary and promising. ¶ On the one hand, it is substantiated by the failure of the epistemological project that has long dominated the field. On the other, it offers a different positive heuristics that challenges IR’s traditional disciplin- ary boundaries and methodological assumptions. Interest in pragmatism therefore does not seem to be just a passing fad – even if such an interpre- tation cannot entirely be discounted, given the incentives of academia to find, just like advertising agencies, “new and improved” versions of familiar products.

#### Epistemology doesn’t indict observations of material reality

Wendt 2000 (Alexander Wendt, Professor of International Security and PolSci, Ohio State, 2000 On the Via Media, Review of International Studies 26)

In the book I argue that, compared to ontology-talk, the value of epistemology talk for a discipline like IR is considerably less than something as imposing as the third ‘Great Debate’ might suggest. What matters more is what there is, not how we can know it, since we clearly do know things, and the ‘how’ of this knowledge will necessarily vary with the many different kinds of questions we ask in our field, and the varied tools at our disposal for answering them.

#### Indicts of our epistemology/knowledge production don’t come before or disprove the case

**Jackson 2010** (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, DC, 2010, “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics,” ebook)

Faced with the impossibility of putting an end to the science question within IR by turning to the philosophy of science, what should we do? Since we cannot resolve the question of what science is by appealing to a consensus in philosophy, one option is to become philosophers of science ourselves, and to spend our time and our scholarly efforts trying to resolve thorny and abstract issues about the status of theory and evidence and the limits of epistemic certainty**.** But this is an unappealing option for a scholarly field defined, if loosely, by its empirical focus (world politics), and it would be roughly akin to advising physicists to become philosophers of physics in order to resolve the question of what physics was and whether it was a science. This also mis-states the relationship between philosophical debates and scientific practice; practicing scientists have a pretty good working definition of what it means for something to be “scientific,” but this “is less a matter of strategy than of ongoing evaluative practice,” conducted in the course of everyday knowledge-producing activities (Taylor 1996, 133). We do not expect physicists to give philosophical answers to questions about the scientific status of their scholarship; we expect them to produce knowledge of the physical world. Similarly, we should not expect IR scholars to engage in “philosophy of IR” to the detriment of generating knowledge about world politics; the latter, not the former, is our main vocational task**.**

### A2 Discourse Matters

#### Language focus creates a prison house- prevents solutions to problems

McNally**,** 1997 (David McNally, professor of political science at York University, “in defense of history” p. 26-7)

We are witnessing today a new idealism, infecting large sections of the intellectual left, which has turned language not merely into an independent realm, but into an all pervasive realm, a sphere so omnipresent, so dominant, as virtually to extinguish human agency. Everything is discourse, you see and discourse is everything. Because human beings are linguistic creatures, because the world in which we act is a world we know and describe through language, it allegedly follows that there is nothing outsides language. Our language, or “discourse”, or “text” – the jargon varies but not the message – define and limits what we know, what we can imagine, what we can do. There is a political theory here too. Oppression is said to be rooted ultimately in the way in the way in which we are and others are defined linguistically, the way in which we are positioned by words in relation to other words, or by codes which are said to be “structured like a language.” Our very being, our identities and “subjectivites,” are constituted through language. As one trendy literary theorist puts it in David Lodge’s novel Nice Work, it is not merely that you are what you speak; no, according to the new idealism, “you are what speaks of you,” Language is thus the final “prison-house”. Our confinement there is beyond resistance: It is impossible to escape from that which makes us what we are. This new idealism corresponds to a profound collapse of political horizons. It is the pseudoradicalism of a period of retreat for the left, a verbal radicalism of the world without deed, or, rather, of the word as deed. In response to actual structures and practices of oppression and exploitation, it offers the rhetorical gesture, the ironic turn of phrase. It comes as little surprise, then, when on of the chief philosophers of the new idealism, Jacques Derrida, tells us that he “would hesitate to use such terms as ‘liberation’” Imprisoned within language, we may play with words; but we can never hope to liberate ourselves from immutable structures of oppression rooted in language itself. The new idealism and the politics it entails are not simply harmless curiosities; they are an abdication of political responsibility, especially at a time of ferocious capitalist restructuring, of widening gaps between rich and poor, of ruling class offensives against social programs. They are also an obstacle to the rebuilding of mass movements of protest and resistance.

#### Discourse doesn’t cause war

Reiter 95 DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR

A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of the third, **most skeptical view of preemptive war**, because even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent (by including only wars), they are still rare events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption.¶ The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out. Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, casts doubt on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that hostile images of the enemy increase the chances of preemption, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that such fears may not be sufficient to cause war. In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are present to a very high degree. This implies that these are insubstantial causal forces, as they are associated with theoutbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war. To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.

#### Overemphasis on method destroys their scholarship

Wendt 2002 Wendt, Handbook of IR, 2002 p. 68

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

#### Our reps reflect material reality

Mearsheimer 1995 John Mearsheimer (International Relations professor at the University of Chicago) 1995 The False Promise of International Institutions in International Security Vol 19 Number 3 Winter, pp 43-44.

The main goal of critical theorists is to change state behavior in fundamental ways, to move beyond a world of security competition and war and establish a pluralistic security community. However, their explanation of how change occurs is at best incomplete, and at worst, internally contradictory.155 Critical theory maintains that state behavior changes when discourse changes. But that argument leaves open the obvious and crucially important question: what determines why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas? What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of discourses? This general question, in turn, leads to three more specific questions: 1) Why has realism been the hegemonic discourse in world politics for so long? 2) Why is the time ripe for its unseating? 3) Why is realism likely to be replaced by a more peaceful communitarian discourse? Critical theory provides few insights on why discourses rise and fall. Thomas Risse- Kappen writes, "Research on. . . 'epistemic communities' of knowledge-based transna- tional networks has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific ideas are selfected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside." 156 Not surprisingly, critical theorists say little about why realism has been the dominant discourse, and why its foundations are now so shaky. They certainly do not offer a well-defined argument that deals with this important issue. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the fate of realism through the lens of critical theory. Nevertheless, critical theorists occasionally point to particular factors that might lead to changes in international relations discourse. In such cases, however, they usually end up arguing that changes in the material world drive changes in discourse. For example, when Ashley makes surmises about the future of realism, he claims that "a crucial issue is whether or not changing historical conditions have disabled longstanding realist rituals of power." Specifically, he asks whether "developments in late capitalist society;" like the "fiscal crisis of the state," and the "internationalization of capital," coupled with "the presence of vastly destructive and highly automated nuclear arsenals [has] de- prived statesmen of the latitude for competent performance of realist rituals of power?" 157 Similarly, Cox argues that fundamental change occurs when there is a "disjuncture" between "the stock of ideas people have about the nature of the world and the practical problems that challenge them." He then writes, "Some of us think the erstwhile dominant mental construct of neorealism is inadequate to confront the chal- lenges of global politics today."158 It would be understandable if realists made such arguments, since they believe there is an objective reality that largely determines which discourse will be dominant. Critical theorists, however, emphasize that the world is socially constructed, and not shaped in fundamental ways by objective factors. Anarchy, after all, is what we make of it. Yet when critical theorists attempt to explain why realism may be losing its hegemonic position, they too point to objective factors as the ultimate cause of change. Discourse, so it appears, turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection of developments in the objective world. In short, it seems that when critical theorists who study inter- national politics offer glimpses of their thinking about the causes of change in the real world, they make arguments that directly contradict their own theory, but which appear to be compatible with the theory they are challenging.159 There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future. Critical theory, according to its own logic, can be used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations may be an element in stimulating people to act ... such expectations are almost never realized in practice."

### Extinction outweighs

#### Extinction outweighs

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

#### Extinction is the only egalitarian metric---anything else collapses cooperation on collective action crises and makes extinction inevitable

Khan 18 (Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/)

Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves. Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

#### Existence is a prerequisite to ontological questioning

Wapner 2003 Paul Wapner (associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University) Winter 2003 “Leftist criticism of” http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

#### Existential threats outweigh – all life has infinite value and extinction eliminates the possibility for future generations – err against threats, because of innate cognitive biases

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>) 1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy [hu]mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

### Realism Good

**Realism is inevitable – Uncertainty and enmity between states is fixed – Justifies our epistemology and takes out the alternative.**

**de Araujo 14** (Marcelo,professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-43)

Some **moral enhancement theorists argue** that **a society of morally enhanced individuals** **would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in** the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by **climate change**, grand scale **terrorist attacks**, or the risk of **catastrophic wars.** **The assumption here is** quite simple: **our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation**. **If human beings were morally better** – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – **there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment.** Although simple and attractive, **this assumption is**, as I intend to show, **false**. **At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions**, **but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis.** The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. **Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating**, for instance, **to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily,** or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some **studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people**,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, **may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytoci**n in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. **The assumption that there is a relationship between,** on the one hand, **threats to the survival of humankind and**, on the other, **a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is c**learly **made by** some **moral enhancements theorists**. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, **both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities.** The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). **Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction”** (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The **attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed**, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, **Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts** (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But **the question**, of course, is **whether moral enhancement will** also **improve the prospect of our coping successfully** **with** some major threats to the **survival of humankind**, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or **to reduce evil in the world**, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the **states are the** main, if not the **only, relevant actors** in the context of international relations; **and** second, that states **compete for power** in the international arena. **Moral considerations** in international affairs, according to realists, **are secondary** **when set against the state’s primary goal**, **namely its own security and survival**. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, **it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs.** And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is **its “anarchical structure,”** i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. **It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival**. **In the absence of a superior authority**, over and above the power of each sovereign state, **political leaders** often **feel compelled to favor security over morality**, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, **even if** **human beings turn out to become morally enhanced** in the future, **humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios** described by some moral enhancement theorists. **This is likely to happen if, indeed**, **human beings remain compelled to cooperate** within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But **under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response** – and that **in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary.** Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). **What has to be changed**, therefore, **is not human moral dispositions**, **but the very structure of the political international system of states** within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While **moral enhancement** may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it **will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons**. **Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability**, **at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future.** The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And **in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create**, **political leaders will** often **fail to cooperate,** **and** occasionally **engage in** conflicts and **wars**, **in those areas that are critical to their** security and **survival**. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, **this is likely to continue to happen**, **even if,** in the future, political **leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking** through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, **addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering** **is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states**.

#### Even if realism’s foundations are problematic, it’s theoretically useful for understanding IR – rejecting it outright is ahistorical and causes worse violence by greenlighting ethically untenable positions like the alt

**Abraham 17** [Kavi Joseph, Johns Hopkins University. “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” https://academic.oup.com/ips/article-abstract/11/3/221/3798787]

This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that **those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to deem realism, in all its complex and contradictory manifestations, as a failed, unethical, and fundamentally racist/imperial project**. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. **A third response**, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, **is to work on an epistemic register, selectively taking insights from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world**. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this **failing does not delegitimize other realist insights**. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better.

The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with building a counter-imperial machine is to neither dismiss constituencies that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to tactically align with them; rather, establishing resonant connections among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, highlighting shared dispositions to difference, is to push the latter toward repositioning itself on new ethical lines that limit contemporary forms of violence. To recover a minor position in realism is not to accept all realist positions, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is, however, to amplify the shared spirituality that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward prudential rather than imperial defenses of difference. It is to furnish current research agendas with an anti-imperial focus, to seek the creative possibilities that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements.

Thinking from the Present

By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the politics that motivates a theoretical project of linking realist and postcolonial thinking. If the ends of this project were to simply gather critiques of liberalism and its relationship to imperial practices, then certainly a return to classical realist thought adds little epistemic value over and above postcolonial approaches. However, the ends of this argument are to outline and energize a counter-imperial machine, to cultivate a shared spirituality that can gather diverse and divergent constituencies to confront dangerous practices. In my estimation, countering an imperial machine that operates in complex ways and at complex sites requires a political strategy as unwieldy and diffuse, linking constituencies that we may otherwise dismiss. **That a tradition of realism regularly circulates through halls of power across the globe should be reason not to reject righteously but rather to leverage its authorized status. We can talk about imperialism, knowledge production, and race here, while they can talk about anarchy, power, and self-interest there—or we can theoretically work on the lines of thought that reverberate among us**. To reiterate, building a countermachine is not driven to “pragmatic” reconciliation or consensus and, thus, remains distinct from the “eclecticism” of other plural approaches popular in IR today. While the combinatory logic of paradigmatic synthesis has its place, the connections between realist and postcolonial thought articulated here are made in a far more agonistic manner. Rather than produce something like a “postcolonial-realism,” **this** argument **involves pushing contemporary realist scholarship toward new research agendas and new forms of critique** that both capture a spirit internal to its own traditions while confronting the realities of contemporary global politics. It engages with minor positions along the realist canon to orient today’s realism away from the logic of great power politics operating under anarchy toward an understanding of how the logic of liberal order permits forms of imperial intervention.

Needless to say, **drawing together realist and postcolonial thought**, as this essay has done, **can be met with analytical skepticism and political hostility. A mode of argumentation that refuses comparisons of theoretical cores or non-truncated readings of select theorists strikes a note of analytical evasion**. To this there is no defense—other than that already discussed at length. On the other hand, if the expressly political purpose of this work is accepted, the argument anticipates strong political reservations: why align the project of postcolonial theory with realism, an unethical tradition of militarism and realpolitik? To this I would respond that while a kind of strategic essentialism has its place, **reducing “realists” to a coherent body of thought not only obscures the complexity of their thinking** (see never-ending interpretations of Machiavelli as an example) **but reproduces the narrative of transhistorical unity that some realists use to authorize unethical policy programs in the first place**. More critically, however, **in embodying an unproductive ahistoricism, it poses conventional realist categories of anarchy, selfinterest, and military power as the political problem to confront whereas the present historical context demands attunement to how some of these drives** (militarism, national interest) **connect with discrete problems of liberalism and imperial practices**. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the dominance of (neo)realism in IR is overstated (Walker and Morton 2005; Maliniak et al. 2011) and that the ascension of liberal IR theory is sociologically tied up with the present hegemony of a US liberal world order (Sterling-Folker 2015). In other words, while realism may have been a productive foil in Cold War bipolarity, we must theorize from the present. In doing so, we may find that **countering imperial formations may benefit from resonances established not just among postcolonial, feminist, poststructural, and other “critical” theorists but contemporary realists who identify links between liberalism and imperialism** (Walt 2013). Indeed, **if realism as a policy program defending the national interest is entangled with current militaristic and imperial interventions, we should push the premise of this statement, that difference should be defended, in anti-imperial and prudential directions**. Doing so may allow new openings to emerge in the present sense of closure, new strategies to think and defend alternative politics. In this way, we may more fully embody postcoloniality by not being satisfied with either narrow critique or brash conversion but rather attentive translation.

### No impact

#### Threat con doesn’t cause war

Kaufman 9, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, ‘9, (Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

#### There’s no impact to the K – reps don’t shape reality

Balzacq 5 (Thierry, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Namur University, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context” European Journal of International Relations, London: Jun 2005, Volume 11, Issue 2)

However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that **one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional' and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a** more **radical approach to security problems where**in **threats are** institutional, that is, **mere products of communicative relations** between agents, the **CS has neglected the importance of 'external** or brute threats', that is, **threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are**- **hazards for human life. In methodological terms**, however, **any framework over-emphasizing** either **institutional** or brute **threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon**. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, **how problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them.** This **is not always true**. For one, **language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it**. Moreover, **it is not theoretically useful nor** is it **empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence**. For instance, **what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence**. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that **some security problems are the attribute of the development itself**. In short, **threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language**. **Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization.** Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, **external developments are central to it.**

#### No threat inflation

Ravenal09 – (2009, Earl, Professor Emeritus at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy,” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1, 21-75)

Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia‐class submarines … aircraft carriers … F‐22 fighters … [and] Osprey tilt‐rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no strategic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold‐plated white elephants.” The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies … looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military‐industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military‐industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section: In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies … routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182) Thus, “bureaucratic‐politics” theory, which once made several reputations (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense‐intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub‐industry within the field of international relations, 5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,” 6 which can be considered the right‐wing analog of the “bureaucratic‐politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision‐making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes: Public‐choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop separate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly. There is, in this statement of public‐choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public‐ignorance and elite‐expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post‐government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self‐dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract‐dispensing and more under‐the‐radar‐screen agencies of government, the “public‐choice” imputation of self‐dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self‐promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense. Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic‐politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent‐seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub‐rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives. My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic‐politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role‐playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic‐politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points—empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role. Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national‐security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub‐rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more parochial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state‐level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self‐seeking impulses of the individual. Role‐derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer‐reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and transmitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged. My own direct observation suggests that defense decision‐makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non‐rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision‐making. In that structure, obvious, and even not‐so‐obvious, “rent‐seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent‐seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self‐placement in these reaches of government testifies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### Securitization Good / Alt fails

#### Rejection of securitization leads to instability and international intervention – turns their impact

McCormack 10 – Lecturer in International Politics, Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states**,** we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Rejection of security flips their K AND alt fails

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#### Even if security is a construction, the alt cannot create change in actors that have already internalized it

Wendt 92 (Alexander, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Chicago, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics, International Organization, VOl. 46, no. 2.)

Let us assume that processes of identity- and interest-formation have created a world in which states do not recognize rights to territory or existence—a war of all against all. In this world, anarchy has a “realist” meaning for state action: be insecure and concerned with relative power. Anarchy has this meaning only in virtue of collective, insecurity-producing practices, but if those practices are relatively stable, they do constitute a system that may resist change. The fact that worlds of power politics are socially constructed, in other words, does not guarantee they are malleable, for at least two reasons. The first reason is that once constituted, any social system confronts each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviors and discourages others. Self-help systems, for example, tend to reward competition and punish altruism. The possibility of change depends on whether the exigencies of such competition leave room for actions that deviate from the prescribed script. If they do not, the system will be reproduced and **deviant actors will** **not**.” The second reason is that systemic change may also be inhibited by actors’ interests in maintaining., relatively stable role identities. Such interests are rooted not only in the desire to minimize uncertainty and anxiety, manifested in efforts to confirm existing-beliefs about the social world, but also in the desire to avoid the expected costs of breaking commitments made to others—notably domestic constituencies and foreign allies in the case of states—as part of past practices. The level of resistance that these commitments induce will depend on the “salience” of particular role identities to the actor. The United States, for example, is more likely to resist threats to its identity as “leader of anticommunist crusades” than to its identity as “promoter of human rights.” But for almost any role identity, practices and information that challenge it are likely to create cognitive dissonance and even perceptions of threat, and these may cause resistance to transformations of the self and thus to social change.” For both systemic and “psychological” reasons, then, intersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend. This does not change the fact that through practice agents are continuously producing and reproducing identities and interests, continuously “choosing now the preferences [they] will have later.” But it does mean that choices may not be experienced with meaningful degrees of freedom. This could be a constructivist justification for the realist position that only simple learning is possible in self-help systems. The realist might concede that such systems are socially constructed and still argue that after the corresponding identities and in have become institutionalized, they are almost impossible to transform.

#### Threats are real – we must securitize them to prevent war

**Knudsen 1**– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they refer to 'real' phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.

#### Our impact is epistemologically sound – it’s based on readings of history and statistically strong modelling – empirics are the best way to make predictions – the alt causes extinction

Scott D. Sagan 95. Assistant professor of political science at Stanford University. 1995. “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate.” p.115-116.

There are two basic kinds of errors that one can make in assessing nations other than one's own. The first error is rooted in ethnocentrism. This is a common mistake Americans make when looking at others: we too often assume that other nations are less competent, less intelligent, and less rational than the United States. Kenneth Waltz has performed an important service in this regard: his analysis of nuclear proliferation is a valuable corrective against such ethnocentrism and the blind spots it can create among both scholars and government officials. He is absolutely correct, in my view, to criticize a number of proliferation pessimists who argue, in effect, that the United States has been perfect in handling nuclear weapons (but others will not be), that the United States can control these awesome weapons forever (but no one else can), or that the United States has utterly unproblematic civil-military relations (but no one else does). Waltz's analysis should serve as a constant reminder of how dangerous it is in international affairs to assume, to put it crudely, that the United States is smart, but that other nuclear states are or will be stupid. The second basic error, however, is the opposite: to assume that others are better than we are. This is, I believe, the central problem with Kenneth Waltz's arguments about the consequences of proliferation. He now appears to accept many of the arguments made by scholars who have studied the operational accidents and near-accidents, conflicts in civil-military relations, and other organizational problems experienced by the United States during the Cold War. Yet he maintains that other states will do better, will be smarter, will learn more quickly, will, in short, avoid the kinds of errors that we have suffered in the past. I believe, in contrast, that there are both strong theoretical reasons and emerging empirical evidence to expect that new states will not avoid such problems. New nuclear powers may not make exactly the same mistakes as their predecessors; but they are likely to make their own serious errors, and some will be deadly.